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Time was a significant factor in shaping disruptive defense innovation 
solutions in World War II and the early Cold War.  During this period, significant 
advances were made in military aircraft, missiles, submarines, electronics, and other 
technologies that were achieved through a time-based development approach of rapid 
experimentation and operational prototyping.  Since the 1960s, however, the time 
taken to develop and deploy U.S. military systems has significantly increased.  This 
increase corresponded to a shift in emphasis within the public management regimes 
established to govern defense innovation to one of predominately controlling cost.   
 
A systems analysis approach to defense management gained prominence 
during the Kennedy Administration and emphasized cost analysis, program 
budgeting, and centralized planning and control from within the Office of the 
  
Secretary of Defense as a means to obtain greater efficiency in defense spending.  
This framework was implemented through a series of linear processes overseen by 
compartmented management regimes such as the requirements, budget, acquisition, 
and contracting functions in a structure institutionalized in law and regulation. These 
linear processes evolved in a way that increased the minimum time to conduct 
defense innovation that far exceeded previous developmental timelines.   
 
Compounding the problem of linearity, government-unique processes and 
requirements within defense management regimes have created barriers to the civil-
military integration of the industrial base. This has furthered the establishment of a 
narrow, specialized defense industrial base by excluding from the defense market 
those commercial companies that innovate quickly within time-based constraints.   
 
While periodic end-rounds to management regimes were created when the 
Department needed to rapidly innovate in an emergency or to access innovation from 
the larger commercial market, these efforts have been at the margins of expenditures 
and were eventually constrained by the traditional management regimes.  A broader 
ability to reduce innovation times or expand the defense industrial base will require 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Sed fugit interea, fugit inreparabile tempus  
“But time is lost, which never will renew” Virgil 
 
The relationship between time, defense innovation, and the institutions 
responsible for such innovation is a misunderstood and unappreciated aspect of 
national security policy.  For an individual, time is a non-renewable resource.  There 
is only so much time in a day, week, month, year, or a life to complete the tasks we 
individually deem important.  For an institution like the Pentagon or a corporation, 
there is no certainty of finality.  If and when such an end may arrive, whether through 
reorganization, merger, defeat, or collapse, the life of an institution often exceeds that 
of any one individual.  The institution is larger and seemingly more permanent than 
the sum of the individuals that support it with a portion of their life’s energy.  This 
has benefits as well as costs, as the importance of time or the urgency of a mission 
can sometimes be set aside to address other values that may arise, particularly if there 
is no near-term compelling existential threat to the institution that forces it to take 
other action.   Management regimes within institutions are formed to implement and 
optimize processes to correspond to these values.  Process may ultimately undermine 
time. 
Time intersects with the institutions that are responsible for defense 
innovation in much the same way.  The primary purpose of national defense 
institutions is to prepare for threats by training and equipping armed forces, which 





periods when other competing factors and values deemed more important by 
Congress or an Administration come to prominence.  In intervals when an existential 
threat is lacking, it is easier for these other matters to fill the vacuum of time and 
weaken the ability to respond once time becomes important again.  This does not 
happen overnight and occurs through slow incremental changes in the way things are 
done.  The discounting of the importance of time in these endeavors can slowly limit 
options. Decades of neglect make it even more difficult to respond differently or 
effectively.    
This may be one of those periods.  The future course of U.S. defense 
innovation appears to be at an inflection point.  Concerns about an emerging great 
power competition is setting the stage to overturn what has been in essence a hiatus in 
large-scale defense innovation of over three decades.  The end of the Cold War 
encouraged the U.S. and its allies to achieve a “peace dividend” through the taking of 
a “procurement holiday” that corresponded with a drawdown of forces in Europe.  
These last three decades could also be described as one in which the U.S. was able to 
take an innovation holiday, as there was little demand for new disruptive defense 
innovation. 
    As U.S. defense policy shifts its attention to China and, to a lesser extent Iran, 
North Korea, and a revanchist Russia, the ability to innovate and deliver new defense 
capabilities to U.S. forces similar to historical “Great Power” conflict periods such as 
World War II and the Cold War will become more important in discussions about 
maintaining future global security and stability.   As in these past conflicts and other 





more importantly – the time to develop such innovative capabilities, will be critical 
factors in enabling national security success.   In a global competition focused on 
deterrence and perceptions of technological superiority, time will be increasingly of 
the essence.  
 
The Nature of the U.S. Defense Innovation Problem: Setting the Geopolitical and 
Technology Development Stage 
 
The urgency to reconsider a nation’s approach to innovation (both in its 
underlying economy and to support national defense priorities) typically comes in 
response to a threat, generally based on an assessment of changes in the global 
military and technological balance of power.  These changes derive from the current 
innovation system not providing for technological or economic advantage and 
causing a country to lag behind other nations.  From a national security perspective, 
how well a country develops and adapts scientific knowledge and technology into 
military capabilities is a component of deterrence, and, should deterrence fail, a 
significant basis for success or failure on the battlefield. 
Recent trends appear to be moving in the wrong direction for the United 
States.  As China continues to rise economically, there have been no shortage of 
concerns raised about U.S. economic decline and the competitiveness of the 
American economy, especially vis a vis China.1  Closely linked to this belief has been 
a perception of U.S. military technological decline.  The Department of Defense’s 
 
1 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, 





(DOD) concerns about the potential loss of technological superiority led to calls for a 
new “Third Offset Strategy” and the establishment of the Defense Innovation 
Initiative in 2014.2   The offset strategy concept referred to two previous periods of 
intense U.S. defense technological innovation.  The first occurred in the 1950s and 
saw the development of new long-range missile and space reconnaissance 
technologies.   The second, in the 1970s, initiated advancements in stealth, precision 
guidance, and geolocation. A Third Offset was advocated that would take advantage 
of emerging, primarily commercially developed, technologies to counter China and 
Russia.  
Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the announcement of this 
strategy addressed trends in U.S. military technological superiority:  
 
“That superiority has never been guaranteed, and today it is being increasingly 
challenged. Technologies and weapons that were once the exclusive province 
of advanced nations have become available to a broad range of militaries and 
non-state actors, from dangerously provocative North Korea to terrorist 
organizations like Al Qaeda and Hezbollah – all clear threats to the United 
States and its allies. 
 
And while we spent over a decade focused on grinding stability operations, 
countries like Russia and China have been heavily investing in military 
modernization programs to blunt our military’s technological edge, fielding 
advanced aircraft, submarines, and both longer range and more accurate 
missiles. They’re also developing new anti-ship and air-to-air missiles, 




2 "Defense Innovation Days" Opening Keynote (Southeastern New England Defense Industry 
Alliance), September 3, 2014, as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 
Newport, Rhode Island.   
3 Reagan National Defense Forum Keynote, November 15, 2014. as Delivered by Secretary of Defense 





The Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
for Fiscal Year 2016 summed up the challenge of how the Senate and Secretary 
Hagel’s immediate successors were viewing the problem. 
 
“Still, the committee's primary concern with the acquisition system is that 
reform is now needed for national security reasons to maintain technological 
and military dominance. An inadequate acquisition system is leading to the 
erosion of America's defense technological advantage, which the United 
States will lose altogether if the Department continues with business as usual. 
The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
stated recently: “We've been complacent. Our technological superiority is 
very much at risk, there are people designing systems [specifically] to defeat 
us in a very thoughtful and strategic way, and we've got to wake up, frankly.'' 
 
Global R&D is now more than twice that of the United States. Chinese R&D 
levels are projected to surpass the United States in 2022. Even when the 
Department is innovating, it is moving too slowly. Innovation is measured in 
18-month cycles in the commercial market while the Department acquisition 
cycles are measured in decades. At a recent speech at Stanford University, 
Secretary Carter stated: ``The same Internet that enables Wikipedia also 
allows terrorists to learn how to build a bomb. And the same technologies we 
use to target cruise missiles and jam enemy air defenses can be used against 
our own forces--and they're now available to the highest bidder. Whether it's 
the cloud, infrared cameras, or the GPS signals that provide navigation for 
ride-sharing apps, but also for aircraft carriers and our smart bombs--our 
reliance on technology has led to real vulnerabilities that our adversaries are 
eager to exploit.''4 
 
Ultimately, to address these concerns a new National Security Strategy was 
signed by the President in 20175 and a new National Defense Strategy (NDS) was 
produced in 2018 by then Secretary of Defense James Mattis.  The NDS proclaimed: 
“Today, we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our 
 
4 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2016: Report (to Accompany S. 1376), 114th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rpt.114-49, p. 164. 
5 United States, President (2017-2020: Trump). The National Security Strategy of the United States of 






competitive military advantage has been eroding.” 6   This document was significantly 
different from other strategies published since the end of the Cold War, in that it 
specifically recognized a distinct threat and outlined new challenges facing the United 
States in an emerging era of great-power competition.  The 2018 National Defense 
Strategy Commission report mandated by Congress to review the NDS warned that 
“America’s military superiority -- the hard-power backbone of its global influence 
and national security-- has eroded to a dangerous degree…It might struggle to win, or 
perhaps lose, a war against China or Russia.”7  In a September 2020 bipartisan report, 
the House Armed Services Committee continued to reinforce the fact that the gap in 
military capabilities between the U.S. and the rest of the world was narrowing:  
 
“The gravity and complexity of threats emerging to challenge the United 
States is proliferating as technological advancements in artificial intelligence, 
quantum information science, and biotechnology transform society and 
weaponry at an exponential rate. This is occurring as adversarial capability is 
increasing to the point where the United States may soon lose the competitive 
military advantage it has enjoyed for decades.”8 
 
The rise of these new threats has generated the need to create new military 
capabilities to address them.  Unease about the quality of U.S. defense innovation has 
been growing for decades, but has become compelling as more evidence confirms the 
beginnings of a Chinese advantage.  This shift in the technological balance of power 
 
6 United States, Department of Defense. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the 
United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge. Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, 2018. p.1. 
7 United States, National Defense Strategy Commission, and United States Institute of 
Peace. Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National 
Defense Strategy Commission. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2018. p. iii-vi. 
8 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Future of Defense 





is being demonstrated by the U.S. losing to China in numerous Pentagon war games.9  
While this shift has corresponded with China’s growing economy, it has also been 
enhanced by trends in the commercialization, proliferation, and globalization of 
technology that have allowed the world to catch up to an unmatched U.S. military 
technology dominance at the end of the Cold War.  These trends portend the 
beginnings of a shift in the perception of the global balance of power and could have 
serious ramifications for future deterrence strategies.   
China is now a profoundly different potential adversary than the old Soviet 
Union was, and will likely require a different innovation approach than what was 
successful in the Cold War against a bureaucratic, statist, and non-market economy 
that was much smaller than the U.S. As Christian Brose observed:  
 
“The Soviet Union was powerful, but it was never America’s peer. China is 
becoming America’s peer, and it could become more than that. It is integrated 
into the global economy and developing its own domestic sources of 
technological development, not just copycat industries but increasingly 
innovative and world - leading companies.  Made in China 2025, issued in 
2015, seeks to establish China as a world leader by 2025 in ten high - 
technology industries, including robotics, aerospace manufacturing, 
biotechnology, and advanced communications and information technologies, 
such as 5G networks.” 10 
 
A lesson relearned in the Cold War is that the overarching economy and the 
defense portion of that economy are closely linked and vitally important to national 
security.  Ultimately, the U.S.-Soviet competition pivoted on which system could 
support a higher level of defense spending that could be directed to primarily 
 
9  See “The Kill Chain” by Christian Brose which described that China has won every war game the 
U.S. has conducted in the last decade.  Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending American in the 
Future of High-Tech Warfare, (New York, Hachette Books, 2020), p. xi-xii. 





government-sponsored and directed innovation. The Cold War arms race ended with 
a near Soviet economic collapse.  The smaller and less efficient Soviet economy was 
broken trying to compete with a U.S. arms buildup in the 1980s that was underpinned 
by a larger, more market-driven economy that could withstand the shift of economic 
resources to defense.11  This does not seem likely to happen anytime soon with China.  
In fact, at some point in the economic competition the U.S. may face the opposite 
truth and have difficulties budgeting and competing militarily with the types of 
capabilities an eventually larger Chinese economy could support.  
China’s military policy during its rise appears to have been shaped by the 
Soviet experience.   Policies were designed to first nurture economic might.   State-
sponsored capitalism has focused on taking advantage of market incentives while 
relying on cheaper asymmetric defense technology disruption in the near term.  Once 
economic parity with the U.S. had been achieved, a transition could be made (as what 
may be now happening) to increase more traditional defense outputs.  It appears that 
Deng Xiaoping’s strategy to “hide your strength, bide your time” may be coming to 
an end.12  
The economic advantages the U.S. had vis a vis the Soviet Union are not 
comparable nor relevant with respect to China.   China’s larger population and 
 
11 For a history of the Cold War see and the importance of economics see: John Lewis Gaddis, The 
United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992; John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History. New York: 
Penguin Press, 2005; U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian, "The Collapse of the Soviet 
Union" https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union, accessed December 3, 
2020; and Ofer, Gur, Soviet economic growth,1928-1985. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
1988.  
12 Tobin Harshaw, “Emperor Xi's China Is Done Biding Its Time” Bloomberg Opinion, March 3, 2018. 
Deng’s often quoted maxim is sometimes linked with Sun Tzu’s “Appear weak when you are strong, 





economy (while still Leninist-controlled) has adopted market characteristics that have 
enabled enormous growth in the economy that the Soviet Union was never able to 
achieve.  A future shift in China’s state-sponsored capitalist model to a more Soviet-
style planning process might offer the U.S. a respite from future competition, but 
despite some wavering in cultivating economic freedoms, the system still seems to be 
maintaining its economic output and growth advantages.  The U.S. must adjust its 
innovation policies to try to compete with a potential adversary in the making that has 
four times the population, many more scientists and engineers, an equivalent sized 
economy that is growing at a faster rate, and equivalent access to globalized 
technology advances.13 
Competing at a great power level today may have been easier if the U.S. had 
continued to robustly modernize and invest in new disruptive military technologies 
after the end of the Cold War.  Instead, at least initially, defense investment budgets 
were significantly reduced and these resources shifted to consumer and domestic 
government spending priorities.  While defense spending rose after the events of 9/11, 
the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan required a technology development focus 
on counter insurgency that, while innovative in its own way, was narrower and more 
limited in scope than what would be required against a near-peer adversary.  Rather 
than look to develop new advanced solutions against more potentially sophisticated 
adversaries, modernization efforts focused on incrementally upgrading traditional 
 
13 This daunting math changes when the U.S. combined with its allies in NATO/EU, Australia, Japan 
and Korea equals China in population and for at least the time being has economic output that is over 





capabilities and legacy platforms while addressing anti-terrorist operations against 
low-technology adversaries.   
Thus, despite spending significant resources on defense over the last two 
decades, the U.S. allowed its technological dominance as measured against developed 
nation states to decline.  The weapon systems dominance gained from technology 
developed in the 1970s, produced in the 1980s, and visibly displayed in the Gulf War, 
was allowed to atrophy as the knowledge of how to build these weapons proliferated.  
Meanwhile, the U.S. is now at risk of suffering a loss of competitive advantage 
through, for example, Chinese and Russian development of hypersonic missiles, 
asymmetric tactics, and the leveraging of new technologies.  As the Defence Minister 
of the United Kingdom recently confirmed, “our enemies have studied our 
vulnerabilities and adapted far more quickly than us.”14  Robert Work, the former 
Deputy Secretary of Defense and architect of the Third Offset strategy said that he 
regretted talking about the “Third Offset” because “in hindsight, it sounded like we 
(the U.S.) had an advantage.” On the contrary, as he stated with regard to growing 
Chinese military might that “this is what it’s like to be offset.”15  Both adversaries and 
allies have begun to achieve parity in many defense capabilities, and in some cases 
may be moving beyond the U.S.16  This potential reversal of fortunes has been helped 
 
14 Helen Warrell, “Defence Secretary Admits UK is Behind Adversaries”, Financial Times, September 
14, 2020. 
15 Robert Work, June 21 2018 speech at the Center of New America Security annual conference: 
Strategic Competition: Maintaining the Edge. Quoted in Byron Callan, Capital Alpha Partners 
“Sweating the Strategic Competition” June 21, 2020.  
16 William Greenwalt, Leveraging the National Technology Industrial Base to Address Great-Power 
Competition: The Imperative to Integrate Industrial Capabilities of Close Allies, Atlantic Council, 





by technological stagnation and risk aversion in the U.S. government, and by the 
passage of time. 
Perhaps the most significant trend of recent history to call into question U.S. 
technological dominance is that defense innovation is no longer led by government 
direction and support as it was at the height of the Cold War.   The commercial 
market has become the leading source of innovation in many areas of relevance to 
national security.17  Advances made by Silicon Valley18 in artificial intelligence, data 
analytics, robotics, autonomous systems, and quantum computing are at the forefront 
of recent DOD and other countries’ interest in the future applications of these 
technologies in weapon systems.  From an industrial base standpoint, the most 
innovative sources of these new “enabling technologies” are in the civilian sector, not 
the defense sector.   
The 2018 NDS did not directly mention the concept of the Obama 
Administration’s Third Offset strategy, but there was continuity in the same sustained 
focus on the need to develop the types of technologies dependent on commercial 
innovations to meet this new strategy.19  The NDS identified the technologies of 
interest to DOD and six out of these eight technologies are being primarily advanced 
 
17 National Defense Strategy, p.3; See also: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 
2020 Interim Report; and Michael Horowitz, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and 
the Balance of Power,” Texas National Security Review, 1, No. 3, May 2018, p. 41. 
18 While the term “Silicon Valley” is a geographical description of the information-technology hub that 
grew up in the San Jose/San Francisco corridor in the United States, in this study it will be used to 
stand-in for the broader innovation culture of nontraditional firms and a venture capital ecosystem that 
have now planted innovation hubs in many other geographical areas in the United States, and within 
allied countries. 
19 It also should be recognized that the Obama Administration’s strategy was greater than just the Third 
Offset and included as part of its Defense Innovation Initiative greater outreach to Silicon Valley 






in the commercial sector. The remaining two have important commercial technology 
components as well: 
 
“The security environment is also affected by rapid technological 
advancements and the changing character of war. The drive to develop new 
technologies is relentless, expanding to more actors with lower barriers of 
entry, and moving at accelerating speed. New technologies include advanced 
computing, “big data” analytics, artificial intelligence, autonomy, robotics, 
directed energy, hypersonics, and biotechnology – the very technologies that 
ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future. The DOD 
recognizes that new commercial technologies will change society and, 
ultimately, the character of war. The fact that many technological 
developments will come from the commercial sector means that these state 
competitors and non-state actors will also have access to them, a fact that risks 
eroding the conventional overmatch to which our Nation has grown 
accustomed.”20 
 
A larger list of technologies was released by the U.S. government in 2020 that 
continued to reflect the importance of new advances in the commercial sector.21  This 
list is in some ways similar to but not as comprehensive as the one in China’s Made 
in 2025 plan, which may be a more useful guide in identifying the commercial 
technologies that will be the source of future competition between the U.S. and 
China.22 
The newfound interest in commercial advances by DOD is merely tracking 
trends of where the money has been flowing into research and development (R&D) 
over the last four decades.  Recent data shows that three large commercial 
 
20 National Defense Strategy, p. 3. 
21 The Critical and Emerging Technologies list reflects the 20 technology areas that United States 
Government Departments and Agencies identified to the National Security Council staff as priorities 
for their missions. See: “National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies”, The White House 
October 2020. 
22 See: Congressional Research Service, “Made in China 2025” Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress 
August 11, 2020; and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built on 





information companies – Apple, Google, and Amazon – each now spend more in 
R&D than the leading prime contractors of the U.S. defense industry combined.  
These companies were also increasing R&D while the defense industry was cutting 
back (see Figure 1.1).  
 








The trend that eventually led to the superiority of advanced commercial 
technologies over defense began in 1980, when U.S. private R&D first overtook U.S. 
government R&D.  From parity in 1980, the U.S. government’s share of U.S. R&D 
 
23 Silicon Valley Defense Working Group, “Department of Defense Emerging Technology Strategy: A 
Venture Capital Perspective” April 2019, p. 36.  The defense companies included in Figure 1.1 are 
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, United Technologies (now part of Raytheon), General Dynamics, 





has been rapidly falling ever since (Figure 1.2).  Unlike in the 1950s and 1960s, DOD 
is no longer the driver of innovation in the U.S.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: Ratio of U.S. R&D to GDP By Source of Funding for R&D:  
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This commercial R&D trend also subsequently led to a technological leveling 
of key dual-use technologies on a global scale as global R&D began to dwarf 
combined U.S. R&D.   Just as the U.S. government no longer dominates U.S. R&D, 
its relative significance in global R&D has declined over many decades in both the 
public and private sectors. According to the most recent data from the National 
Science Foundation, global R&D equaled around $2.2 trillion in 2017, with the U.S. 
share comprising about 25 percent of that.25 Based on the current 
government/industry split, U.S. government R&D equaled about 2.3 percent of global 
R&D.  U.S. private-sector R&D would amount to about 18.1 percent of global R&D 
with the academia and the nonprofit sectors providing the remaining share, although 
some of the latter may be funded by the U.S. government.26  
An understanding of the dynamic of how commercial innovation leapfrogged 
military progress will be critical in shaping future successful defense innovation 
approaches.  China may have a better realization of these trends, as witnessed by its 
aggressive focus on the military-civil fusion27 of its industrial base – a concept similar 
to what was once referred to in the U.S. in the 1990s as civil-military integration 
(CMI).  While DOD began outreach to Silicon Valley, changes to underlying 
 
25 National Science Foundation, Science and engineering indicators, 2020. 
https://ncses.nsf.gov/indicators 
26 Author calculations based on data from National Science Foundation, Science and engineering 
indicators, 2020. Another source of information on R&D trends is the annual Research and 
Development Magazine Global R&D Funding Forecast. 
27 Tai Ming Cheung, “From Big to Powerful: China's Quest for Security and Power in the Age of 





innovation practices that would entice non-traditional companies into the defense 
marketplace and achieve greater CMI have not yet happened at scale.28   
The debate on the impending decline of U.S. military technological 
superiority led to in the latter portions of the Obama Administration a defense budget 
rise after a 5-year decline from the heights of the Iraq war spending (that rise 
subsequently began leveling off in the Trump Administration – see Figure 1.3).  
These new resources were first used to shore up readiness and the maintenance of 
older systems, and then on spending more money on existing systems already in the 
acquisition pipeline.  A recent focus has been placed on addressing a perceived 
hypersonic missile gap and developing a few other new defense systems and 
capabilities.  While new U.S. defense programs have been initiated under a new great 
power competition strategy, it is far from certain that they will be successful – they 
may languish as many recent acquisition programs have over the past several 
decades.   
A perhaps more productive and complementary exercise would be to first 
better understand how the innovation system and its underlying practices have been 
working, and then attempt to shape the necessary incentives to achieve more effective 
innovative approaches, rather than just increasing spending.  As defense budgets have 
risen there has been a rather narrow and superficial debate fixated on how much 
money is needed for traditional weapons platform approaches, rather than questioning 
whether DOD is spending these resources effectively.  More spending may not buy 
 
28 Future of Defense Task Force 2020, p. 68. For a history of the barriers to non-traditional 
participation in the defense market see: Jacques S. Gansler, William C Greenwalt, William Lucyshyn, 
Non-Traditional Commercial Defense Contractors. Naval Post Graduate School, Defense Technical 





greater security if the way those resources are used (i.e., how defense innovates) is 
constrained by diminishing returns or if circumstances have changed to such a degree 
that current technology development paths to innovation and acquisition practices are 
irrelevant or, at worse, counterproductive.  
 
 





Investment = DOD procurement + Research, Development, Test and Evaluation. 
 
 





It is thus necessary to look beyond the amount of resources being allocated to 
the question of how those resources are being spent.   While overall budgets are 
important guides to priorities, many other factors, such as management processes, 
practices, and organization, and the nature of the industrial base are critical enablers 
as to whether these priorities can be met.  Perhaps most importantly, incentives and 
the criteria used to measure success are key determiners as to what actually gets done.   
Management reforms of how the U.S. equips its military have been ongoing 
for decades, but these attempts have been seen as only successful at the margins.  A 
longtime observer of the defense innovation system remarked: 
 
Despite the many studies and the similarity of their findings, major defense 
programs still require more than fifteen years to deliver less capability than 
planned, often at two to three times the initial cost. Most attempts to 
implement improvements in the management of the defense acquisition 
process during the past fifty years have fallen short of their objectives.30  
 
This trend may be an indication that greater underlying factors and barriers to 
implementation are at play and need to be identified and addressed with respect to 
defense innovation policies.  It also could mean that perhaps the wrong questions 
have been asked over the last fifty years of management reforms or that inadequate 
criteria are being used to measure and guide success or failure.   If this is the case, and 
the system is optimizing to meet the wrong criteria, then past reform solutions may 
have actually made the problem worse.  At a minimum, the study of trends in the 
longstanding defense innovation system could provide needed insights into the 
 







implications of any new technological competition that is emerging and perhaps 
provide a better understanding into the origins of technological progress and 
advancements that could inform future reform efforts. 
 
Why Has Defense Technological Innovation Become Harder to Achieve?  
The question guiding this research effort is based first on an attempt to 
understand the nature of the changes in how the U.S. develops and deploys military 
capability (i.e., how it innovates) today compared with previous historical periods, 
and then to determine what effect any of these changes may have had on current 
approaches to defense innovation.  Defense innovation now appears to be a more 
difficult endeavor than it was in previous periods of U.S. history.  If that is true, why 
is that the case?  Why has defense technological innovation become harder to achieve 
than in earlier periods in U.S. history? 
Exploring that initial research question leads to a number of sub-questions that 
will be considered:   
• If the current defense innovation system used to develop U.S. defense 
capabilities is different than in earlier years, in what ways is it different – and 
does that really matter?  Is DOD now less innovative (and by what measure) 
than it was in the early Cold War and does that make a difference?   
 
• How does one measure innovation, and more importantly, how does one 
measure the quality of innovation?  If defense technological innovation in the 
U.S. is found to have slowed over the decades, what are the specific factors 
behind this deceleration? 
 
• Are technological trends causing the U.S. to have fallen or be at the risk of 







• Will future defense innovation challenges be equally as hard for all 
competitors?  
 
• How have process rules, incentives, and disincentives that guide potential 
defense innovation changed?   
 
• How are they the same or different and how have they impacted government 
program managers and the industrial base that supports defense, and has this 
impacted defense innovation? 
 
 
The proposed path to answering these questions is to be found in reviewing 
the criteria and underlying incentives and practices the military has used in the past 
and now uses to develop and buy weapons capabilities.  This can be explored through 
a combination of literature and historical review, process tracking, and data analysis 
of how the U.S. has attempted to achieve its defense technological innovation goals.   
The first step will be to define the concepts, terms, and variables of what comprises 
the defense innovation system.  The dissertation will next review the historical record 
and determine the evolution of the changes that occurred within this defense 
innovation system to include the industrial base that supports innovation, and the 
rules and processes that guide innovative efforts in defense.  The evolution of the rule 
sets that are created and implemented through various defense management regimes 
such as budget, acquisition, and contracting, are tracked and reviewed for their impact 
on the ability of the industrial base to deliver new innovative capabilities.    
To evaluate this historical record, sufficient criteria are needed to determine 
the productivity of innovation.  In this case two benchmarks are used – one that is 





addresses when critical disruptive new military technologies emerged.  While the date 
of first successful test or deployment of a technology may be measurable, the 
determination of what is a new, critical, or disruptive technology is more subjective 
and may be a source of some debate.   Still, selecting technologies such as nuclear 
weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, the integrated circuit, stealth aircraft, 
nuclear submarine, precision targeting, satellites, and the jet engine should be 
revolutionary or disruptive enough to provide a minimum level of agreement for 
heuristic purposes.   
The second criterion addresses time.  How long did it take to create a new 
weapon system from the initiation of a program to a capability that is being used in 
the field by U.S. forces?  Past studies and available data on the rate of defense 
innovation are assessed to compare time to development in different historical 
periods.   Together these two measures, one of the quality of innovation and the other 
a factor or measure of the productivity of innovation, will be used in an assessment of 
the trends in U.S. defense innovation.  The final methodological approach used is to 
review historical cases of when the defense innovation system is considered 
inadequate to achieve a near-term purpose and then determine what changes are made 
to enhance innovation and what criteria guides those changes.  This provides insight 
into what criteria may be important and what needs to change to achieve that criteria.  
 
Current Understanding of Defense Innovation Framework 
Prior to World War II, there was not necessarily an academic focus on defense 





Commissions or Congressional hearings in the furtherance of general oversight 
responsibilities.  Many of these efforts began not from concerns with the state of 
defense innovation but because of perceptions of problems with wartime contracting 
such as profiteering, fraud, waste, and abuse when acquiring commodities such as 
food, clothing, and munitions.  For example, the Nye Committee or the Special 
Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry was established in 1934 to 
investigate issues with U.S. defense procurement during World War I.31 and during 
World War II, the Truman Committee – or the Senate Special Committee to 
Investigate the National Defense Program -- was formed to review ongoing 
allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse in defense programs.   Its remit lasted until 
1948 when the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations was created.32 
After World War II, defense innovation became a significant topic of interest 
to the government.  The U.S. government sponsored research at academic institutions 
and at government sponsored organizations. An early body of literature in the 1950s 
was conducted by the newly-formed Federally Funded Research and Development 
Corporations (FFRDCs) such as the RAND Corporation, that was established in 1948 
and grew out of the World War II success with operations research.  RAND was 
founded by Douglas Aircraft and senior Air Force officials and began to focus on 
(work that still continues to this day) the description of how DOD develops and 
acquires weapons systems to support reform of the defense acquisition and budgeting 
 
31 When it comes to fraud, waste and abuse, time is usually not an issue to deter an investigation as the 
Nye Committee was established 16 years after the end of World War 1. 
32 The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations is now housed in the Senate Committee on 





systems.33 The two most significant focus areas of defense innovation policy in the 
post-war era were the recognition of the important role of the private sector and of 
government support for science.  A large degree of the research, commentary, and 
analysis on defense innovation from this period is found in congressional testimony 
and reports, other primary government sources, or government-sponsored research 
that was primarily directed at incorporating in peacetime the significant shifts in the 
defense innovation system that occurred during the war.34   
The first major public academic look at the acquisition process, undertaken 
within the Harvard Business School in 1958 and published in 1962, was The Weapons 
Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis by Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. 
Scherer.  This review has served as a classic in the field and explored the market 
structure and the performance of the weapons acquisition process.35  Peck and 
Scherer relied on the work that the school did for the government during WWII and 
afterwards on the commercial aviation industry.  Among more data descriptive 
exercises, they explored relationships between cost overruns and certain contractor 
incentives such as contract type and DOD oversight mechanisms. While some of 
Peck and Scherer’s analysis was quantitative, most was not.  It was based on a small 
set of case studies (12 weapon systems and 7 commercial developments) and surveys 
 
33 See a brief history of RAND: https://www.rand.org/about/history/a-brief-history-of-rand.html 
; and Virginia Campbell, “How RAND Invented the Postwar World” Invention and Technology, 
Summer 2004, p.50. 
34 The most comprehensive bibliography of these sources during the time period from 1945-1960 can 
be found in E.V. Converse, E. V and W.S. Poole, United States, Department of Defense, History of 
Acquisition in the Department of Defense Volume 1: Rearming for the Cold War 1945-1960; Historical 
Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2012.  p. 676-717. 
35 Merton J Peck and Frederic M Scherer. The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis. 





covering the period of time between 1945-1960.  Peck and Sherer’s cautioned against 
treating weapons development like a commercial endeavor or a basic scientific 
research program. Weapon systems development to them was unique and uncertain:  
 “it is characterized by unique elements of uncertainty resulting from the 
combination of, first, the extent to which weapons press the limits of existing 
engineering art and scientific knowledge and, second, the character of demand 
for weapons in a cold war environment. The better performance of 
commercial development in staying within budgets, meeting schedules, and 
achieving performance objectives is explained largely by the fact that most 
commercial products developments are not initiated until major state of the art 
and marking uncertainties have been resolved.”36 
 
These observations would subsequently be essentially ignored.  In 1964, Scherer 
explored specific economic incentives such as competition and profits and their 
impact on acquisition in The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives.37   
Still. these two efforts by Peck and Scherer have served as the introductory 
basis for analysis conducted in the field of defense acquisition and innovation policy.  
The first book focused on macro issues of the outputs of acquisition and Scherer’s 
second on micro incentives that guide actions in the industrial base.   Peck and 
Scherer’s more cautious and adaptable approach, to what at the time may not have 
been completely understood to be a revolutionary innovation system, was, however, 
in practice quickly overshadowed by the systems analysis approach at RAND.   This 
understanding of how revolutionary that earlier system discovered at the height of 
World War II was, and could be argued is still today, lost on most practitioners.  
 
36 Ibid. p. 8-9. 





A significant watershed in defense management practices occurred in the 
1960s when academic theory jumped from the think tanks to DOD practice.  It was 
not only that significant work in academic theory and literature related to defense 
management occurred at RAND, but most importantly that this work served as the 
basis for major management reforms at DOD.  The body of work by Hitch and 
McKean in, for example, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, and 
Novick’s work on program budgeting38 resulted in the underpinnings of the current 
defense management framework, which has served as the operating model for 
managing defense innovation since the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.  Hitch 
would later be credited as being the “father” of the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System (PPBS) although that title may legitimately belong to Novick.39 
Novick outlined the need for program budgeting to essentially be used to 
oversee and manage individual weapons programs in a more scientific way.  The 
analytical unit of the program and cost data related to such a program became the 
dominant variables to manage innovation efforts over the next six decades after the 
creation of the PPBS system in 1961. This process institutionalized program 
budgeting to managing weapon systems.  Novick continued to refine the concept of 
 
38 David Novick, Efficiency and Economy in Government Through New Budgeting and Accounting 
Procedures. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1954.; David Novick, Weapon System Cost 
Analysis. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1956.; David Novick, Which Program Do We Mean 
in Program Budgeting? Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1954.; David Novick, Program 
Budgeting: Long-Range Planning in the Department of Defense. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1962.; and David Novick (ed.), Program Budgeting: Program Analysis and the Federal 
Budget. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1967. 






program budgeting to improve the link to defense acquisition.40  There have been a 
few detractors to this concept, as Eric Lofgren recently noted:   
“Studying its implementation in the Pentagon and around the world, budget 
scholar Arron Wildavsky concluded in 1978 that “Program budgeting does not 
work anywhere in the world it has been tried.” Revisiting the question in 
2013, Allen Schick concurred. He found program budget efforts “were rarely 
successful.”41 
 
Line-item budgeting consisting of large pots of undifferentiated money that 
could be used on many purposes made it difficult to focus on performance of how 
well those funds were spent.  Program budgeting at its basic level is simply a way to 
focus the budget on objectives.  Implementation of what is a common sense “good 
government” management tool would be fraught with second order effects.  This was 
particularly so as the program budgeting system moved to more detailed and specific 
objectives such as weapons system development that would at least in their initial and 
most innovative phases prove difficult or impossible to predict. 
 The problem of program budgeting’s potential disconnect from practicality 
was pointed out as early as 1954 by Frederick Mosher, and its Achilles heel was 
time.42  The process time it takes to conduct program budgeting as it has evolved 
 
40 David Novick and Daniel J. Alesch, Program Budgeting: Its Underlying Systems Concepts and 
International Dissemination. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1970.; David Novick, Program 
Analysis Revisited. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1971.; H.G. Massey, David Novick, and 
R. E. Peterson, Cost Measurement: Tools and Methodology for Cost Effectiveness Analysis. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972.; David Novick, The Meaning of Cost Analysis. Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 1983.; David Novick, The role of the military comptroller in defense 
management. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004. 
41 Eric Lofgren, “The DOD Budget Process: The Next Frontier of Acquisition Reform” George Mason 
University School of Business, Center for Government Contracting, White Paper Series #5, June 29, 
2020. p. 1. 
42 Frederick C. Mosher, Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice with Particular Reference to the 
U.S. Department of the Army. Public Administration Service, American Book-Stratford Press, Inc., 





requires perfect foreknowledge of events many years prior to budget execution. 
Perfect knowledge may not often exist except in the minds of central planners, but it 
was this ability to precisely predict outcomes based on program cost estimates that 
Congress would eventually hold DOD accountable for while limiting flexibility to 
move funds to other alternatives when these estimates were wrong. A budget system 
disconnected from the importance of time and impervious to flexibility leads to 
waste, misallocation of resources, and missed opportunities for innovation that can 
never be recaptured.43 
Any such criticism seems to not have had an effect on subsequent discussions 
surrounding defense budgeting and acquisition reforms. Alain Enthoven and K. 
Wayne Smith in How Much is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969 
primarily described the PPBS system that had been put in place during the Kennedy 
and Johnson Administrations as the ideal approach for defense management to enable 
proper oversight and structure to innovation efforts.  They focused on the goal of cost 
efficiency in the outputs of defense and described the nature of the defense 
management problem as a matter for controlling cost overruns on these outputs and 
reducing duplication and waste.  This goal was primarily directed at achieving better 
visibility over what had become a cost-based analytical system that depended on 
centralized management from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) over the 
services and defense agencies who needed to be tightly overseen by a higher 
 
43 The other great disconnect in establishing program budgeting at the Pentagon in the early 1960s was 
the limited thought as to how Congress would use this tool.  Perhaps not DOD’s intention, but creating 
this process has allowed Congress to better plan for earmarks within states and congressional districts 
in a way that would require unattainable levels of prediction at DOD and limit future budgetary 
flexibility. Eventually, as will be explained later in this paper, the one way to come to terms with these 





authority. James Q Wilson’s advocacy of bureaucratic decentralization through 
distributed authority and distributed autonomy to the contrary44 centralized control 
from OSD over military service run innovation programs has been a goal since the 
1947 National Security Act.45  The 1958 Defense Reorganization Act furthered 
centralization at DOD and allowed the adoption of the cost-based systems analysis 
approach of program budgeting advocated by Novick and Hitch.  For management 
defense analysts like Enthoven and Smith they fully recognized that the 1958 Act was 
the defining moment that allowed PPBS to move forward.46 
Subsequent Presidential Commissions from the Fitzhugh Commission 
(1970),47 and the Commission on Government Procurement (1972)48 continued to 
recommend greater centralized control over defense innovation programs, the use of 
program budgeting, systems acquisition, centralized joint requirements systems to 
initiate programs, and better cost estimating and planning to support program 
budgeting as programs were executed.  The next major scholarly contribution was not 
until 1974, by Ronald Fox in Arming America: How the US Buys Weapons that 
addressed the macro-innovation outputs and described the management of the 
weapons acquisition process that had evolved since the 1960s reforms.49  He would 
cover similar but updated material in 1988 in the Defense Management Challenge: 
 
44 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: 
Basic Books, 1989. p. 365. 
45 The 1947 Act established the Office of the Secretary of Defense that was in theory put in charge of 
defense acquisition.  It was not until the 1958 Act that this theoretical power was strengthened. 
46 Enthovan p. 2. 
47 Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense, Blue Ribbon 
Defense Panel. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 July 1970.  
48 Report of the Commission on Government Procurement, vols. 1 and 2. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 31 December 1972.  
49 J. Ronald Fox, Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons. Boston: Division of Research, 





Weapons Acquisition.50  Fox would return to what would become a familiar refrain 
for the next 40 years: that despite pervasive reform, issues previously identified by 
other analysts such as cost overruns, schedules slippages, and inadequate cost 
estimation still existed. In 1980, Jacques Gansler’s The Defense Industry provided an 
update on the micro-innovation inputs and incentives in a detailed economic analysis 
of the defense industry of the time.51  Fox and Gansler together can be viewed as a 
follow up to Peck and Sherer’s macro and micro versions of acquisition analysis.  
Scholarly research, congressional oversight, and government-sponsored 
research has continued to operate within the cost-based, program-centric, systems 
analysis paradigm of Hitch, Enthoven, and Novick.  On the macro program level, 
there has been a focus on cost estimating and prediction and cost performance52, 
while at the micro level issues related to competition, profits, and pricing issues 
related to the defense industry prevailed.53 Most cost-based research has been 
conducted internally within DOD or by FFRDCs such as RAND and the Institute for 
Defense Analysis (IDA) specifically for DOD.  Some, but not all, of these reports 
were made public.54  While much of the qualitative literature has been primarily 
 
50 J. Ronald Fox and James L Field, The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition. 
Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1988. 
51 Jacques S. Gansler, The Defense Industry. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980.  
52 Robert L. Perry, Reforms in System Acquisition. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975. 
Arena, Mark V., Obaid Younossi, Kevin Brancato, Irv Blickstein, and Clifford A. Grammich, Why 
Has the Cost of Fixed-Wing Aircraft Risen? A Macroscopic Examination of the Trends in U.S. 
Military Aircraft Costs over the Past Several Decades. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008; 
Arena, Mark V., Irv Blickstein, Obaid Younossi, and Clifford A. Grammich, Why Has the Cost of 
Navy Ships Risen? A Macroscopic Examination of the Trends in U.S. Naval Ship Costs Over the Past 
Several Decades. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.; Gordan Adams, Paul Murphy, and 
William Grey Rosenau. Controlling Weapons Costs: Can the Pentagon Reforms Work? New York: 
Council on Economic Priorities, 1983. 
53 U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO Report, Impediments to Reducing the Costs of Weapon 
Systems, PSAD–80–6, 8 Washington, DC, 1979.; Fox p. 31-33;  
54 See: Younossi, Obaid, Mark V. Arena, Robert S. Leonard, Charles Robert Roll, Jr., Arvind Jain, 





government or industry sponsored, focused, and conducted, the academic literature 
addressing these issues has been more limited and, in many cases, also sponsored by 
the federal government.55  While these efforts have focused on issues that were 
broader than cost (to include manufacturing incentives, maintenance and logistics, 
schedule, and the ultimate performance of systems), cost has been the most 
significant factor explored and the primary variable to be managed to address these 
other issues.  Also, while acquisition reform research has focused some on 
commodity, services, and information technology acquisition, major weapon systems 
acquisition has dominated the literature.   
In the last decade attempts were made to address the lack of public 
quantitative analysis, mostly on larger defense acquisition programs.  Since Peck and 
Scherer there have been few subsequent academic quantitative studies published and 
those published focus on cost, and the differences in cost as compared to a beginning 
benchmark at the start of the program.  Historical data is often based on 
congressionally-mandated reports called Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) for 
larger weapon systems known as Major Acquisition Defense Programs (MDAP). 
These reports were mandated by Congress in the Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982 but 
were being prepared internally at DOD since the 1960s.56 The use of SAR data 
 
Completed and Ongoing Programs, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-588-AF, 2007;   
Arena, Mark V., Robert S. Leonard, Sheila E. Murray, and Obaid Younossi, Historical Cost Growth of 
Completed Weapon System Programs, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, TR-343- AF, 2006; 
and  Davis, Dan, Pay Me Now and Pay Me Later: The Effect of R&D Cost Growth on Subsequent 
Procurement Costs, Alexandria, VA: CNA, CRM D0024982.A1/Final, May 2011.  
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War Colleges and the National Defense University. 
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analysis and weapon systems quantitative research analysis has been conducted 
internally by DOD to support decision-making.  The last major departmental publicly 
released analytical study was performed by the IDA during the Obama 
Administration.  Then Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, Frank Kendall, initiated this effort to explore the reasons behind DOD’s 
poor performance as reflected in cost overruns in developing weapon systems and to 
help guide policy in this area.  The first report was published in June 2013 and the 
second was published in June of 2014.57  In these quantitative based reports, DOD’s 
level of analysis focused on individual weapon systems or types of weapon systems.  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been another source of data on the 
performance of defense weapon systems.  Since 2002, GAO has published an annual 
report on weapon systems development based on SAR cost reporting and while 
continuing to report on cost, schedule, and performance issues, has added a GAO-
specific variable developed over the years regarding technical maturity and 
knowledge.58 
The few quantitative approaches and the larger amount of qualitative analysis 
have been related to major weapons program and the perceived factors that have 
contributed to cost increases or focused on the effectiveness of contract incentives 
that have served as a source of many ideas and policy prescriptions proposed to try to 
 
57 U.S. Department of Defense, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2014 and 2013 
Annual Reports, June 2013, June 2014. 
58 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Defense Acquisitions Annual Assessment: 
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Data for Oversight, GAO-20-439: June 3, 2020. This criterion has been implemented by Congress 
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fix that problem.   Performance issues have been addressed but primarily in the 
framework of not meeting predicted performance outcomes as promised at the 
beginning of a program.  The underlying reasons for cost overruns on individual 
weapon systems have historically been blamed (among other things) on budgetary 
and requirements instability, technological immaturity, program management 
turnover or qualifications, bureaucratic oversight structures, poor cost estimating,59 
and political gamesmanship in selling weapon systems (i.e., no one would ever 
approve to buy a weapon system if they really knew what it was going to cost).  This 
last item is known as “buying in” and can be attributed to both government and 
industry actors and can negatively impact not only defense programs but also public 
infrastructure projects.60  
Because of these perceptions of past poor performance based on cost analysis 
benchmarks and the importance of these systems for national security, weapons 
systems acquisition has been one of the most studied processes within the federal 
government.  During the last 60 years there has been no shortage of government-
sponsored studies looking at the acquisition process.  Beginning with Peck and 
Scherer there were close to 300 different studies on the acquisition process identified 
in 2012 by the Defense Business Board.61  The 2006 Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (an internal study mandated by DOD) identified 128 major 
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studies on the subject of acquisition reform since the 1949 Hoover Commission.62 
According the Business Executives for National Security, there were over 262 
relevant studies published between 1986 and 2009 advocating the reform of defense 
acquisition to address the efficiency of buying weapon systems.63   
Since these tallies, in the last decade there have been no shortages of further 
reviews, studies and opinions on the process of defense acquisition and innovation, 
beginning with the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Investigations’ October 2, 
2014 report focused on weapon systems acquisition,64 the section 809 panel reports,65 
and the most recent observations on “Defense Management Reform: How to Make 
the Pentagon Work Better and Cost Less” in 2020 by Peter Levine from IDA.66 
The existing defense management literature that has grown up and evolved 
over the last 60 years continues to offer new recommendations on how to make the 
acquisition process better by improving cost estimating, management practices, and 
oversight.  Observers of defense innovation practices and policy both inside and 
outside of government have rarely been able to break away from the basic 
assumptions that have underlined defense management systems and theory since the 
early 1960s.  Marginal changes have been recommended to better implement the 
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existing structure to focus on process to manage programs and costs beginning with 
improving the processes for joint requirements, technology readiness, cost estimating 
and program budgeting to manage better outcomes.  Ultimate success for a program is 
to be measured by a lack of cost overruns and delivering the requirements and 
specifications promised at the beginning of a program, and on a predicted schedule.  
A sub-genre of research has focused on contracting incentives, contract types, 
fairness, and competition with a goal of how these tools bring value to the taxpayer as 
measured by how well a program meets it predicted targets. 
The results of the research cited here have not led to exemplary policy 
decisions or “fixed” the problem.  Many of the same cost problems that Peck and 
Scherer first observed continue to plague the system.67  There is no doubt that a 
concern about cost should be an important variable when dealing with taxpayer 
dollars on multi-billion and, in the case of the F-35, trillion-dollar programs.  Still, as 
it has evolved, this cost-based approach is based on the premise that certainty and 
predictability in weapon system development and budgeting is achievable – often 
decades in advance.  That level of precision simply may not exist in the real world, 
and to do so and be effective – as Peck and Sherer warned – would be to adopt a 
commercial model where all technical risk has been reduced.  To continue to operate 
with the view that one can have it all and that this prediction is possible is to continue 
to refine processes based on assumptions that are counterproductive and even 
detrimental to U.S. national security if new innovation is needed.  Other variables that 
 





have previously been de-emphasized may be helpful to consider along with different 
criteria for measuring what it means to successfully innovate in defense. 
 
The Criterion Problem 
The primary thesis of this review is that a different criterion for assessing 
defense innovation success or failure should be considered: time.  This focus on time 
or speed is distinct from the current idea of a planned schedule within a cost-based 
predictive framework.  Time can act as an overarching constraining function to the 
process of innovation much as cost does today. The baseline assumptions originally 
made by Novick, Hitch and Enthoven, and others over the last six decades that have 
stressed cost as the basis for evaluation should be reviewed and assessed while a time 
criterion for measuring success in innovation should be explored and evaluated.  
Hitch and McKeon identified a criterion problem in 1960 that remains a valid issue: 
“. the selection of an appropriate criterion is frequently the central problem in the 
design of an economic analysis intended to improve military decisions.”68 If you start 
with the wrong criteria for evaluation, the answers one gets may be inappropriate to 
the problem, and perhaps worse, processes will become optimized for the wrong 
results.  
The framework to deliver defense capabilities, or what will be described as 
the current defense innovation system, is very different than what existed in the great 
power conflicts of World War II and the early Cold War, and is not what is needed 
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today.  Three major variables have undergone significant change over the last 60 
years.  These include first, the structure of the industrial base and secondly, the 
applicable management regimes that together with the industrial base comprise the 
defense innovation system. The third variable is also one of the key outcomes of such 
an innovation system and that is the time it takes to deploy defense capabilities.  
These variables have likely changed because the criteria for success has also changed.  
A time-based focus to innovation has been lost due to an excessive focus on linear 
processes designed to manage cost that have continued to grow.  Today’s criterion 
problem is much different than the one that faced Hitch and McKeon.  The criteria 
chosen to evaluate the success of defense innovation over the last 60 years is one of 
efficiency measured by cost.  Effectiveness as measured by timeliness of the 
deployment of capability may be a more valid criteria in the current national security 
environment but it currently is not valued.   
 
Contribution 
This effort builds upon the defense management and acquisition process 
reform literature that provides the framework and foundation of analysis of past 
thinking on defense innovation primarily focused on predictive cost controls.  From 
that foundation, an alternative management oversight criterion based on time will be 
proposed that could replace or, at a minimum, augment the measures of success to the 
current framework that is used to develop and deploy weapons capability.   This 
approach is to a degree a return to asking some of the original questions and concerns 





original observations of what it means to innovate in the defense environment.69  
Even at what in retrospect could be viewed as the height of successful U.S. defense 
innovation efforts, there was a concern that lead times were then too long and that 
defense should not be managed like a traditional commercial enterprise. According to 
Peck and Scherer:  
“In our view the weapons acquisition process is unique, without the salient 
characteristics of commercial activity on one hand or of scientific activity on 
the other. Ideas and concepts relevant to the weapons acquisition process are 
difficult to come by, for what is needed is not something borrowed, but 
something new.” 70 
 
A subsequent focus on cost from commercial management practice – something that 
Peck and Sherer criticized and warned about – nonetheless became the dominant 
management tools to guide defense innovation.   
While I do not intend to reject the values – cost, efficiency, fairness, or 
competition – that have led to the adoption of current management processes, this 
approach will attempt to relegate these values to a more subservient position with 
respect to a different criterion – that is, time to development and deployment.71  These 
other values are important, and could still be factors of consideration in a time-
constrained system. But in cases of national defense and certain other governmental 
 
69 Peck and Scherer, p.4-6 and 53-54. 
70 Ibid. p. 586. 
71 There is likely a need for a future debate on the adequacies of the adoption of PPBS and the systems 
analysis framework at DOD and whether this system served more the interests of OSD and the 
appropriations committees rather than efficiency.  Despite all of the potential good that can come form 
program and performance budgeting, the potential for these tools to be politically “weaponized” may 
do more to serve the allocation of the defense budget for political means on stated efficiency grounds 
when neither efficiency or effectiveness is being achieved. An interesting dissertation by a current 
analyst at RAND begins to dig into the debate on these questions when PPBS was initiated.  See: 
Stephanie C. Young. “Power and the Purse: Defense Budgeting and American Politics, 1947–1972.” 
Dissertation. University of California, Berkeley, 2009.  This effort though will stick to the narrower 






missions, an excessive or predominant focus on these other values may result in a 
continued crowding out of effective innovation without the constraints inherent in an 
overarching criterion of time.  A system divorced from time that relies upon long 
linear processes will end up failing if the needs of the mission are time sensitive or 
one’s adversary approaches innovation in a different, more agile way.  Even if DOD 
were to suddenly meet its current measures of cost-based success under the existing 
system – something it has not been able to consistently do in the last five decades of 
weapon systems acquisition measurement – the  outputs of the defense innovation 
system could be a failure if all innovation risk has been bled out of the system.  The 
discussion must begin by exploring which criteria to use (and when) and how success 
should be measured.  
This research will also build on academic work on civil-military integration of 
the industrial base to begin the questioning of many longstanding assumptions behind 
the basis for other current defense management processes and regimes.72   While 
these regimes are not all strictly based on cost and process linearity, they have had the 
effect of creating barriers to those entities that specialize in time-based innovation.   
As defense management regimes have been at the leading edge of the 
management practices in the government, this effort could also contribute to other 
government innovative and management efforts beyond strictly defense.  Any 
technological or engineering-based projects established to address climate change or 
global warming will likely confront many of the innovation challenges that DOD has 
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faced over the last 75 years.  These civil missions are likely to face the same criteria 
that favors predictive cost systems and the predominance of values other than time 
that could negatively impact the ability of the government to guide successful 
innovation to address these vital challenges. 
While further academic validation and study will likely be needed, this effort 
is an attempt to begin a dialogue on time-based innovation.  It will also attempt to 
identify what should come next in further study, begin the discussion of the barriers 
to making policy changes that focus on time and working with agile industrial 
entities, and hopefully lead to future areas of research and collaboration.  Still, the 
evidence will also lead to proposed alternative policy changes that could be 
immediately made to enhance defense innovation when speed and effectiveness as 
defined by time to market are required. 
 
Organization of Dissertation 
Initially, several concepts will be defined and put into historical context.  
First, in Chapter 2, the concept of innovation in general and then what it means to be 
innovative in a national security context will be explored.  Next, a specific framework 
for what constitutes the defense innovation system will be established and its specific 
components identified and categorized.  As will be described in more detail, the U.S. 
defense innovation system will be defined as comprising the industrial base (both 
public and private) and the managerial framework of regimes that provides the 
incentives of how this industrial base operates and is structured in order to deliver 





In Chapter 3, the historical evolution of defense innovation outputs as 
categorized by deployable military capability, defense management regimes, and the 
industrial base in the United States will be reviewed.  This review will specifically 
look at how defense management practices and processes have changed over time and 
how the industrial base has changed to meet the needs of these processes.  Ultimately, 
in the 1960s the basis for the current management framework was established that 
subsequently evolved over the next six decades, but within a generally agreed upon 
set of values.  
The key questions asked based on this history are: does the current 
management framework ultimately undermine defense innovation and should its 
underlying assumptions and basis (both academic and institutional) be re-appraised?  
Did a seemingly more scientific and cost-based approach founded on greater control 
over budgetary, capital and labor inputs actually achieve less innovation productivity 
than other approaches?  By one significant criterion, time, the answer appears to be 
yes.   
Chapter 4 reviews the data with respect to time to development as a variable 
and its relationship to defense innovation approaches.  Time is an output but also an 
input and can be used as a constraining factor of the defense innovation system.  The 
time it takes to deliver capability is a measurable variable that when linked to a 
tangible deliverable can also stand in for the degree or level of innovation.  While 
innovativeness may be a value of a system or process it is only when something 
concrete emerges can one begin to measure its significance.  Using time as a variable 





values.  Quality in innovation is obviously important and harder to measure, but 
rather counterintuitively the most significant disruptive advances in defense 
innovation history have occurred when time has been constrained.  Past studies and 
data on the rate of defense innovation are assessed to explore whether time should be 
a basis to evaluate whether there is a current defense innovation problem.  As will be 
demonstrated the time to market in defense programs has been lengthening 
significantly over the years.    
However, the U.S. government has been able to deliver capability faster in 
certain circumstances when time is deemed important or access is needed to portions 
of the industrial base that value time-based innovation, but the key parameter that 
allows this is when programs have been given relief from the constraints of certain 
defense management regimes.  This will be explored in a serious of case examples 
described in Chapter 5.  These cases will focus on: commercial item acquisition 
approaches for information technology and the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) 
precision guided munition during what will be called the first wave of commercial 
technology dominance in the 1990s; the experimental prototyping that led to the 
Predator and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles developed using  Other 
Transactions Authority (OTA);  the deployment of the National Missile Defense 
System in the mid-2000s;  emergency rapid acquisition programs conducted after 
9/11;  SpaceX’s rocket launcher development under a Space Act Agreement OTA; 
and in the latest example of this phenomenon new capabilities and prospects for 





acquisition and production OTA authorities granted by Congress in 2015 and 2016 to 
address competition with China.   
The key factors identified in each of these examples was that time to market 
or the need to access a portion of the industrial base that valued time to market 
became important again.  Most importantly, the methods used to achieve a quicker 
development and delivery focused on ways to go around key aspects of the existing 
management system and processes such as the linear budget, requirements, 
acquisition, or contract management regimes.  For a select few programs the 1960s 
origin defense management regimes were temporarily waived and innovation success 
by measure of quicker time to deployment ensued. 
The final chapter reviews this case experience, comparative time-based 
innovation rates, and the historical evolution of defense management systems and the 
industrial base and then critiques the results of the 1960s defense management 
framework.  Four primary conclusions are made: 1) time is a significant factor in 
shaping defense innovation; 2) over the last five decades, time to deployment of new 
capability at DOD has increased significantly while innovation quality has become 
more incremental; 3) linear processes that implement defense management regimes 
have increased the minimum time to conduct defense innovation; and 4) government-
unique processes within defense management regimes have created barriers to entry 
that have narrowed the defense industrial base and driven out companies that innovate 
on a time-based basis.  Collectively, these conclusions call for a reshaping of defense 
management regimes and a reconsideration of the criteria used in guiding and 





The U.S. defense innovation system was not only once faster and more 
effective than it is now but it will be argued that the current linear management 
oversight framework that implements predictive cost-based evaluation criteria is 
likely the greatest constraint on returning to past innovation successes.  Without 
changes to the criteria and processes underlying defense management, U.S. defense 
capabilities will likely continue a relative decline that will lead to a further erosion of 
U.S. defense technological advantage against its potential adversaries, unless those 
adversaries adopt similar linear-implemented processes – unlikely given their study of 
our system.   A number of recommended changes to conform these management 
practices to a more time-based system are proposed that could be made by law and 
regulation.  In addition, the barriers to implementing any such changes are identified.  
Future research should be conducted to review the assumptions behind the creation 
and evolution of existing management regimes as potential causes that have restricted 
past management reform efforts and, if not addressed will make it difficult for future 







Chapter 2: Concepts and Variables: Defense Innovation, The 
Industrial Base, Civil-Military Integration, and Public 
Management Regimes 
 
“Frankly, … in defense procurement, we have a real mess on our hands” 
David Packard 73 
 
An understanding of the defense innovation system, including its various 
components and incentive structures, is foundational to confronting future defense 
and foreign policy challenges and threats.  Defense acquisition has historically been 
the tool of choice when attempting to achieve technological innovation to meet new 
threats, but addressing the defense innovation problem is much broader than just 
fixing acquisition.  To begin this inquiry, it is first necessary to define one’s terms.  In 
this chapter, an innovation nomenclature will be described and established to begin to 
identify which variables are important to examine.  These will include the concepts of 
innovation, defense innovation, and the defense innovation system.   
The focus of defense innovation in this review will be on measurable 
deployed technological capabilities. The elements of the defense innovation system 
will be defined as those entities, methods, and procedures that lead to the creation, 
development, management, and oversight of the deployment of defense technological 
capabilities.  These include the defense industrial base and the rules and management 
regimes that influence the characteristics of that industrial base.   
The components of the industrial base include a trained science, technology, 
engineering and math (STEM) workforce; and also, the knowledge, infrastructure, 
 





and technologies generated from years of research and development, production, and 
maintenance of not only military equipment, but also dual-use technologies that 
support defense.  The organization, nature, and characteristics of this industrial base 
depend on the resources, funding decisions, and priorities directed at defense; the 
processes that determine those decisions; the incentives put in place by the 
government; and the overarching economic market.  This framework, or operating 
“rules of the game”, provide the pathway a public or private sector entity to 
eventually innovate on behalf of the government, as they are the primary means that 
influence managers to organize labor and capital to meet defense needs.  
These governmentally-generated rules establish the underlying process, 
procedures, and culture of a defense management system that is organized and 
divided into various budget, finance, requirements, personnel, acquisition, 
contracting, systems engineering, security policy, and oversight management regimes.  
To compete in the federal or defense marketplace, an entity must be cognizant of and 
compliant with these regimes.  Depending on how regime incentives are orchestrated 
will have a direct impact on the quality of innovation, the rate or time it takes to 
innovation, and the level of participation that can be generated from the industrial 
base.   
 
Innovation and Defense Innovation 
 The overall concept of innovation will first be explored and then adapted to 
the national security context to determine what is defense innovation and how does 





defined as it rests upon the much more nebulous general concept of innovation.  
Nonetheless, many areas of inquiry provide insights into refining these concepts.   
In the field of business management, innovation has received significant 
attention, highlighted by the works of Clayton Christianson, Peter Drucker, and many 
others.74  Another relevant field of innovation inquiry has been in the area of 
economic history, particularly on the identification of technological turning points 
and their relationship to economic growth, often with a lag as new technologies 
require time to be adopted.  Both of these paths of inquiry are useful for a discussion 
on defense innovation.   This literature is helpful in framing questions that this study 
will raise, such as: What is defense innovation?  Why focus on technological change?  
Is there a U.S. defense innovation problem?  Are there limits to growth in innovation?  
Has it become more difficult to innovate? 
Innovation is a difficult term to define. It becomes even more difficult when 
attempting to measure or quantify the impact of innovation – generally a subjective 
comparison of two different circumstances or states in time.  It has, unfortunately, 
also entered the parlance of marketing as seekers of capital or sales want to be 
considered as innovative and working at the cutting edge of innovation. But what 
exactly is that?  Innovation also must be distinguished from invention, which in a 
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defense context is quite important, as invention is the source of new discoveries and 
knowledge, funded as basic research, which then become the building blocks for 
future innovation. 
Webster’s Dictionary defines innovation as a new idea, method, or device, or 
the introduction of something new.75  But newness for the sake of newness may not 
always define innovation.  There appears to be no shortage of views on the concept. 
Scanning the business trade press, annual reports, and earnings calls, one may find 
hundreds of different definitions of innovation emanating within various companies 
each seemingly creating their own version of the term’s meaning in their strategic 
planning processes. Much as a new start-up or a Fortune 500 company would, this 
review will attempt to develop its own applicable definition of innovation, to be used 
in a defense context. 
In a practical sense, and at its most basic level, innovation can be looked at as 
some given output to a series of inputs (budget, personnel, equipment or capital, 
research or invention) that come together to deliver some new thing or process that is 
markedly different from (and provides some advantage over) the previous output.  
This idea becomes much more complicated when attempting to come to terms with 
the quality of innovation.  Quality is another subjective term that is dependent on the 
varied levels of inputs, incentives, and the effect of the innovation.  There can be a 
standardized aspect of quality related to factory production when a unique part needs 
to be repetitively made and one is measuring tolerances or error rates.  Trying to 
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measure a qualitative difference can run into issues related to different standards 
influenced by whether inputs support outcome and performance-based objectives 
rather than output and process-based ones. In other words, is quality generated by the 
recognition of a greater value or by improving process?  Something may be new or 
different but is it better, and if so, who should be the judge of that and by what 
criteria? 
 Although he didn’t expressly explore the concept of defense innovation, 
Clayton Christianson is helpful in not only trying to address the issue of the quality of 
innovation, but also the effect of innovation.  His classification of innovation types in 
business, while addressing the relationship between business firms, can provide a 
useful nomenclature for describing certain types of defense innovation that arise in 
the competition between states.  Certain definitions may need to be adapted and take 
on different connotations when looking at a national security environment rather than 
a business environment. 
Still, modifying Christianson’s “Innovator’s Dilemma” framework to military 
technology can provide a useful analytical tool in helping to define certain aspects of 
defense innovation.76  The incentives and objectives that Christianson focused on to 
address why companies fail will be different within a business market than in the 
national security enterprise, where competition among states is not tested in the same 
way or as quite as often as in the market. In fact, success in deterrence strategies 
involves never having to test that competitive balance between powers. Still, there are 
 





enough similarities that the model of sustaining and disruptive technologies can 
become a useful explanatory tool in defense. 
Christianson’s first innovation type is sustaining or continuing to make only 
those improvements necessary to maintain market competitiveness.  This is primarily 
focused on continuous process improvement within one’s business model.  It requires 
no change to culture or operations and is the way a firm maximizes profits over the 
long term.   In a national security context, this can be thought of as the minimum 
effort necessary to maintain the balance of power.   
The incremental improvement of weapons systems initially designed in the 
1970s has been the predominant focus of U.S. acquisition approaches toward the 
modernization of weapon systems for the last fifty years.  In fact, many of those same 
systems started during the Cold War are still the foundation of U.S. military forces – 
the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, M-1 Tank, Apache helicopter, F-15, F-16, and FA-18.   
Ships, of course, have planned lifetimes and receive incremental upgrades whenever 
they are in port for maintenance.  For the last several decades, incremental upgrades – 
either through new contracted programs with the original contractor or conducted 
during depot maintenance of these items – have been the major source of defense 
innovation.  This is a minimalist strategy that corresponded to the lack of threats after 
the end of the Cold War and thus could be compared to sustaining or maintaining 
one’s position in the market.  As will be seen, it also corresponds with a constraining 
oversight process focused on delivering capability to meet pre-ordained estimated 





technical or managerial. Sustaining innovation can continue in a national security 
context until these forces are tested on the battlefield.  
In Christianson’s concept, one could have radical or revolutionary change 
within the sustaining innovation category.   This is a step change in technological 
innovation that provides further market advantage, but is designed to maintain one’s 
place in the marketplace.  As in more incremental sustaining efforts, there is no need 
to change culture or operations.  This distinction in the national security context 
seems to be worth its own category of revolutionary or sustaining revolutionary.  A 
step change in military innovation occurred in intelligence, surveillance, data 
analytics, and sensor fusion to address post 9/11 national security threats designed to 
track down small independent combatant units in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. These 
new innovative efforts were examples of how to enable near-term technological 
advantage on the battlefield, but they would not have been made except for urgent 
operational shortcomings.  Other rapid innovation efforts conducted during this time, 
such as adapting the V-frame hull on Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles 
(MRAPs), counter-improvised explosive device (IED) programs, and advances in 
battlefield medicine to address the proliferation of road side bombs and armor-
penetrating weapons, could also be thought of as revolutionary in the sense that they 
while technologically significant did not require a significant change in culture or 
operations to incorporate and provided further battlefield advantage.   
Finally, disruptive innovation upends markets.  It not only requires a major 
technological or market offering change but a change in culture and operations or 





that is more accessible and available to a larger population. This is likely not to come 
from the incumbent, who is more focused on sustaining innovation. In business, 
disruptive innovation comes from finding a cheaper way of doing things -- which has 
not always been the case in the defense market.  The one area in defense that might 
qualify is the proliferation of cheap, unmanned drones to smaller militaries as a more 
accessible way to achieve several military missions. The increase in the use of drones 
by less capable militaries and insurgent groups may adhere more to Christianson’s 
idea of finding a cheaper way to do something.  The recent use of drones in Nagorno-
Karabakh for tactical advantage by Azerbaijan and the drone strike on Saudi Arabian 
oilfields in 2019 are recent examples of that type of potential disruptive defense 
innovation.  The asymmetric strategies pursued by Russia and China, such as cyber 
warfare and disinformation, and anti-access/area denial (A2AD) strategies may be 
cases of revolutionary innovation, but could also meet Christianson’s disruptive 
criteria of cheaper, more accessible innovation likely to be initiated from outside the 
dominant culture.   
 While disruptive innovation can change the market and culture or operations, 
the Christianson framework would need to be modified in defense to address a truly 
radical new revolutionary technology or capability to emerge, which is likely to be 
less accessible and perhaps more expensive than other alternatives, at least initially.   
The submarine, tank, aircraft carrier, nuclear weapons, and satellites were disruptive 
innovation candidates as defined by the need to change culture, but they do not meet 
the rest of the Innovator’s Dilemma definition.  Disruptive innovation may be closer 





Military Affairs doctrine from the 1970s that originated in the Soviet Union and was 
the source of much interest in the U.S. after the Gulf War by Andrew Marshall in the 
Office of Net Assessment.77  Future disruptive innovation in this context could 
potentially cover the potential use of artificial intelligence linked to autonomous 
systems or directed energy weapons.  Recent advances in hypersonic missiles may be 
disruptive, but as they seem to fit within the culture of current missile systems and 
delivery, they might also be thought of as a revolutionary step change from ballistic 
or cruise missiles. 
Under these definitions, defense innovation in the U.S. has focused in 
peacetime on evolutionary or sustaining, and (in a pinch) in minor conflicts since the 
end of the Cold War, on revolutionary sustaining innovation.  To compete in a new 
Great Power competition, defense innovation will likely need to be disruptive, and 
that will likely require a change in culture. The ingrained cultural resistance to 
disruptive new technologies and ways of doing business is a useful concept when 
addressing opposition to any potential changes to the industrial base and management 
regimes necessary for further future defense innovation.   
The arms race or action-reaction arms control literature that arose during the 
arms control debate of the 1960s may also be relevant in assessing the logic behind 
advances in defense sustaining and revolutionary innovation.78 If the logical next step 
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in weapons technology development would just elicit a new expensive 
countermeasure, would it not be better to call a halt to all of that wasteful expenditure 
through an arms control agreement?  Perhaps, but only if your opponent decides to 
pursue domestic spending alternatives as well, rather than use the savings in forgone 
countermeasures to invest in another, more troublesome threat like cyber warfare or 
hypersonic missiles.   
The policy debates conducted since the 1990s on achieving a Revolution in 
Military Affairs or a Third Offset Strategy in the mid 2010s may well fit within a 
disruptive innovative framework, but these analyses may better correspond to another 
approach to assess innovation by focusing on historical turning points (or what can be 
viewed as past disruptive innovations).79  The history of technology, and particularly 
the industrial revolution, has focused on identifying broad sweeps or turning points in 
innovation – such as steam power, railroads, electricity, the internal combustion 
engine, airplanes, or computers. For example, Robert Gordan classified these periods 
and technologies in the following way: 
‘The interpretation of past economic growth is anchored by the three 
industrial revolutions. The first (IR #1) centered in 1750-1830 from the 
inventions of the steam engine and cotton gin through the early railroads and 
steamships, but much of the impact of railroads on the American economy 
came later between 1850 and 1900. At a minimum it took 150 years for IR #1 
to have its full range of effects.  
 
The second industrial revolution (IR #2) within the years 1870-1900 created 
within just a few years the inventions that made the biggest difference to date 
in the standard of living. Electric light and a workable internal combustion 
engine were invented in a three-month period in late 1879. The number of 
municipal waterworks providing fresh running water to urban homes 
 
79 Barry Watts, “The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary 






multiplied tenfold between 1870 and 1900. The telephone, phonograph, and 
motion pictures were all invented in the 1880s. The benefits of IR #2 included 
subsidiary and complementary inventions, from elevators, electric machinery 
and consumer appliances; to the motorcar, truck, and airplane; to highways, 
suburbs, and supermarkets; to sewers to carry the wastewater away. All this 
had been accomplished by 1929, at least in urban America, although it took 
longer to bring the modern household conveniences to small towns and farms. 
  
The third revolution (IR #3) is often associated with the invention of the web 
and Internet around 1995. But in fact electronic mainframe computers began 
to replace routine and repetitive clerical work as early as 1960.” 80 
 
Defense technologies could be categorized using a similar classification of 
turning points in defense technologies, grouping into historical periods various 
disruptive technologies such as gunpowder, the longbow, firearms, the machinegun, 
iron-hulled ships, submarines, tanks, aircraft, radar, the jet engine, missiles, 
reconnaissance satellites, nuclear weapons, stealth, and precision guided weapons and 
navigation.  In defense, however, identifying what is most innovative in the last 40 
years is difficult, if not daunting, as innovation moved to more incremental sustaining 
types of innovation while the commercial sector has been more disruptive.81 
The idea of a lack of major disruptive defense technologies in the recent past 
leads to another useful source of ideas from debates and ideas between those who 
tend to be technological pessimists, such as Robert Gordan and Tyler Cowen, versus 
the techno-optimists such as Matt Ridley or the culture of Silicon Valley.82  Has there 
 
80 Robert J. Gordon, “Is U.S. Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six 
Headwinds” Working Paper 18315; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. August 
2012.  
81 Unmanned defense systems may eventually prove to be the exception, but as will be seen in Chapter 
5 these systems were developed outside the prevailing defense innovation system. 
82 Tyler Cowen. The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All the Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern 
History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better. New York: Dutton, 2011.; Ridley, Matt. The 
Evolution of Everything: How New Ideas Emerge. First U.S. ed. New York, NY: Harper, an imprint of 





been a decline in innovation and if so, how does one measure that?  The pessimists 
argue that we have reached the end of the easy discoveries and that the computer 
revolution has not had the productively increases that we imagined.  The optimists 
argue that the world is getting better and innovation will continue as long as it is 
based on the freedom of thought and application of venture capital flowing to new 
innovative ideas in the Silicon Valley eco-sphere. 
This debate is relevant to national security as some of the more significant 
approaches that the military is pursuing are the next steps in the computer revolution.  
DOD can still benefit from those advances taking place in the economy as a whole.  
Whether it can take the next innovation step or it has just gotten harder to elicit 
breakthroughs in defense science and technology development remains to be seen.  
Unlike in the rest of the economy, DOD has not taken advantage of and adapted to 
the commercial computer revolution and innovation as well as the commercial 
market.  DOD’s innovation approach currently supports the techno-pessimists, but is 
a limit to knowledge or the innovation model that might be holding DOD back?  The 
technological optimists may argue for adopting a different model that could lead to 
disruptive innovation that would reject the pessimist’s thesis.   
 
Defense Innovation as a Capabilities Based Variable 
While the preceding literature may be useful in a defense policy sense and can 








important aspects to assess when looking at defense innovation, and can they be 
measured?  Many of the described concepts focus on shifts in technology or the use 
of technology, although process innovation can also be argued as being disruptive.  In 
looking beyond defense technology, defense innovation can be found in a number of 
personnel, process, and operational areas.  First, innovation can occur through 
different strategy and tactics, such as the application of forces and technology in new 
combinations, for example, the Blitzkrieg of the 1940s, the Airland Battle of the 
1980s, or potentially today’s concept of All Domain Operations.  The French had 
more tanks than the Germans at the start of WWII, but they also had a different and 
ultimately unsuccessful concept of operating them.  James Q. Wilson thought the 
secret to the German success against France was better organization: “the key 
difference between the German army in 1940 and its French opponents was not in 
grand strategy, but in tactics and organizational arrangements well-suited to 
implement those tactics.  Both sides drew lessons from the disastrous trench warfare 
of World War I.  The Germans drew the right ones.”83 
Technology alone may not lead to victory, but new ways of using equivalent 
technology can make a difference.  A matchup between two forces with identical 
technologies can lead to entirely different outcomes.  Better and more innovative 
tactics and training leading to greater force readiness are critical to implementing 
strategy.   Leadership innovations such as those that would allow individual soldiers 
to make decisions in the “fog of war” rather than rely on centralized headquarters 
decisions beyond the battlefield may also be a force differentiator.   
 





Still, science and technology development is a critical factor usually 
considered first when discussing future defense innovation.  Better tactics, leadership, 
and training will find it difficult to overcome severe technological or industrial 
overmatch.  While the lessons of Vietnam and Afghanistan prove that overmatch can 
be overcome, in these cases success came only through decades of unconventional 
warfare and political strategy aimed at maintaining a stalemate. Technology can and 
should be a focus area for analysis and policy, but technological superiority should 
not be thought of as a guarantee to achieving one’s political objectives through 
warfare.  
What technology does have going for it as a variable to use when analyzing 
defense innovation are the decades-long sources of data underpinning it.  There are 
usually official public discussions about military programs starting with earlier 
technology research efforts.  Research funding levels and priorities provide insights 
into where future disruptive ideas may be coming from.  While many of these ideas 
don’t succeed, are abandoned, need further discovery, or meet the so called “valley of 
death” awaiting non-existent funding in the future, those programs that do survive can 
serve as a basis of further analysis.   
The level of science and technology spending is measurable and can provide 
insights into priorities and possible future capabilities.  Still, even proving an idea in 
research doesn’t mean it will be adopted or that adoption won’t have a significant 
lead time.  These efforts do not imply that it will actually lead to a useful new item 
that military personnel may be willing or able to use.   Once usage happens though, a 





reason that science and technology development leading to deployment as a 
capability is an appropriate measure of defense innovation.  The focus of the 
measurement of defense innovative efforts in this study will be on the physical 
weapons system capabilities that are tested, deployed, and used by U.S. forces, while 
recognizing that defense innovation also occurs in many other non-technology areas.    
Thus, as a basis for measurement, defense innovation will be defined as the 
changes that are made with technology as demonstrated in the tangible and 
measurable output of a deployable defense capability.  These deployed or operational 
programs are not only material and calculable, but often used as a basis for measuring 
the balance of power between states, for example in the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies’ annual Military Balance that lists by nation the number and types 
of ships, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, and other military equipment and 
capabilities.84  When trying to measure or define defense innovation, it becomes 
practical and logical to focus on weapon systems.  This is not only where most data 
are, but also where there has been the greatest focus of governmental and academic 
literature on defense management.    
Advances in basic science and invention are important, but if not coalesced 
around a usable system or capability, are just an unused building block until 
incorporated into an operational prototype or system.  The key data point for analysis 
is likely to be found in the later stages of technology development, particularly 
regarding operational prototyping and the fielding of a defense capability or weapon 
 






system where operators can use and test the system.  A similar point in commerce 
would be at the stage of the marketing of a new product where consumers for the first 
time decide whether to buy such a product.   
Weapons systems are the tangible outputs of defense innovation policies and 
over the years significant data has been collected on the underlying costs, schedules, 
plans, and performance of these systems.  Identifying lessons learned from this data 
and experience that can be used to inform future policy decisions and debates is one 
goal of this research.  The use of these systems for evaluation is not only important 
for analysis because there is data, but also because of their outsized importance in 
military affairs.  
 
The Defense Innovation System 
If the concept of successful defense innovation is equated to deployed defense 
capabilities, then the next step is defining the system that produces those capabilities, 
followed by identifying and categorizing specific system components.  The defense 
innovation system is critical to the success, failure, quality, and performance of any 
new defense innovation that manifests itself as a deployed capability.  The defense 
innovation system can be divided into two components.  The first is the industrial 
base that develops and produces the results of defense innovation – i.e., designs, 
produces, and maintains a deployed weapon system.  The second is the management 
framework that provides the rules and management oversight regimes that govern and 






Industrial Base Component of the Defense Innovation System 
The industrial base component of the defense innovation system includes the 
stock of people, knowledge, infrastructure, and capabilities generated from prior 
research and development, production, and maintenance of not only military 
equipment, but also dual-use technologies that support defense.  How these different 
factors are organized to support defense and national security needs determines the 
nature, structure, and characteristics of the industrial base (such as whether it is 
competitive, monopolistic, privately or government run).  The defense industrial base 
is a subset of the larger domestic economic and global industrial base and varies in its 
makeup based on ownership of the means of production.    
The determination of how defense capability is provided, and by whom, is the 
subject of a nation’s defense industrial policy.  Defense industrial policy is, in the 
broadest sense, how a nation harnesses its economic resources to meet its military 
needs.  It is a subset of (and also dependant on) a nation’s overall industrial and 
national economic policy.  This industrial policy can be de facto, de jure, laissez-
faire, or explicitly identified and codified.  Those who oppose the concept of a 
national industrial policy need to come to terms with the fact that a laissez-faire 
approach to let the markets decide the course of investment and innovation is in 
actuality an industrial policy in itself.85 
 
85 The implications of a laissez-faire industrial capacity were illustrated during the COVID-19 
pandemic. The personal protective equipment industry had moved offshore to China absent any 
incentive to stay in the U.S. as there appeared to have been no countervailing awareness or policy to 





A nation’s industrial base or industrial capacity places limits on the kinds of 
defense innovation that can be pursued.  For example, if certain industrial capacities 
are lacking, a nation may have to either develop that capability within the 
government, provide incentives for domestic industry to enter the government 
market,86 or contract with entities abroad to obtain that capability. Once a capacity 
has been created, maintaining or monitoring that capacity becomes important, 
otherwise due to neglect it may atrophy or disappear.  
A nation’s defense industrial policy can function at the national economy 
level, the industrial sector level, the industrial unit level, and at the workforce level.  
Economic incentives and other variables operate at each of these levels and contribute 
to industrial policy outcomes.  Industrial policy is dependent on a series of 
management regimes, such as contracting, whose practitioners would likely not 
consider themselves conducting defense industrial policy but are critical in shaping 
how the defense industrial base is organized and incentivized. 
At the national level, the ability to provide security to its citizens from 
external and internal threats is a primary function of government and a key test of 
competence. To defend against threats to its sovereignty, the military and civilian 
sectors of the economy of a nation are linked at a basic level.  Military capability has 
to be paid for and the underlying economic capacity to create a surplus is a necessary 
requirement to supporting a professional military and dedicated defense industry.  
This was as true with a Bronze Age agricultural surplus that allowed for the creation 
 
86  Possible incentivizes include creating domestic source restrictions that require all government 
agencies to source from a domestic company, tariffs, taxes, sanctions, and advanced purchase 





of a specialized warrior class as it is for the role of the Federal Reserve, sufficient tax 
revenue, and Treasury financing in the nuclear age.  A surplus in the underlying 
economy is a necessary prerequisite of any military capability.  
At the national level of industrial base strategy and policy, wealth in the 
underlying economy is a key variable with Gross Domestic Product (GDP), level of 
debt, and the ability to borrow money in peacetime or wartime critical to the military 
potential of a nation.  Defense capability relies on the civilian sector to create the 
wealth or surplus that can be taxed, expropriated, used as collateral to incur debt, or 
otherwise shifted to meet military needs.87   Thus, the ability of the 
civilian/commercial side of the economy to ultimately create overarching wealth and 
a growing GDP is key to the ability of a nation to remain militarily strong.   While 
overall economic health is not always thought of as traditional defense policy goal, it 
actually stands as the first principle of any supporting defense industrial policy.88  
Once a decision is made to transfer funds to the government, a decision must be made 
about how much of a government’s revenue should be applied to military needs 
(“guns”) or domestic needs (“butter”).  Figure 2.1 identifies the public policy choices 
that the U.S. has made since World War II.  While top-line defense expenditures have 
risen during this time, the allocation between guns and butter has changed with a 
 
87 Decisions made about how to allocate the resources of a nation to meet defense needs have 
significant national security and economic implications.  The inability of the underlying economy to 
create enough wealth to pay the debts incurred to support the military activities of 16th and 17th century 
Hapsburg Spain and France in the 18th century weakened these nations and contributed to their decline 
from Great Power status.  It did not take long after the destruction of Europe’s wealth in World War II 
to see that these nations could no longer maintain large colonial possessions overseas nor prevent the 
passing of global power to the United States and the Soviet Union.  
88 Former Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mullen’s concern about the national debt in 
2012 may have taken by some as a surprise coming from a senior military official, but looking through 
history it should come as no surprise that the military is concerned about the ability of a nation to 





growing percentage of GDP moving to nondefense government spending and a 
declining percentage for defense. 
 






Once resources are shifted to military control and executed through a defense 
budget, defense industrial policy focuses on the industrial sector level and how the 
 





defense industrial base should be structured.  Throughout history, as the need for 
advanced weaponry evolved, the defense sector of an economy primarily become a 
specialized unique government-run industrial base focusing on products that typically 
do not have a civilian use.  This often required maintaining a dedicated industrial base 
in peacetime that could be ramped up in times of conflict.  Gradually, in many nations 
there began an evolution from an arsenal model, where the government controls the 
means of defense production, to a greater role of the private sector – particularly in 
times of crisis, where there is a need to mobilize to meet a near-term threat.  This 
private sector participation has been justified for efficiency, but also for innovation 
reasons. 
The next policy level of analysis is at the industrial unit level and the 
microeconomic and behavioral incentives that operate within a firm or a 
governmentally owned industrial enterprise.  If the entity is privately owned, 
concerns such as the maximization of profit, market share, risk, and the control of 
intellectual property become important values.   The various distinctions in private 
ownership also become important, as contractors can be publicly-traded firms or 
privately held, and the views of these investors on profits, cash flow, and revenue can 
impact the firm’s behavior.  What is significant, at least in the U.S. and other 
democracies, is that private sector firms usually have the option of participating or not 
in the defense industrial base. Therefore, the nature of regulatory management 
regimes are key determinants in that participation decision. 
If an industrial base entity is government-owned, political factors are more 





will likely be responsible for directly appropriating funds for the operation of these 
entities.  Sometimes, market-like mechanisms are created to try to mirror the private 
sector or incentive private sector behavior in a public sector entity, such as the use of 
working capital funds or competition between public entities, but these are not 
necessarily needed or the norm.90  The U.S. experience with its government-run 
arsenals and depots illustrates that it is extremely difficult politically to close a 
government run facility, while the private sector can do this much easier. This 
resistance to political factors is one source of near-term comparative advantage for 
the private sector.  On the other hand, having a “just-in-case” governmental capability 
provides greater resiliency in a crisis and an alternative to a monopoly private sector 
provider.  Once closed, however, sufficient demand, lead time, and resources are 
necessary to reconstitute an industrial capability – whether private or public.  U.S. 
allies have found it easier to close or privatize government facilities, but it has often 
only been severe defense budget constraints that forced these countries to do so. 
Finally, a fourth level of defense industrial policy is concerned with the 
personnel capabilities of industrial units and the associated government 
organizations’ ability to effectively oversee the industrial base that can meet defense 
needs.  As technological and managerial complexity rises in defense systems, the 
workforce must have the necessary skills and experience to address that complexity.  
The workforce level unit of analysis is important not only at the industrial unit level 
but also in the managerial workforce of the government that must oversee a vast 
 
90 Working capital funds are revolving funds established by Congress to finance commercial like 
operations at DOD such as maintenance depots.  See: U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Defense 





technical enterprise.  The core question at this level is: does a nation have the 
scientists, engineers, managers, technical knowledge, and necessary resources to 
design, develop, test, and produce advanced weapon systems? 
The defense industrial sector can take on many different structures, as outlined 
in Table 2.1.  One of the key distinctions that can be made when analyzing the 
structure of the defense industrial base is highlighting the degree of private sector or 
public sector participation and the ownership of facilities, equipment, and intellectual 
property.  On one end of the spectrum, the government can own and operate the 
means of production and the private sector’s role is limited.  In the middle of the 
spectrum, is a military-unique, privately-run industrial base that only supports the 
government, and on the other end of the spectrum, is an integrated commercial and 
military base that supports both defense and commercial applications.  The industrial 
base can be privately held and run or be some mixture of the two-sector model, such 
as a hybrid where the government owns the assets but the private sector runs 
operations.  In each of these structures the private sector can execute a government-
created specification or mandated solution, have discretion in developing and 
determining a military unique solution, or bring in a commercial solution developed 















TABLE 2.1: Defense Industrial Sector Structures Based on Degree of Reliance  
                      on Private Sector 
 
Structure Role of Private Sector 
Government Owned-
Government Operated 
Arsenal          
• Private Sector May or May Not Provide 




• Private Sector Management of 
Government Arsenal 
Private Sector 
Arsenal                                         
• Private Sector Management and 
Ownership of Means of Production 
• Build to Print from Government Designs 
and Military Specifications 
 
Military Unique Industrial 
Base                               
• Develops Military Solutions within 
Specialized Industrial Base 
 
Military-Unique + Commercial-
Off-the Shelf (Limited Civil-
Military Integration)  
• Augments Defense-Unique Solutions 
with Non-Modified Commercially 
Available Off-the Shelf Products 
 
Military-Unique + Commercial 
Items (Partial Civil-Military 
Integration) 
• Augments Defense-Unique Solutions 
with Modified Commercial Products 
 
Full Civil Military 
Integration                                 
• Integrates Commercial and Military 
Unique Bases 
• Adopts Commercial Best Practices 
• Produces Military Products on 





Within the privately-held defense industrial base a further level of distinction 
can be made.   Are these private firms conducting only military business or 
combining their military with commercial business in development and production?  
Do firms have unique separate defense divisions or do they support both markets with 





market is so unique that a firm has to essentially set up the equivalent of a stand-alone 
private sector arsenal, which is differentiated from the public one in that the profit 
motive provides some market discipline – which the public arsenal lacks.  Each of 
these issues must be considered at not only the prime contractor level, but at the lower 
tiers, since the latter frequently represent the major risk and cost issues on a defense 
program. 
This discussion of the internal structure or incentives of the private sector 
leads to the introduction of the concept civil-military integration (CMI). Defense 
technological innovation in the U.S. and elsewhere has been greatly influenced by the 
periodic cooperation and integration of the commercial and military unique industrial 
bases.  The level of this technological cooperation has been referred to as the degree 
of CMI in the national industrial base.   CMI became a widely-used defense term of 
art and policy objective in U.S. in the early 1990s and refers to a policy that was 
starting to be pursued in the 1980s, but whose roots go back farther.   
In the 1990s, a congressional agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, 
defined CMI “as the process of uniting the Defense Technology and Industrial Base 
(DTIB) and the larger Commercial Technology and Industrial Base (CTIB) into a 
unified National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB). Under CMI, common 
technologies, processes, labor, equipment, material, and/or facilities would be used to 
meet both defense and commercial needs.” 91    
 
91 U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, “Assessing the Potential for Civil Military Integration,” 
September 1994, p. 15. The DTIB is comprised of both privately run and government run entities that 





The level of CMI is differentiated by the degree of segregation of various 
aspects of the industrial base into a stand-alone DTIB and CTIB.   This segregation 
can occur at the technology, process, workforce, industry, individual firm, or facility 
level.  The goal of CMI at each of these levels is to encourage desegregation and 
establish greater integration of the two industrial bases to enable improved 
cooperation and the sharing of ideas, workforce, and capital to maximize productivity 
and innovation in both the defense and commercial sectors.  Thus, if a firm like 
Boeing was producing a defense and commercial product on the same production line 
(as it now does with the P-8 and the 737), that implies a higher degree of CMI than 
having separate production facilities or separate business units focused on different 
markets. 
The nature of the private portion of the industrial base can be changed through 
mergers and acquisitions leading to the consolidation of the defense industry, foreign 
investment, or through new entrants into the market such as emerging small business 
and from the venture capital market.  The health of adjacent commercial markets and 
perhaps the most importantly – revenues, cash flow and profit margins in relation to 
those available in the commercial market are other key factors.  Revenues, cash flow 
and profits and cash flow determine whether a company will enter or continue to 
remain in the defense market.  Ultimately, it will be profits that determine whether a 
company stays in business.  Wall Street and private finance police how well a firm 
manages its profitability over the long run and will provide incentives such as 
punishing the stock price or withholding capital or debt financing if it believes 





The financial markets are vitally important in shaping incentives for whether a 
company chooses to stay in the federal market or not, yet are often not considered or 
are an afterthought in government actions.  The industrial base is a collective of 
individual units.  If private, these units as individual firms respond as a dependent 
variable to either a constraining or liberating set of rules and incentives that are made 
in the capital markets or, as will be explored in the next section, by its monopsonist 
buyer, the DOD.   
A final factor that is useful in analyzing the defense industrial base is the 
degree to which the domestic industrial base is open to buying or cooperating with 
industrial units in foreign countries.  This could range from public sector R&D 
cooperation, to purchasing from foreign governments and foreign companies, to 
private-sector to private-sector cooperation.  Domestic source restrictions and security 
requirements may prevent such cooperation, but it also may prevent commercial firms 
from accesses technology and internal industrial units that reside overseas to 
participate in defense programs. 
 




The organization, nature, and characteristics of the industrial base that 
supports defense is dependent on the budgetary resources, funding decisions, and 
priorities directed at defense; the processes that determine those decisions; and the 
incentives put in place by the government.  This framework of rules provides the 





innovate successfully for the government, as they are the primary means that 
influence managers to organize labor and capital to meet defense needs.  These rules 
influence whether to enter or exit the market and the degree of CMI within a firm and 
collectively in the larger industrial base, based on multiple company decisions. 
These incentives, or rules on the government side, are implemented by public 
management regimes that may set the rules in addition to overseeing them.  Some of 
these rules are enacted into law, often at the request of the executive branch 
management regime, or from companies attempting to gain a market advantage. This 
rule set is influenced by a series of values that the government – either the 
Administration or Congress – is trying to achieve. For example, to achieve a certain 
level of efficiency, effectiveness, fairness, competition, innovation, socio-economic 
goal, or other purpose.  The availability of resources and the level of threat are two 
other variables that may influence these rule sets.   
These governmental rules comprise the underlying process, procedures, and 
culture of defense management regimes that address budget, finance, requirements, 
personnel, acquisition, contracting, systems engineering, security policy, and 
oversight. To compete in the federal or defense marketplace, a governmental actor or 
firm must be cognizant of and compliant with these regimes.  How the regimes’ 
incentives are orchestrated has a direct impact on the degree of innovation and level 
of participation that can be generated from the industrial base.  For private sector 
firms and participation, this is particularly exacerbated when the governmental 
regimes are at odds with market norms and practices – which is the other side of the 





markets is equally important as these rules factor into whether firms will even enter 
the government market.  For those that stay, it can impact their access to talent and 
financing.   
Each management regime can impact defense innovation in two major ways.  
The first is on the nature of the industrial base and how it is able to propose solutions 
to defense problems.  The second has to do with the constraining factor of regime 
process on the time to conduct innovation.  Governmental rules set a timetable for 
how long it takes to innovate – i.e., how long it takes to deliver a weapons capability 
to the troops in the field or sailors at sea.  Compliance with the rules of the regimes 
takes time, and that time becomes the lower limit of how fast the government can 
innovate, as defined by the ability to deliver defense capability.  Obviously, if the 
government is trying to do the impossible, time goals become meaningless, so there is 
always a necessary balance between the art of the possible and desired schedule. 
The amalgamation of defense management regimes that impact defense 
innovation are part of a larger government management framework that exists in the 
federal government.  All of the regimes have a congressional component or interest, 
and many have either active participation or oversight from other federal agencies 
that restrain and check DOD behavior.  Many other management functions at DOD 
address more than just the development of technological capability.  On the DOD 
organizational chart, policy, intelligence, strategy, and operations are important and 
each of these functions has its own management regime, which could be assessed and 
analyzed for its impact of innovation.  While these regimes will be discussed where 





technological capabilities and thus are critical to defense innovation will be of 
primary focus.  This set and subset of management regimes that support the function 
of developing weapons systems capability are the components of the Defense 
Innovation System.   
The collective management regimes that constitute the Defense Innovation 
System could also be described as the overarching acquisition system (Appendix A 
provides a more detailed description of each regime’s focus, rule set, and potential 
impact on innovation in general). This would be a much broader framework than 
what one currently thinks of as the acquisition system, but may have a better 
explanatory function.  For years, much of the theoretical focus on the acquisition 
system has seen an undue focus first on the contracting system and then the program 
management function.  The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) 
panel report in 2006 attempted to broaden this to include other several management 
regimes into a concept of “Big A” acquisition that included – requirements, budget 
and acquisition vs. “Little A” – contracting.92  This has been a useful but not inclusive 
description as other regimes such as personnel, security, and oversight can also 
impact and are an integral part of most acquisitions of defense innovation programs.  
It is also significant that larger issues related to innovation and the industrial base are 
often not considered a holistic system with the industrial base often assumed as a 
given or a constant.   While this framework is more complex than the DAPA “Big A” 
construct, it is more realistic.  Each of the management regimes that influence 
 





weapons acquisition can be better described as the management regime component of 
the Defense Innovation System. 
Each management regime – whether structured to do so or not – impacts the 
nature of the industrial base and often the time it takes to innovate.  These impacts are 
determined through policy choices by the government in how it formulates the 
problem of what it wants innovation for, how it wants to engage the industrial base 
(both public and private), and how it uses its market power to set the rules that govern 
relations with the private sector.  These rules are not only public procurement or 
contracting rules, but include, for example, addressing technology transfer and the 
ability of the private sector to use its technology and sell a product or service once it 
does so to the government.   
The government can set these rules because the defense market is not a 
normal market that exists in a capitalist economy.  It is a monopsony market 
comprised of one sovereign buyer and many sellers.  Within the defense monopsony 
market, the government can structure the rules to fit the type of industrial base it 
prefers, with each structure requiring an optimal rule set to achieve.93   Thus, by the 
virtue of being a monopsony, the government determines the rules through 
acquisition policy and guided by industrial policy objectives, which ultimately 
determines the makeup of the defense industrial base.  The reality is that the 
 
93 There are several advantages and disadvantages to the current U.S. government run monopsony 
market.  The government can focus on leading edge technologies that the commercial market is not 
focusing on that can lead to various technological spin-offs to the commercial sector.  The size of the 
U.S. defense market at over $400 billion in domestic contracts and foreign sales allows for a degree of 
concentration of effort, but still, it pales in comparison to the $2.7 trillion information technology 
market. While the defense market lacks competition at the prime contractor level, the majority of costs 
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government may not be guided by the overarching impact when it makes up its rules 
separately in each specific management regime, but creating rules does not mean that 
there is not an impact. The optimization of rules for each management regime may 
actually suboptimize the outcome of the system as a whole. 
If regime rules are too limiting or the market too small, there may be no firms 
willing to participate or only one sole-source provider that the government then has to 
monitor and potentially, be forced to manage the health of that provider.  On the other 
hand, in some markets the government can choose to leverage the commercial 
marketplace and take advantage of whatever level of competition exists in that 
market, but may be limited to buying whatever the current commercial solution is that 
may not completely meet the military’s need.  In other cases, the government may 
need to manage competition, creating an artificial market that attempts to maintain 
competition for a unique government need – for example in the cases of submarines 
or warships that have limited commercial equivalents.94 
However, the government may not always obtain significant benefits from 
maintaining competition in the defense market, such as greater innovation and cost 
reduction because of how the market is structured.  The market can be centrally 
managed through a more command and control approach or can be more passively 
managed, taking advantage of the incentives of the marketplace and only intervening 
when competition or some other priority is under threat.  Still, even with what may be 
 
94 Although, even in these predominantly defense-unique markets there is a civilian submersible 
market and similar shipbuilding technologies are used on container ships and cruise liners (not to 
mention commercial electronics and business practices) that could be tapped to the military’s benefit 






defined in government programs as robust competition – 2-3 defense unique firms 
bidding on a major defense system – this approach might be leaving out the 
innovational opportunity from firms that have little incentive to do business with the 
government.   
Therefore, in a monopsony, the criteria used in any top-down command and 
control management approach is an important factor to explore in what type of 
industrial base coalesces around the government market.  Because the defense market 
is controlled by the buyer, a seemingly laissez-faire approach to competition could 
end up with only a few providers that specialize in compliance with centrally-
determined unique government rules.  This could be at odds with an outwardly 
centralized approach that would divide up the market in ways that could encourage 
new entrants by making government rules more open and commercial-like.  Whether 
using a centralized or laissez-faire approach to implement government-unique or 
commercial-type rules are some of the alternative government market structures that a 






Chapter 3: The Evolution of U.S. Defense Management 
Regimes and the Industrial Base 
 
“[PPBE is] really a relic of the Cold War — a holdover from the days when it 
was possible to forecast threats for the next several years because we knew who 
would be threatening us for the next several decades …  [It is] one of the last 
vestiges of central planning left on Earth.”  Donald Rumsfeld95 
 
 
Prior to any potential reallocation or increase in resources to address a rise in 
national security threats, it is vitally important to understand the reasons behind past 
innovation successes before determining what approach the U.S. should adopt in 
developing and delivering new military capability.  This chapter assesses the 
historical record of the factors that influenced U.S. defense innovation to include 
specific defense capability advancements, the industrial base, and defense 
management regimes.   Three periods will be reviewed.  The first, from the founding 
of the Republic until the beginning of World War II, saw the rise of a narrow and 
limited price-based peacetime defense innovation framework that was found 
unworkable in periods of conflict.   The second period emerged during World War II 
and lasted until the early 1960s.  This system relied on a time-based innovation 
approach and was ultimately replaced in the third period by a cost-based system that 
continues to dominate today.96  
 
95 Donald H. Rumsfeld, remarks delivered to the DOD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week 
Kickoff—Bureaucracy to Battlefield, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., September 10, 2001; quoted in 
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), Exploring a New Defense Resource Management System, IDA 
Paper P-3756, Alexandria, VA: IDA, April 2003.  
96 Several sources of documentation have been extremely useful in providing a foundation in the 
history of how the U.S. has managed defense innovation efforts.  The U.S. government has done a 
remarkable job through its network of history offices at OSD and the services to document acquisition, 
logistics and maintenance issues that have faced the military since the revolutionary war.  One such 
project to describe the history of defense acquisition since World War II was commissioned in the late 
1990s and culminated in an assessment by Fox in 2011 (“Defense Acquisition Reform: An Elusive 









The roots of the defense innovation system (both in the industrial base and 
federal management regime incentive framework) date back to the pre-World War II 
era.   The U.S. Constitution gave Congress the power “to provide and maintain a 
Navy” and “to raise and support Armies.” This was offset, however, by an aversion to 
actually creating a strong standing military by limiting army funding in the 
Constitution with the caveat “but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a 
longer term than two years.”97 This anti-militaristic approach was also linked to the 
experience of the Revolution when the British quartered troops in American homes -- 
the subject of the Third Amendment to the Constitution to prohibit such a practice.  
Upon independence, a cyclical history of conflicts influenced U.S. defense 
innovation policies and the development of a defense industrial base up until the 
beginning of World War II.   These cycles manifested themselves through defense 
budgets increasing in response to conflicts but – most critically – followed by a desire 
to return to minimal defense spending after each conflict.  As Jacques Gansler 
observed: “Beginning with the revolution, the United States has built up its defense 
production as required for a war, and as soon as the conflict was over, producers 
essentially disbanded and returned to normal commercial operations. Each time, the 
 
difficulties in reforming the defense acquisition system over a 50-year period.  The first two volumes 
in the series by Eliot Converse and Poole provided significant insight into the evolution of defense 
management regimes from World War II to 1968. Another significant source of historical context is 
James Nagle’s history of government contracting. Nagle, James F. “A History of Government 
Contracting” Washington DC: George Washington University Press, 1999. 





approach taken was that this would be “the last war, and no future military would be 
required.”98   
Defense technological innovation and the nature of the industrial base has 
been shaped by a demand signal usually triggered by a threat or perceived threat and 
then followed by the application of resources.  In the U.S. prior to World War II there 
was little demand except during periods of conflict.  Thus, a historical cyclicality 
centering on peacetime vs. wartime needs can be measured and delineated by the rise 
and fall of the defense budget.  Budgets were limited during peacetime and then grew 
rapidly during periods of conflict.  These cycles were measured in decades (as seen in 
Figure 3.1) with the Civil War and World War II accounting for the largest spikes in 
spending interspersed with smaller spikes for the War of 1812, the Mexican Wars and 
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Industrial Base Prior to World War II 
 
The pre-World War II experience of long cycles between conflicts had a 
significant impact on the U.S. industrial base.  From the initial large-scale defense 
program initiated by President Washington (the building of 6 frigates that came to 
prominence in the War of 1812)100, to the need to build a self-sufficient armaments 
 
99 United States. Bureau of the Census, and Social Science Research Council (U.S.). Historical 
Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, 1949. 
100 Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy. 1st ed. New York: 





industry, and to supply troops during the Civil War and World War I, defense needs 
have shaped how the federal government approached the private sector and what type 
of industrial base was created to support the U.S. government’s national security 
needs.    
Essentially, two different industrial bases formed depending on whether the 
nation was in the middle of a conflict or not.  The first was a self-sufficient, 
peacetime industrial base that was primarily composed of government-run and 
operated facilities.  These facilities were supported by the private sector for primarily 
raw materials and supplies, and incentivized through a price-based contracting 
system.   During these peacetime interludes, the U.S. Congress and presidential 
administrations were satisfied with a limited military budget that was insufficient to 
conduct major operations.  This peacetime budget could support a few publicly-run 
arsenals and shipyards, a limited navy, and a few army units based in frontier forts far 
away from the population.   
The second system rose up during war or periods of conflict and focused on 
rapidly incorporating overseas and domestic private sector innovations and 
production to augment the limited capacities of the public arsenals and shipyards.   To 
address mobilization needs, the U.S. government would begin to quickly look to 
commercial companies, but without investment over the years it took time for these 
firms to stand up and produce military items.  There was limited to no anticipatory 
planning or recognition of a threat prior to a conflict, and thus no signalling of an 
advance expenditure of funds to begin the long lead times required to conduct 





U.S. defense spending rose rapidly at the beginning of a conflict that then initiated an 
inevitable mad dash to lock down supplies and equipment. 101   
Because mobilization was not planned in advance, the shift to the private 
sector for military production took longer than most would realize.  Oftentimes, the 
conflict was over before equipment could be delivered.  For example, during World 
War I, a new private defense industry (including a nascent aircraft industry) began to 
develop, but did not ramp up production in time to make a major difference in the 
war.  With the armistice, contracts were canceled and the private defense industry all 
but evaporated.  In between these various cycles, that portion of the private sector 
industrial base that geared up to support the government’s war effort went back to 
supporting the commercial sector and the public sector arsenals regained their 
predominance in supporting a peacetime U.S. military.  Private shipyards resumed a 
focus on commercial shipbuilding.  Early U.S. defense manufacturers such as Dupont 
or Colt would shift from the U.S. military market to supplying gunpower and 
armaments to the overseas market or the mining sector and to other commercial 
uses.102  
 
Defense Management Regimes Prior to World War II 
 
Implementation of the cyclical rise and fall of defense budgets that impacted 
the composition of any temporary private defense industry was carried out primarily 
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through the contracting process, which developed in peacetime into a price-based 
regime.  Until World War II, management regimes were fairly basic.  The most 
important were the budgeting, finance, and contracting regimes.  The budget account 
structure was not complicated and was based on organization or mission.  The finance 
system designed to report to Congress on expenditures was tallied by clerks who kept 
detailed receipts according to Congressional direction.103  Contracting was the most 
fluid and changing over the various budget cycles.  A cyclical contracting experience 
arose that first had to address the enormity of mobilization and then inevitable 
wartime fraud and abuse became embedded in government management culture.  A 
similar pattern would reoccur in response to each subsequent increase in defense 
expenditures driven by war or conflict.  
In peacetime, management regimes focused on spending a limited budget to 
support arsenals, military installations, and forts.  The government was highly 
distrustful of the private sector.  This was likely for good reason, given past examples 
of fraud and profiteering.  The private sector was not always entirely to blame, 
however. There was also a history of government procurement agents in charge of 
contracting who, when given greater discretion in contracting, often were incentivized 
to look after their own interests rather than the government’s.  Procurement agents 
were often paid a percentage of the contracts they negotiated, which unfortunately did 
nothing to incentivize low prices being paid, and in fact did the opposite.104   As a 
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result of abuses from paying inflated prices, a system of sealed bidding and awarding 
contracts based on low price became the peacetime contracting default, rather than 
negotiating contracts based on a subjective concept of value to the government.  The 
concern over officials enriching themselves through taxpayer dollars has a long 
legacy, reaching back to at least 1808, when Congress passed statutes to prevent 
government officials from benefiting from contracting.105 
The peacetime contracting regime became a price-based model designed to 
limit fraud and price gouging.  Any private sector contracting, usually for supplies to 
support government installations, was conducted on a low-price basis after a sealed 
bid competition.   These two criteria – sealed competitive bids and low price -- 
formed the basis of the contracting management regime of the pre-World War II era 
and would be re-emphasized in later historical periods.  The reality, though, is that 
very little defense contracting was taking place during these long periods of peace 
and low military budgets.  Contracting in peacetime was higher at civilian agencies 
such as the postal service or for infrastructure projects.  Further, these civilian 
contracts also tended to go to low bidders under a competitive sealed bidding process.  
As Nagle observed: “the country, especially, Congress, has idealized competition and 
fixed-price contracts.  Since the early days of the Republic, Congress has clearly 
preferred a competitive bidding system in which contracts are advertised, all bidders 
given a fair opportunity to compete, and the lowest bidder receives a fixed price 
contract.”106 
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Sealed bidding is extremely competitive and incentivizes private industry to 
bid as low as possible – locking in gains for the government.  On the negative side, 
companies could bid too low and run into problems of performance – i.e., they lose so 
much money that they default on their contract and the government is left with few 
options when faced with an unexecuted contract except to start over.  While designed 
to prevent profiteering and fraud, there was always the chance that a contractor would 
bid low and then walk away or deliver poor quality goods. This is known as product 
substitution in order to skim off a higher profit.  Still, these low-price sealed bid 
competitions did eliminate the procurement agent’s incentive to pay higher prices.  
The other problem with competitive sealed bidding was the time involved to 
conduct a procurement.  Nagle noted that: “Competitive bidding is often the least 
efficient way to contract and has often obstructed America’s ability to prepare for 
war.  A major part of America’s preparation for its wars, both in the nineteenth and 
especially in the twentieth centuries, has been the need to suspend or modify the 
competitive bidding rules as the country rushed to overcome decades of neglect.”107  
As will be seen in Chapter 5, the approach of suspending the rules was continually 
used to address more than just contracting issues as management processes became 
more complex in the latter half of the 20th century. 
The sealed bid contracting process, while adequate in peacetime, came under 
immense pressure early in a conflict.  The process was too slow to respond to high 
demand.  Thus, when the traditional procurement system could not handle the new 
demand and as the role of the private sector and time became critical, the peacetime 
 





procurement system collapsed and emergency contracting authorities were used.   
These wartime authorities relied on negotiated procurement methods with often 
multiple contractors, but awarded without competition to sole-source providers.   
In the meantime, in the rush to get anything out to the troops as quickly as 
possible, procurement scandals and fraud flourished.  Inevitable ethics and conflicts 
of interest issues arose during rapid negotiations that led to even greater fraud and 
abuse.  A protectionist preference was also inherent in peacetime contracting, when 
money become available and the government did not want to buy from abroad.  The 
inability of U.S. companies to produce immediately led to emergency negotiated 
overseas procurements.  Many of these contracts also suffered from fraud, waste, and 
abuse and the purchase of old, outdated, sometimes unusable European equipment.  
This emergency wartime system – susceptible as it was to cases of wartime 
profiteering, price gouging, and fraudulent product substitution (delivering sawdust 
rather than gunpowder as an example) – would eventually be wound down after 
hostilities ended.  If the conflict lasted long enough, countervailing pressures would 
arise during hostilities to begin to immediately address cases of fraud, waste, and 
abuse, such as when Congress passed the False Claims Act of 1863 known as the 
“Lincoln Law”.108  This Act incentivized whistleblowers to come forward by paying 
them a percentage of funds of identified fraud.  Since most conflicts were of shorter 
duration, it was usually after demobilization that congressional hearings would 
address wartime excesses and inevitably laws were passed designed to prevent such 
occurrences from happening again.   Ultimately, a reset to the peacetime acquisition 
 





system would commence, reverting to the sealed bid, low price, government run, 
protectionist arsenal system.  The procurement system tightened up, budgets were 
slashed, profits limited, and the cycle resumed.  
This cyclical history of the U.S. innovation system prior to World War II was 
relatively stable and predictable.  Paying a low price was most valued in peacetime 
while rapid access to supplies mattered in wartime.  What might be most significant 
was the length of the peacetime cycles.  The time between wars was measured in 
decades, which gave the acquisition system time to reset to a “peacetime acquisition 
equilibrium.”  For over 150 years, the U.S. defense innovation system responded to 
this pattern.  Moving from a peacetime to a wartime system and back again -- 
responding to wartime needs that then triggered contracting oversight scandals and 
then adjusting to a decline in the budget.   
 
Defense Innovation Prior to World War II  
 
How did this early U.S. defense innovation system actually perform in 
delivering innovation? The reality is: not very well.  Developing new defense 
capability was not a driving factor in peacetime and in wartime equipping troops was 
the first priority.   Most new innovation came from Europe as technologically, the 
U.S. arsenals lagged developments in Europe with a few exceptions.  When conflicts 
arose the first place to look was to the state of art in Europe.  The foreign transfer of 
technology made sense as the European powers were in a constant state of war or 
preparation and R&D was more robust in Europe than in the U.S.   Given the short 





and explosives with a limited role, at least initially, of bringing in new indigenous 
innovations based on wartime R&D. 
Peacetime indigenous defense innovation was measured in decades and 
primarily conducted in-house in the publicly-run arsenal system.  While several 
peacetime initiatives periodically built up the navy and led to a few sporadic out-of-
conflict cycle increases in the shipbuilding budget, once built the U.S. often lost 
interest and allowed these ships to age.  In wartime an opposite trend occurred.  As 
Mowery observed: 
“…. mobilization for war since at least the mid-nineteenth century has 
involved a surge in military demand for existing weapons and systems that is 
available in a crisis situation and are compatible with established tactics and 
strategies. Wartime mobilization therefore relies on the increased production 
of weapons that were largely designed and developed prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities. The pressures of wartime mobilization focus R&D and related 
investments in weapons development on improving reliability and 
performance of existing systems, rather than developing radically new 
technologies.”109 
 
Several exceptions to these innovation trends hold relevant lessons for future 
U.S. defense innovation.   First were periodic pockets of U.S. innovation that arose in 
wartime – particularly during the Civil War and World War I – that served as the 
inklings of an eventual need for a corollary to Mowery’s argument.   The length of a 
conflict had an impact on the introduction of new innovations with the Civil War and 
World War I.  The Civil War saw the introduction of new time-base innovations such 
as the repeating breach loaded rifle, the machine gun, naval mines and torpedoes, and 
the iron-clads, along with the adoption of new innovations from the commercial 
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market to military uses (railroads, telegraph, and balloons for aerial reconnaissance).  
World War I continued to build on some of these advances but added tanks, 
submarine warfare, airplanes, flamethrowers, poison gas, and radios to the mix.  The 
first lesson is that each of these wartime innovations came about or were significantly 
advanced due to time constraints of meeting the threat.  Still, like most U.S. defense 
innovation in this period, these were largely forgotten and unfunded after the war and, 
if applicable, an advancement moved out into the commercial market and drove new 
commercial advances such as for continuous wave technology in radios after World 
War I.110  
Two other lessons came from this experience.  The first was the CMI benefit 
from working with the military.  In both the Civil War and World War I came major 
shifts in the creation of commercial industry.  The Civil War propelled the clothing 
industry into the industrial age through the standardization of clothing sizes and the 
same types of demand kickstarted the radio industry after World War I. These 
industries became stronger and benefited greatly from supporting the war effort.  At 
times in U.S. defense economic history the commercial sector has been the lead 
change agent for technological advancement and at other times military needs drove 
innovation.111  From the late 1800s to the present day, the materials, 
telecommunications, and transportation industries each grew and expanded, through a 
push-pull mechanism of national security and commercially competitive needs.  As a 
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result, both the military and consumers benefited from the cross-pollination of ideas, 
research, and breakthroughs in technology, manufacturing, and business practices.    
The other issue was the concept of industrial mobilization lead time. In World 
War I, the U.S. performed poorly in ramping up to support the troops. It wasn’t until 
the end of the war that industry was at full capacity.  As a result, General Pershing did 
not receive a single American tank on the battlefield in time to make a difference.112  
It took 18 months of war to finally get industry mobilized.  This is still a pretty good 
standard of the time it takes to create a new industrial capacity to meet a wartime 
need. Even increasing spending has limited effect on reducing that time.   This time 
needs to be factored in before the process begins.  Mobilization must begin 18 months 
to 2 years ahead of time or one risks suffering the reality of what former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld once said: “You go to war with the army you have, not the 
army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”113 
There were also a few significant peacetime innovation exceptions during the 
pre-World War II era.   These include: 1) the development of interchangeable parts in 
the1820s; 2) technological changes in the steel industry in the late 1800s driven by 
naval shipbuilding requirements; 3) the rise of private R&D facilities in the late 
1800s; and 4) the history of early aircraft development and post WWI aircraft 
experimentation funding by the Army.  Each of these examples shine some light on 
the issues related to and the nature of defense innovation that will be important to 
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later analysis.  While wartime efforts in this period illustrate the importance of time to 
development, these peacetime innovative examples illustrate the importance of CMI 
in the industrial base, and the role of rules in the innovation system.   
 
Case Example: CMI Innovation Transfer from Military Unique Defense 
Technology to Commercial Market Development (Springfield Arsenal) 
 
 
Despite efforts to control military technology and practices, if there is a 
commercial use, this technology and knowledge ultimately moves into the 
commercial market.   For example, the shipbuilding demands of the Royal Navy in 
the 16th and 17th centuries furthered the development of new technologies and 
manufacturing techniques that were applied to commercial shipbuilding.  The 
evolving military need for interchangeable parts that would eventual revolutionize 
commercial manufacturing received its first significant boost through the evolution of 
cannon production in France in the 1700s.114  European improvements in military 
manufacturing brought forth knowledge that eventually spread to European 
commercial enterprises and then across the Atlantic Ocean, just as in the last several 
decades manufacturing knowledge proliferated to China and other parts of the 
developing world.   This diffusion of intellectual property and manufacturing 
knowhow from Britain and Europe would ultimately lead to the creation of the 
“American System” of manufacturing or mass production. 
 
114 Shipbuilding required complex industrial processes to produce pulleys, rope, sails and other fittings 
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This first started to germinate in the Springfield arsenal in Massachusetts in 
the early 1800s.  Mass production’s development in the U.S. was advanced by 
military research and development generated by the U.S. Army’s specific and quite 
rigorous military requirement to achieve interchangeable parts in gun manufacturing 
in the early 1800s.  “Believing that interchangeable weapons would mean easier field 
repairs and cheaper manufacture, the officers of the Ordnance Department urged 
development of uniform small arms, with detailed written specifications and gages for 
inspection purposes.” 115  This did not happen overnight as it took “thirty-five years of 
sustained effort at making essentially uniform muskets, succeeding to the satisfaction 
of Armory mechanics in 1849.”116 
The manufacturing solutions for this requirement once developed at the 
Springfield U.S. Army arsenal eventually spread throughout the U.S. economy.117   
These techniques were further refined in the commercial marketplace over many 
decades as workers left the arsenal and built their own enterprises.  This knowledge 
applied to clocks, furniture, bicycles, and eventually automobiles ultimately created 
the industrial capacity and ability to mass produce at scale.   
The development of interchangeable parts at the Springfield Arsenal became 
the first of many examples of the need to solve hard military problems or 
requirements that exceeded what was available in the commercial marketplace.  This 
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triggered research into new technologies and once these hard problems were solved 
that knowledge was eventually transferred back to the commercial sector where it 
took on a different life of its own.  In our own era, this dynamic is one that could 
incentivize many artificial intelligence, robotics, and data analytics firms to enter the 
defense market to try to solve some of these difficult military problems and then use 
the knowledge that comes from that research on more profitable commercial uses.  
 
Case Example: CMI Innovation Transfer from the Imposition of Military 
Unique Requirements on the Commercial Market (Specialty Steel) 
 
 
While the Springfield Arsenal example is one where the government led an 
innovation that moved into the private sector, the military’s need for a more costly 
solution not available in the commercial market can oftentimes set the stage for 
competitiveness for those private sector firms that produce to a more demanding 
military specification.  These requirements can sometimes be imposed on industry 
through a product specification.  The steel industry in the 1880-1890s was shaped by 
one such a product specification for naval ships.   
The U.S. Navy asked the steel industry for higher quality steel.  Despite 
intensive resistance from a steel industry that did not want to make the required 
investments, the U.S. Navy continued to insist on a more stringent requirement. Many 
companies decided to forgo U.S. contracts because the cost of compliance and the 
capital costs in building a new mill to produce such steel would be too high. Two 
companies, Bethlehem Steel and Carnegie Steel, eventually would specialize in 





advantage as this new specialty steel eventually became the commercial standard.   
Other steel manufacturers could not compete and went out of business, leaving these 
two companies to dominate the market.  The Navy’s requirements and enforcing 
those requirements through rigorous testing “were the real means of producing the 
quality of material now so universally used in the industry.”118 
Unique military specifications do not always lead to adoption by the 
overarching commercial market but neither does this dynamic always lead to an 
isolated industrial capacity that only supports the military.  It is possible that the 
current requirement for higher information security requirements in the DOD’s 
Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification and the National Institute for Standards 
and Technology SP800-171 cybersecurity standard could bring change to the 
commercial market.  Both of these standards now required on current defense 
contracts are more stringent than what the commercial marketplace requires of 
vendors. This could create a situation where U.S. firms achieve a comparative 
advantage similar to the late 1800s Navy specialty steel example.  
 




At other times, advancements in the commercial market led to huge 
innovations that can be leveraged in wartime.  In the U.S. prior to World War II, CMI 
manifested itself primarily in the civilian side supporting national defense in times of 
crisis but also serving as a source of innovation and new products and ideas when 
 





called upon.   CMI in one form or another has been a key aspect of developing 
military capability in the U.S. since the Revolutionary War.  The U.S. Navy’s first six 
frigates authorized in 1794 (the first large-scale weapons platform purchase by the 
U.S. government) were built in those shipbuilding communities that were producing 
commercial merchant ships.  The Civil War necessitated the mobilization and 
integration of industrial and commercial capacity on both sides of the conflict.  The 
importance of the non-defense commercial industrial sector and CMI should not have 
come as a surprise, as from the beginnings of the industrial age to the dawn of the 
information age, technological change has been sparked and maintained by a 
combination of military and civilian demand signals and investment.  As the 
industrial revolution advanced, military applications and improvements closely 
followed commercial breakthroughs.   
In the late 1800s, an important development arose that would influence the 
rise of the time-based processes of experimentation and prototyping that would be 
adopted by the U.S. government in WWII.  This was the transition from sole inventor 
to inventor-run research and development centers.  As Whitehead sums up the 
century: “the greatest invention of the 19th century was the invention of the method 
of invention.”119  The industrialization of R&D that occurred in Edison’s labs and 
then in company laboratories like Bell Labs provided a framework to invention 
through experimentation and prototyping, but also more importantly, the scientific 
and engineering basis that could be built upon by the military.  While technologies 
such as radio were heavily used and both Edison and the predecessor to Bell Labs 
 





were active in supporting research efforts in World War 1, the reality is that it would 
take something like WWII to take full advantage of this development method.  
These commercial research and development centers were the foundation for 
significant innovation in the U.S. For decades new technologies and ideas germinated 
in these invention workshops and many of these technologies made it into military 
solutions.  But they also became the example of how to innovate on an industrial 
scale.  When it came time to develop radar and nuclear weapons in World War II 
there was already a model in place. 
Audrey Cronin recently pointed out the importance of the “tinkerers” of the 
late 1800s-early 1900s who were at the forefront of innovation that resulted in 
capabilities with profound military uses.  She argued that in today’s decentralized 
information technology centric innovation environment “Rather than try to wrest 
control of the chaotic process of open technological innovation, the U.S. government 
should better inspire and incentivize today’s whizz kids—the Nobels, Marconis, and 
Wright Brothers of the twenty-first century…”120 There are still lessons in the 
invention of the method of invention that may be relevant almost 150 years after 
Edison started his first laboratory in Menlo Park, New Jersey. 
 
Case Example: Experimentation Authority – the First OTA 
 
 
The final example illustrates that even in the peacetime culture prior to World 
War II it was sometimes necessary to go around management regime rules to 
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innovate.  While this consistently happened in wartime, it was during the interregnum 
between WWI and WII that the U.S. military attempted to break the mold of limited 
peacetime innovation by pursuing a partnership with the private sector.  Advances in 
aircraft that were made in WWI continued around the globe and in the commercial 
sector but the U.S. military quickly fell behind.  After the war, the fledgling airline 
and aircraft industries were kept alive mostly due to U.S. government airmail 
contracts and not because of military demand. The expectation was that the U.S. 
would need to wait for the next conflict to advance this technology as procurement 
rules were preventing successful experimentation. 
This delay did not happen and for just a short period of time the military 
would be able to advance aircraft technologies that would prove insightful and 
important to future U.S. success in WWII.   Both the Navy and the Army Air Corps in 
the mid-1920s took some of the biggest steps taken toward future CMI efforts 
through a reinvigoration of U.S. aircraft development programs.  In 1924 Congress 
created a committee to review progress in aircraft development and this committee 
concluded that “the destructive system of competitive bidding” was leading to 
disastrous results as the lowest bidders were not making progress.  As a result, 
Congress acted and passed the Navy Air Act of 1926 and the Army Air Corps Act of 
1926.  Rather than dictate a military specification and solution which would have 
been required under the sealed-bid competitive process, the new approach allowed the 
services to, engage the private sector to come up with their own solutions, leaving 
“most management decisions to private aircraft and engine firms, where research, 





unavailable to federal managers.”121  Thus, to get around the existing bureaucratic and 
inflexible contracting and acquisition process, Congress authorized experimental 
authority that was the precursor of what is now known as Other Transactions 
Authority (OTA).  This authority allowed for a more commercial contracting process 
and enabled greater innovation and flexibility in accessing the private sector.122   
The experiment only lasted about 8 years but it was enough to jump-start the 
industry and experiment with new concepts, and it allowed the military to continue 
developing aircraft that evolved from those experimental aircraft.  The reason this 
new experimental contracting authority lost favor is that in the early 1930s the U.S. 
entered a rather late countercyclical reaction to the excesses of that last war.  The 
narrative of the “Merchants of Death” who drug the U.S. into WWI for profit was the 
topic of a book bestseller in the early 1930s. It was not long before these arguments 
were amplified in 1934 by the Republican isolationists in the Munitions Investigating 
Committee in Congress or the Nye Committee as a means to keeping the U.S. neutral 
in the growing potential for conflict in Europe.  In this environment the Vincent 
Trammel Act of 1934 was passed. While allowing the Navy to finally rebuild, it 
contained provisions that limited contractor profits, required ships to be built in 
government shipyards, and introduced more stringent government audit rights on 
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contractors.  This would not be the last time that acquisition reforms and the narrative 
of fraud, waste, and abuse were surreptitiously linked to seemingly non-related issues 
of disarmament, isolationism, and an anti-war effort.  Still, that was the price to pay 
to allow the U.S. to begin to reconstitute a naval force that would be sorely needed in 
7 years’ time. 
 
World War II to Early Cold War Defense Innovation System 
 
World War II was a watershed moment for U.S. defense innovation.  It didn’t 
have to be and could have very easily conformed to the pre-World War II pattern.  
Whether through serendipity, planning, luck, or foresight, the past cycle was broken 
both immediately prior to the conflict and afterwards.  This period did not last long – 
at most 25 years from the late 1930s to the early 1960s – but it became the most 
innovative period from a defense perspective in U.S. history and the source of some 
of the most significant military technologies still in use today.   
Many lessons had already been validated from the pre-World War II 
experience.   Time constraints (primarily in wartime) could focus innovation efforts.   
Civil military integration of the industrial base cut both ways.  It was an enabler as 
research conducted in private sector labs could have significant military potential and 
these labs validated the importance of experimentation and prototyping.  On the other 
side of the ledger, for commercial firms solving hard government problems there 
were benefits to be had from applying this knowledge to the commercial market such 
as was seen in the advances made in communications after WWI or the steel industry 





became barriers to innovation and participation by the types of firms the government 
may need, but could be sidestepped with special authorities such as was seen in 
aircraft experimentation during the 1920s.  And finally, as witnessed in all previous 
conflicts, the industrial base needed time to transition to war-time production and 
innovation so the sooner to begin that effort, the better.  
As in previous conflicts, the peacetime management and industrial base 
framework was set aside during World War II.   What was a bit different was that this 
shift began prior to the conflict and continued into the early Cold War period to meet 
the immediate needs for rapid innovation to first address heretofore unprecedented 
war-time needs and then an unexpected competition with the Soviet Union.  The 
World War II system began as a wartime system similar to those enacted in past 
conflicts that were established to bypass the older management framework. The 
exigencies and length of the war led to some different innovation approaches being 
successful with time to deploy capability emerging as even more of a critical variable.  
After the war, the onset of the Cold War, the maintenance of larger peacetime defense 
budgets, and a new robust approach to government’s role in peacetime science and 
technology policy saw a continuation and evolution of the distinctive WWII 
innovation model.  This model was different than any peacetime model in previous 
U.S history and was similar to the World War II model that it closely mirrored.  This 
system was defined by a focus on experimentation, prototyping, and time-based 
development and brought together both the government and the private sector in a 
high degree of civil military integration of the industrial base, although somewhat less 





Still, in the 1930s there was no defense industry to speak of.  In what has been 
a similar historical pattern, demobilization after World War I resulted in a smaller 
military footprint and a specialized industrial base that resided in a few government-
owned arsenals and facilities.  The first difference was the degree of advanced 
industrial base mobilization that allowed for the gearing up of the private sector in the 
years preceding the U.S. entering the conflict.  After the failure of the Washington 
Naval Treaty, the beginning of a naval build-up occurred in the 1930s.   The typical 
need for a rapid rush to mobilize industry was somewhat tempered due to the ability 
of President Roosevelt to offer support and equipment to the UK and France in the 
run up to World War II through the lend lease military aid program. This allowed the 
U.S. industrial base to begin production in the late 1930s to support these arms 
transfers, which then paved the way for a more rational mobilizational in 1942 after 
the U.S. entered the war and needed to increase its own equipment needs. 
The other important factor was the large transfer of technology knowledge 
from the UK that occurred in the Tizard mission in 1940 and the subsequent industrial 
cooperation that occurred between the UK, Canada, and the U.S.  The sharing of the 
UK’s technology for (among other things) the cavity magnetron miniaturized 
microwave radar levelled the playing field and saved the U.S. decades of research, 
development, and experimentation time.  This allowed the U.S. during the war to 
focus on the next incremental developments in radar and other technologies that could 
build off of a higher level of knowledge.  Next, the overall emergency and the limited 
time frames to get technology into the hands of the soldiers, sailors, airman and 





innovation became the order of the day, but it had the advantage of gaining access to 
the UK’s technology.  It also had the benefits of the knowledge brought in from 
decades of experimentation in the private sector and the adoption by the government 
of that experimentation and prototyping process.  Finally, the U.S. effort was 
furthered by the large immigration of scientists and engineers from Europe who came 
to the U.S. to escape the Nazis in the run up to the war. 
This period became the height of CMI. The existential threat of World War II 
resulted in an almost complete integration of the U.S. military and civilian industrial 
bases as the country converted commercial production to military uses.   Thus, as 
World War II began for the U.S., the U.S. aircraft industry expanded from its role of 
carrying the mail and a few passengers in a developing airline industry.  These 
passenger plane designs were converted into bombers and British fighter and engine 
designs were produced en masse in the U.S.123 The rest of commercial industry 
converted to military applications and served as the “Arsenal of Democracy” and a 
foundation for eventual victory.  The commercial manufacturing base and its mass 
production expertise was able to reduce the excess capacity that had built up from the 
legacies of the Depression.   
This was no mere government takeover of the commercial industrial means of 
production to conduct the war effort, but a partnership where industry was allowed to 
bring its manufacturing technology and knowhow to bear on military problems of 
increasing production of military items on a vast scale.  In a nod to the interwar 
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experimentation and development of military aircraft, the greatest success of World 
War II industrial innovation occurred not when the U.S. government dictated a 
solution but when it engaged the commercial industry. Individual scientists and 
engineers with problems or requirements allowed the private sector to apply 
commercial development and manufacturing methods to come up with solutions.124  
The results were staggering: two million trucks and thousands of aircraft, tanks, ships, 
and artillery pieces were built in just a few years. 
It was also not a one-way street as the commercial industry benefited from the 
vast expenditures the U.S. government spent on such things as machine tools.  These 
same machine tools would eventually serve as the basis for U.S. manufacturing 
dominance into the 1960s and 1970s.  Industrialists such as William Knudson from 
Ford and then General Motors, who was brought in by Roosevelt to run U.S. war 
production, understood that the war would not last forever and that it offered the 
potential to re-tool American industry that could not afford to so during the Great 
Depression.  This type of foresight allowed for the new machine tools and 
infrastructure purchased by the U.S. government to support the war effort and 
provided the means by which the U.S. maintained economic dominance and 
competitiveness for decades.125  
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Still another innovation model emerged that was different from the “Arsenal 
of Democracy” mass production model.  This was the bringing together, under 
government leadership and planning, scientists and engineers to work on emerging 
breakthrough technologies.  The research labs of Edison and Bell were replicated writ 
large under government watch and ownership.  Whether it was in radar, 
communications, the breaking of encrypted codes, or what became the greatest 
example of the model – the Manhattan Project – centralized government planning and 
execution of technology development led to huge technological advances.   
The other significant approach taken by the Manhattan project was it was 
planned with significant duplication in mind.  Failure was expected, and thus planned 
in, so there was never one path to development.  In one sense, the Manhattan Project 
managers were replicating the competition that would occur in private research labs.  
As Peck and Sherer observed, “five completely different full-scale methods of 
producing fissionable material were carried forward simultaneously” on the 
Manhattan project.126 This is an important lesson that has been forgotten in the 
singular linear acquisition and predictive developmental management approaches 
pursued since the 1970s.   A final point should be made that any time-based 
constraints were limited by the stock of scientific knowledge that had existed at the 
start of World War II. Research could obviously be advanced, and was, but in the 
short period of time that the war lasted (less than 4 years for the U.S.) the current 
baseline of knowledge was what everyone had to work off of to start.  The importance 
of this past academic and private sector research and experimentation was critical.  
 





The differences between the centrally-planned model and the CMI model has 
sometimes led to debate on the source the source of WWII innovation and its role in 
ultimate victory.  Does innovation come primarily from the private sector and then is 
incorporated into military products, or is it the public sector with its demand and 
command and control planning process that leads to revolutionary or disruptive new 
technological innovations?  There are probably no one size fits all answers to that 
question, as it turns out both models were used effectively and were likely critical for 
success in World War II.  There was both a high degree of CMI and government 
direction where appropriate. Basic scientific research before the war was critical. 
Technology leadership depends on where one is on the innovation cycle.  In the midst 
of war there was no one right answer or pathway chosen but there was a portfolio of 
innovation approaches that allowed the government to pick and choose from the best 
models.  Both models benefited greatly from time constraints.  The exigencies of the 
war made time the most important factor in driving innovation in both of these two 
models and that was more important than whether they were contractor or 
government run.  Time and the need for speed drove out the bureaucracy and the 
second-guessing.   Things either worked or they didn’t.  They could be abandoned 
and something else tried.  Mission oriented success is what mattered most.   
Not that excess bureaucracy didn’t exist at the time, but if process, 
bureaucracy, and poor management had been allowed to dominate and prevail, a 
focus on time would not have succeeded.  A price-based focus on competition and 
controlling prices and profits did not go away.  The Vincent Trammel Act had been 





oversight cycle seen in past conflicts over concerns about war time profiteering and 
potential fraud, waste, and abuse.  Mark R. Wilson devotes a chapter in his book 
“Destructive Creation: American Business and the Winning of World War II” to 
“One Tough Customer” that describes issues with red tape, the arbitrariness of 
contract demand, profit and price control to include an excess profit tax of 90 percent.  
Government-owned production facilities and arsenals were used to gain insight and 
benchmark private contractor costs to guard against profiteering and to provide more 
competition.127 
Popular sentiment and congressional oversight bodies such as the Truman 
Committee continued to be highly suspicious of the rise the private sector.  Due to 
these wartime sentiments and oversight uncovering a host of fraudulent examples, 
after the War many factors were in place that were aligned to return the defense 
innovation system to the traditional peacetime cycle.   At war’s end, demobilization 
began its usual course.  Americans were eager to engage in consumption after the 
hardships of total war and the commercial industrial base began to reconfigure 
production back from meeting military to consumer needs.  President Truman could 
not have been unaffected by his experience just a few years earlier in Congress 
focusing on the excesses of the war and concerns over war profiteering.  It was 
understandable that there was a Presidential desire to follow up on some of the issues 
outlined.  The late 1940s saw the establishment of the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulations and the beginning of the bureaucratization of the acquisition statutes.  
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The National Security Act of 1947 began the process of centralization with the 
creation of OSD and the new Secretary of Defense nominally in charge of acquisition, 
although the military services remained effectively in charge until the late 1950s.  
During this beginning to a return to normalcy, if past post-war era experiences 
in the U.S. were maintained, it would have been expected to see a return to a 
publicly-run arsenal system to meet defense needs, such as existed at the army 
arsenals and the public navy shipyards in the lead up to the Civil War and World War 
I and II. Instead, after World War II, a new dominant model emerged where the 
private sector would become the predominant player in both defense R&D and the 
production of defense systems, creating a more powerful augmentation layer over the 
government-run military research and production facilities.  Arsenals would be 
maintained but focused on munitions and maintenance, and were not significant 
sources of new innovation.   A new government-run laboratory structure did arise 
focused on building on the advances of the Manhattan project.  These nuclear 
laboratories established during the war continued to focus on the building and 
development of nuclear weapons, but also relied on private contractors for many 
inputs and systems.   
Several factors eventually countered the usual historical cyclical trend of 
demobilization and budget cuts and a return to the arsenal system and a more rigid 
procurement process.   Driving these changes were two significant figures who 
played key roles in two countervailing trends.  The first was General Eisenhower, 
who recognized the importance the private sector played in the war effort and the 





Still, neither of these visions would have likely played out if the Soviets hadn’t seized 
Eastern Europe and the Cold War broke out. 
The experience of World War II influenced Eisenhower immensely. The great 
advances made in the automotive manufacturing industry as it supported the army 
during the war continued to influence policy once Eisenhower became president.  But 
before that, as the chief of staff of the army, Eisenhower outlined his view on the role 
of the private sector and achieving defense innovation. In a 1946 memo to the army 
Eisenhower stated: 
 
“The recent conflict has demonstrated more convincingly than ever before the 
strength or our nation can best derive from the integration of all of our 
national resources in time of war. It is of the utmost importance that the 
lessons of this experience be not forgotten…. The future security of the nation 
demands that all those civilian resources which by conversion or redirection 
constate our main support in time of emergency be associated closely with the 
activities of the Army in time of peace. The armed forces could not have won 
the war alone.  Scientists and business men contributed techniques and 
weapons which enabled us to outwit and overwhelm the enemy.”128 
 
 
Ike went on to call for the need for civilian assistance in planning to understand 
development in science and technology but also for the private sector to be used in 
the production of weapons.  The arsenal system was under siege. This recognition of 
the role of the private sector was widely shared and as defense contracts continued in 
the beginning the cold war there was a greater reliance on the private sector than ever 
before. This policy to rely on the civilian industrial base for its needs was put in a 
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policy document in the Eisenhower administration in which the government explicitly 
stated that it would rely on the civilian industrial base for its needs.129 
The second lesson from World War II was a realization that science and 
technology were key enablers and something that the government needed to not only 
nurture but lead by sponsoring research and development. Vannevar Bush was 
instrumental from his position as Director of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development.  In his report to the President “Science the Endless Frontier” Bush 
wrote to the President on the need to continue to link scientific research to the 
military’s needs: 
 
“The bitter and dangerous battle against the U-boat was a battle of scientific 
techniques - and our margin of success was dangerously small. The new eyes 
which radar has supplied can sometimes be blinded by new scientific 
developments. V-2 was countered only by capture of the launching sites. 
 
We cannot again rely on our allies to hold off the enemy while we struggle to 
catch up. There must be more - and more adequate - military research in 
peacetime. It is essential that the civilian scientists continue in peacetime 
some portion of those contributions to national security which they have made 
so effectively during the war. This can best be done through a civilian-
controlled organization with close liaison with the Army and Navy, but with 
funds direct from Congress, and the clear power to initiate military research 
which will supplement and strengthen that carried on directly under the 
control of the Army and Navy.”130 
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This report was instrumental in convincing Congress and the Truman administration 
to undertake significant funding for scientific research. This R&D was not only 
directed at the government laboratories but also the private sector.  Federal R&D 
expenditure would serve as the basis of U.S. technological dominance for decades. It 
was not until 1980 that the U.S. private sector caught up to the government in 
research and development spending. 
Still, it was the advent of the Cold War that prevented the return to a 
peacetime system. Despite a commitment to a return to normalcy and a new faith in 
the power of the United Nations, the wartime alliance between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union began to break down.  The stirrings of the Cold War began with the 
unfinished business of the war, but it still took two years to recognize what was 
happening and the Truman Doctrine declared.  The eventual fall out between the 
wartime allies and the split between the West and the Soviet Union created a far 
different budget situation than had existed after previous conflicts.   The budget fell, 
but to a higher sustainable level as the Cold War began to be realized. The budget 
then went up sharply again with the onset of the Korean War in 1950.   
Thus, the immediate post-World War II era saw a different industrial model 
evolve whose origins were established at the height of war.   The establishment of 
both a large privately-run defense industrial base and a government-owned laboratory 
structure to conduct scientific and developmental research (as distinct from a 
government-run system of munitions arsenals and shipyards to build and maintain 





Something also different happened to the defense industry and the rules of the 
acquisition system after World War II because of the onset the Cold War. The budget 
cycles played out in much the same way as they did in earlier U.S. history but they 
did so in an intensified manner as the budget cycles became shorter and amplified the 
effects (see Figure 1.3).  Perhaps most importantly, the cyclical downturns never 
quite went back down to pre-World War II levels or even to the levels immediately 
after WWII.  This provided a minimum sustaining base of defense expenditures that 
could support a private defense industrial base during these periods of traditional 
spending reductions.    
Thus, the post WWII experience was different and the initial phases of the 
Cold War served as the partial continuation of conflict.  This led to a slowdown in 
demobilization and budget declines but also in the continuance of the wartime 
management regimes.  What all of this allowed was the maintenance of faster 
acquisition and innovation cycles through the end of the Eisenhower Administration.  
The post Korean War reduction in funds still left DOD with a budget twice as large as 
that at the end of World War II.  While constrained, DOD implemented the New 
Look (First Offset Strategy) within a period of flat to moderate growth and with a 
focus on strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and guided missile systems. 
President Eisenhower’s “New Look” defense policy set the stage for both the 
blossoming of a unique defense industrial base, and also the creation of new civilian 
commercial sectors in electronics, space, and computing.  Defense research of the 
period led to many of the technological advancements that still serve as the basis for 





submarines, advanced bombers, reconnaissance satellites, and the electronics and 
communications technology that support these major platforms.131 
Still, the most important factor for innovation during this period may not 
necessarily have been who worked on projects, or how, or even the budget.  The 
Eisenhower era management construct continued to be guided by time constraints 
imposed on projects that encouraged scientists and engineers to freely experiment, 
prototype, and question.  There was a tolerance for failure, but most importantly a 
focus on adaptability as that was the only way to bring a project in on time. This 
experimentation and adaptable mindset were relevant to both innovation in the private 
sector and in the government-run labs during World War II and would carry on for at 
least another 15-20 years after the war. 
 
Rise of the 1960s Defense Management Framework 
 
This Golden Age of defense innovation lasted less than two decades, with the 
1960s becoming a transition decade.   First, the longstanding public management 
framework’s focus on price focus and control never really went away, and underwent 
a resurgence with the passage of the Truth in Negotiations Act of 1962.  More 
importantly, management practices were significantly modified in the 1960s and 
1970s to reflect a greater cost-based emphasis.  This rested on a belief that a more 
centrally-managed focus on planned predictive outcomes could be achieved that 
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culminated in a new centralized-management framework based on systems analysis, 
program budgeting, and cost analysis.   Cost analysis supported price analytics and 
the priced-based system was subsumed into the new system.  This management 
system emerged in a series of controlling institutions and regimes designed to oversee 
defense innovation.  It eventually became engrained in culture and administered 
within the military structure and bureaucracy that was stood up after World War II to 
give greater centralized control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  
The further incremental evolution of the institutions and regimes associated 
with the original changes made in the 1960s to defense management continued to 
develop in the subsequent six decades.  While the overall basic premises and 
objectives of the 1960s framework did not change, the management regimes matured 
and became even more prescriptive and compliance oriented over time.  This process 
was incremental like the accretion of barnacles on a wooden ship.  The process began 
with ideas that generated policy frameworks, which grew into institutions, which 
were then further modified by implementation regimes and protected by interests in 
the new status quo.  The new model was not created overnight and despite the default 
to a centralized approach, most of this change was incremental and haphazardly 
applied to different management stovepipes, which made it difficult or even 
impossible for a centralized approach to work effectively.   
 
1960’s Antecedents and the Rise of New Values 
 
Many precursors of the 1960s system began to show themselves in the 1950s 





private sector.  Much of this was built on an intellectual legacy that was nurtured in 
the 1950s and shaped by events.  The following factors all came together to shape the 
management system that was eventually adopted in the Kennedy Administration.  
These include a data-focused scientific management outlook, a belief in the 
effectiveness of central planning emanating from the newly created OSD; systems 
and program cost analysis, systems engineering, a preference for linearity over 
concurrency, enhanced security, an anti-private sector bias, and the rise of socio-
economic factors.  Perhaps most importantly, the 1950s system began to be seen as 
something that needed to be fixed.  It was perceived as undisciplined and chaotic: 
multiple paths were duplicative and experiments that didn’t always work were 
wasteful. Estimates of costs were fictitious and unreliable. The system was ripe for 
efficiency and better management, but by what criteria? 
Scientific management has a long history in business management theory, 
beginning with the experiments of Frederick Taylor and the rise of Taylorism.  The 
application of the idea of making a process more efficient has been a leading driver of 
business and also in the government. The two Hoover commissions, in 1949 and 
1953, focused on this ideal but interestingly enough had the foresight to decide to 
exempt DOD from this ideal.  As Moe observed, “As a statement of administrative 
philosophy, the goals of the first Hoover Commission were definitely in the tradition 
of the Scientific Management movement and of earlier reform efforts. Hoover wanted 
to achieve "economy and efficiency" in the Federal Government.”132 
 






In reality, it did not take long for the concept of greater efficiency and the 
ability to manage the government scientifically to take hold.  This greater level of 
efficiency would be implemented through centralized planning, which at DOD would 
be the Office of Secretary of Defense, newly created in 1947. The idea gained ground 
that the government should be run like a business that in the immediate post war era 
were also centrally-run organizations that were benefiting from the legacies of the 
war that left the U.S. as the only functioning manufacturing economy on the planet as 
other economies were still left in ruins. 
Command and control tendencies were furthered by the experience of the 
government directing the economy in WWII. The need to mobilize the commercial 
economy again at the beginning of the Korean War sparked Congress and the Truman 
Administration to re-establish wartime authorities used in World War II through the 
enactment of the Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950.  The resulting 
establishment of the Defense Priorities and Allocation System, or DPAS, ensured that 
the U.S. government had priority access to civilian production to support the Korean 
War effort and future defense needs, but it was based on the concept of compulsion 
and was more attuned to a central planning approach than an effort grounded in 
market incentives and cooperation.   
Finally, the Soviets’ success in developing their own nuclear weapon in 1949 
and hydrogen bomb in 1955, and most significantly, the launch of Sputnik, led to 
deep questioning of the U.S. capitalist system.  The “Sputnik Moment” shattered U.S. 
confidence and for a certain period of time led to a belief by some in the inevitability 





the Soviets corresponded to a worldview of the U.S. government planners leading the 
effort in World War II against the Nazis. The subsequent perceived “missile gap” in 
the runup to the 1960 election only fed the paranoia. Just as in the Soviet Union, to 
maintain competitiveness and regain the innovation edge, some looked to more 
central government planning based on scientific management as a panacea.  
But how to implement this scientific management approach?  The tool for 
efficiency and effectiveness and managing the government in a more scientific matter 
was systems analysis. Systems analysis grew out of the great benefits derived from 
the field of operations research during World War II, which applied statistical 
analysis to the operations of war.  It was a highly successful way of creating 
efficiencies and greater effectiveness in the previous haphazard way of conducting 
bombing and in anti-submarine warfare.  Systems analysis went the next step above 
operations research.  It continued with the idea of studying how to be more efficient 
by creating step-by-step processes through breaking down each individual component 
of activity and optimizing its functionality.  The acquisition, budget, requirements, 
and engineering processes would subsequently be analyzed and shaped by these 
systems analysis approaches. 
In practice, what systems analysis and the subsequent demand for a more data 
driven approach that followed the success of operations research in the war seemingly 
missed was a disconnect from time. Operations research problems were always time-
based and had a sense of urgency.  The problem of the most efficient way to take out 
a bombing target or how to minimize shipping losses in the Atlantic had a short shelf 





from time and applied to non-urgent problems could go on forever -- lost in a debate 
over data and quality of data.  The systems analysis approach as applied to specific 
processes also seemingly lost the significance of the time it takes to coordinate 
between various other processes, each individually optimized for excellence.  These 
two factors would plague the management regimes that through systems analysis 
thinking evolved step-by-step into a linearity of process implementation. 
In a systems analytical process, cost became the variable that it was necessary 
to manipulate in order to move to a more centralized approach rooted in scientific 
management.  Cost was a variable that was relatively easy to measure at first and by 
easy to measure this allowed the acquisition and budgeting process to evolve around 
various cost measures. Novick and Hitch were instrumental in the 1950s in outlining 
the theory, and eventually the framework, for a concept of program budgeting to enter 
DOD through the PPBE process. 
 The 2nd Hoover Commission (1953-1955) moved beyond reorganization 
issues and continued its focus on managing the government in a more scientific way 
and using the budget as a means for reform to measure performance. While the value 
of managing efficiency through greater cost control had been a main part of the 
Hoover Commissions criteria for government improvement, however, for DOD the 
Commission was hesitant to use that criteria: “Because national survival is at stake, 
cost cannot be the primary factor. In words of a prominent flag officer, “our military 





primarily to seek to get enough material to meet their responsibilities.”133  This 
philosophy did not last for long and the idea of managing budgets through cost 
analysis was already being debated at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s.  Cost 
based program budgeting would be advocated by RAND and then brought to DOD 
and within a very short time, no general officer would ever make such a likely career-
killing statement before Congress again.  
It was, however, much more than just the concepts of cost, program, or 
performance-based budgeting that eventually would morph into DOD’s budget 
process.  The planning process was critical to absorbing the concepts of evaluating 
performance, sorting needs by programs, measuring through cost data, and requiring 
long-term estimating tools of those costs.  Collectively these would serve as the basis 
for the PPBS process and would eventually influence the development of other 
management regimes such as acquisition and requirements.  It was the bringing 
together of these concepts and regimes that was critical to create the management 
system as used in DOD today.  As Allen Schick summarized:  
“Budgetary reform in the United States has evolved through three distinct 
stages, the last of which is associated with the contemporary Planning-
Programming- Budgeting System. In the initial stage, the primary emphasis 
was on central control of spending and the budget was utilized to guard 
against administrative abuses. The detailed classification of objects of 
expenditure was the main control mechanism. The second stage was 
management-oriented. It was concerned with the efficient performance of 
work and prescribed activities. The performance budget, officially introduced 
by the Hoover Commission, was the major contribution of the management 
orientation. The third stage is reflected in the planning orientation of the new 
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PPB system. It had roots in Keynesian economics and the new technology of 
systems analysis.” 134 
 
 
Systems analysis thinking then permeated beyond just thinking about the 
budget and impacted both the engineering and scientific processes.  There began the 
identification of a linear process of advancement.  Eventually, the budget process for 
science and engineering would be categorized based on a RAND recommendation 
into a linear process from basic research to advanced development.135  Thirty-year 
scientific plans would become the norm with predictive pathways for science, 
engineering, and technology to meet.  Somewhere along the way, concurrency of 
development and multiple pathways became seen as duplicative, wasteful, and 
inefficient.  The concept of linear pathways and checklists would eventually creep 
into the acquisition, budget, and requirements processes.   
As cost data was collected and applied to weapon systems performance, the 
initial analysis would show that cost estimates at the time were wildly 
underestimated. Peck and Sherer, in their review of 12 weapon systems, showed 
significant cost increases from initial estimates but surprisingly relatively mild 
schedule time increases.  Unfortunately, conclusions made from such data gathered 
on the cost and schedule performance of weapon systems acquisition that, while 
appropriate to certain acquisitions, was not appropriate in all circumstances. The data 
were accurate but divorced from the reality of how innovation worked during that 
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period.  1950s innovation was about doing things that no one had ever done before, 
such as building a rocket to fly into space.  Of course, no one had any idea about how 
much that would cost beforehand. Because of that reality, applying rigorous cost 
estimation parameters to these new experimental developments would have led to this 
type of analysis being misused -- leading the government down the wrong path when 
disruptive innovation is needed. 
The inability to predict cost and the adoption of more scientific systems 
engineering techniques led to an argument that innovation and experimentation was 
wasteful.  On the extremes, on one side of the spectrum was a desire to slow down 
military advancement, and on the other side a view that all government spending was 
merely a means to inevitable fraud, waste, and abuse.  The amount of money DOD 
was spending was another growing factor in the 1950s pressure on defense.  There 
was a greater scrutiny of these expenditures and the desire to not only use this 
spending for military purposes, but also to gain a social socio-economic advantage. 
The passage of Small Business Act of 1953 was the first of many socio-economic 
statutes that aligned with a protectionist desire, much like the passage of the Buy 
American Act of 1933 and the Berry Amendment in 1941 to ensure that public money 
went to certain states and congressional districts.  What Congress really needed was a 
mechanism to earmark more efficiently.  Program budgeting would eventually 
provide the information to support the types of directed spending the appropriators 
would embrace.  
Another factor driving change in the 1950s was the legacy of Soviet espionage 





from the start in the Manhattan project and the subsequent, fallout from the Hiss, 
Fuchs, and Rosenberg spy scandals triggered not only McCarthyism but new security 
requirements.  These security fears would lead to enhanced secrecy that would favor a 
return to the arsenal system, but this time with specially cleared private sector firms. 
Eisenhower, for the most part, kept many of these trends to negatively impact 
defense innovation in the 1950s in a box.  But as he left office, he stoked the fire of 
what had already been burning as defense expenditures grew and the private sector 
dominated.   Eisenhower’s farewell address on the military industrial complex 
confirmed many in their distrust of profits and the private sector.  Thus arose a 
resurrection of the historic contracting values from the pre-war era and new legal and 
regulatory measures which would have serious unintended consequences.  Despite 
Eisenhower’s support in moving DOD to rely on contractors, he saw profiteering 
coupled with parochialism (he debated whether to mention a Congressional complex 
as well) as a problem that needed to be addressed. This would kick off another round 
of distrust of the private sector behavior and a return to managing profits and 
incentivizing low price solutions. Congressional patronage was never addressed and 
the result was the return of more oversight and constraints on the private sector.  This, 
ironically, turned the defense sector into the privatized arsenal system ever more 













None of these pressures for change would have mattered unless leadership 
embraced them and new management regimes were created to implemented them.  
So, as Eisenhower left the stage, the time-based innovation approach of WWII early 
Cold War ad hoc was coming under pressure.  It was seen as wasteful.  Rockets 
blowing up and satellites not making it into orbit seemed excessive. Cost overruns on 
large development programs would drain the Treasury.  The Soviets looked like they 
were winning the Cold War innovation competition.  But waiting in the wings was a 
solution in predictive management and systems analysis – if only a new leadership 
would grasp it.   
That leadership duly arrived in 1961. The current defense innovation system 
(both the industrial base and federal management incentive framework) then began to 
rapidly change with the arrival of the Kennedy Administration and its choice as 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.  His so-called “whiz-kids” documented in 
David Halberstam’s book on the origins of Vietnam, brought a new scientific 
approach to national security policy that in Halberstam’s telling brought disaster on 
the battlefield that has taken decades to exorcize.136  But a more long-lasting impact 
was the introduction of these approaches to the overall management of the 
Department.  This significant watershed in defense management practice was based in 
academic theory and literature related to defense management that occurred at 
RAND.  Hitch, Enthoven, Novick, and others from RAND joined the Administration 
 





to implement this new framework that resulted in what can be described as the 
underpinnings of the current defense management systems framework.  This 
framework has served as the operating model for managing defense innovation since 
the Johnson and Nixon Administrations.  Whether this framework rises to the level of 
a “Kuhnian” paradigm could be the source of a debate, but it has permeated the 
culture of the government and industry.137 
The period from 1962-1984 is important as the foundational management 
oversight constructs still in use today were established during this time.  For example, 
the PPBS budgetary system was inaugurated in 1961; the Truth in Negotiations Act 
passed in 1962; the Cost Accounting Standards were created in 1970; the DOD 5000 
series acquisition process was established in 1971 based on the then developing 
discipline of systems engineering; and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
established the current basis for technology transfer and control.  Each of these 
constructs contributed to the operational frameworks for defense management and 
oversight and influenced the constructs of the defense industrial base. 
Up until the Kennedy administration, the value of the defense innovation 
system had been speed and effectiveness. Rapid prototyping experimentation, rapid 
deployment, and quick iterations of capabilities were the norm. When the Kennedy 
administration came to power this all changed to a focus on efficiency, as defined 
through a systems analysis cost and price-based analytical approach.  
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This framework was based on a centralized government planning process, a 
predictive focus on technology development, enhanced secrecy and technology 
control of the outputs of this research, improved cost control and the pricing of inputs 
from the private sector, and finally a scientific management outlook that encouraged 
the government to adopt incremental budgeting and five-year plans that mirrored 
Soviet practice.   Systems analysis guided a demand for program cost data and 
estimation based on pricing of inputs from the private sector, eventual constraints on 
the discretion of governmental program managers, and finally a scientific 
management outlook in defense budgeting and planning. These new concepts were 
overlain upon and adapted to longstanding cyclical management and acquisition 
trends harkening back to founding of the Republic that favored government led 
arsenals supported by limited and highly regulated private sector participation as 
sources of supply to the arsenals, procurement processes and practices overly 
designed to limit any appearance of corruption and favoritism, a skepticism of private 
sector profits, and a preference for sealed-bid competitions to support the goal of 
achieving the lowest possible price.  While public arsenals would become private 
ones, and low-price fixed price contracts would evolve into cost-based ones overseen 
by auditors armed with tools to verify cost and price, the original values of distrust of 
contractors would prevail. 
Budgeting, finance, acquisition, engineering, and requirements development 
were all caught up in the Vietnam era of intellectual fervent that favored systems 
analysis, cost analysis and estimation, program budgeting and the faith in the ability 





innovation enterprise.  Through the right processes and data, decision makers could 
annually turn the knobs in a scientific fact-based way to predict and achieve desired 
outcomes.  Perhaps even more damaging was a creeping linearity that was based on a 
view that advancements in science, technology, and economics were predictable and 
inevitable and that one just had to follow a known path in a step-by-step fashion.  
Experimentation, concurrency or the attempt at multiple paths as in the Manhattan 
Project were thought as duplicative and doomed to failure as processes were created 
to prevent such excess expenditures. 
The RAND corporation economists subsequently turned their academic 
research into one of the largest experiments to be conducted in American government 
by bringing systems analysis, enhanced centralized planning, and program budgeting 
into the Pentagon.  This way of thinking eventually impacted the acquisition, 
requirements, engineering, contracting, and finally the scientific development process 
as each regime had to adjust to the new power of the changing budget process when it 
was adopted in 1961. The RAND analysts’ legacy of the search for ever improving 
cost estimating techniques and the adoption of the criteria of managing to estimated 
cost, schedule, and performance baselines for weapon system development has been 
maintained over the decades.   
Non-linear (or what might in today’s world view might even be classified as 
quantum thinking) approaches were relegated to the dustbins of pseudo-science while 
experimentation and prototyping thought of as useful only as part of a program 
development process not as a possible end in itself that might lead to something 





often ended in failure but something that could and must be planned.  Time became 
not a constraining factor but one that was incorporated in predictive schedules that 
ultimately were driven more by adhering to processes rather than building something 
that could be used operationally.  Time as a constraining, limited in duration, variable 
faded from memory. 
In aggregate, these factors led to a new innovation system that replaced the 
post-Cold War system of rapid innovation, time-based development, and what would 
today be known as a “fail fast” culture.  This new system was much more than the 
pre-WWII public management framework that focused on competition, price and 
minimizing profits although this became a pillar.  It was altogether a new thing 
established based on a flourishing of academic and business management focus on 
systems, cost, program management, and budget analysis that began in the 1950s.  
This body of work resulted in a set of oversight criteria, institutions, and processes 
reflect a set of values that once adapted in the early 1960s in the Pentagon have 
become deeply engrained in today’s defense and oversight culture. 
Beginning in 1961, there was established and institutionalized new public 
management regimes to translate these new values into action.  These management 
regimes (budget, acquisition, security, personnel, and information management) were 
designed to provide a framework for the oversight of defense spending and the 
programs that matured out of the disruptive innovations and technology developments 
of the 1940s and 50s, but also to protect those technologies from unauthorized release 
and use. These new institutions can be categorized by effect on time-based on 





on CMI.  Another set of management oversight entities (contract auditors, inspectors 
general, operational testers, and contract law judges and protest lawyers at GAO) 







Chapter 4: Time-Based Defense Innovation Data Comparisons  
“Make use of time, let not advantage slip”. 
Shakespeare 138 
 
Innovation is a challenging concept and even more problematic to measure.  It 
is difficult to evaluate the characteristics and attributes of innovation without using 
subjective criteria, particularly when trying to assess the impact or quality of such 
innovation.  One variable that all innovations share, however, is time.  There is a 
certain passage of time between a good idea and its deployment in the marketplace; 
between the start of a project and its eventual completion.  Time is different than 
schedule, which is a projected, predictive, or perhaps hopeful measure of time.139  
Time is actuality, reality, and certainty.  It is the concrete measure of simply how long 
it took to perform a given task.  As such, time can be a variable used to differentiate 
and classify innovative efforts based on the length of time to completion and 
therefore serve as a basis to evaluate the effectiveness of the defense innovation 
system.  It can also be a forcing function that, coupled with appropriate resources, 
spurs on greater effort, invention, and useful capability.  Still, a focus on time alone 
cannot overcome a lack of a knowledge, scientific foundation, or basic research.  One 
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can only go so fast and achieve so much in a limited amount of time, but when other 
factors are not working against time, it is surprising how much progress can be made.   
In this analysis time will be used as a variable to assess the rate of innovation. 
This rate will be measured by how long it has taken to deploy a military or 
commercial capability.   As will be demonstrated in a number of studies and by 
reviewing past data on weapon systems development, time to market in defense has 
been lengthening significantly over the years.140   While this could be due to 
technological complexity, other factors seem to be more relevant as comparable 
actors (primarily in the commercial sector, but increasingly, our adversaries) seem to 
deliver programs equally complex in less time or at the same rate that DOD did in the 
1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s.  
The inflection point for the rise in time among U.S. defense market innovation 
rates appears to be the mid-1970s, which corresponds to the maturity of the processes 
and procedures of the oversight regimes that began to emerge in the 1960s.  These 
processes, particularly when conducted in a serial or linear fashion, make it 
impossible to innovate at the same time-based rate and approach of the early Cold 
War.  Simply taking the time to complete these processes requires more than it once 
took to deploy capability. Management regimes untethered to time have also had an 
additional secondary impact by erecting barriers to those commercial companies that 
have adopted a time to market philosophy and approach.  The decline in CMI has 
disincentivized the participation in the defense market by commercial companies – 
 
140 As will be seen there have been several analytical studies that have effectively masked this 
lengthening time by moving the effective start of a program through changing the definition of when to 





particularly those that are backed by venture capital or have a Silicon Valley 
provenance focusing on rapid or agile innovation within a strict time period. 
While the rate of defense innovation can be measured by the time it has taken 
to deploy a military capability, the data on this time to market is surprisingly difficult 
to obtain. When it does exist, it differs wildly in methodology and definitions.   Time 
to market for the commercial sector can be identified by measuring how long it takes 
from the start of a program to its introduction in the marketplace. For defense 
programs, development time or time to market can be explored by assessing how long 
it takes from the start of a program to the deployment of an initial operational 
capability.  Specifically, the time it takes to deploy a major weapon system from 
program start to first operational deployment or what is known as Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC).   Determining the specifics of either the start or end date can have a 
significant impact on the measurement of time to market.  Data must be reviewed 
critically and adjusted based on some standard starting and ending point for 
measurement, or the conclusions drawn from such data will have wildly different 
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Time-Based Innovation Up to World War II 
 
Prior to the end of World War II, two types of defense innovation programs 
existed, depending on whether they were conducted during long peacetime budget 
cycles or in wartime.  Naval shipbuilding and improvements to conventional 
munitions such as cannons and rifles were the results of long-cycle peacetime efforts 
and usually based on technology transfer from Europe.  The second type was 
conducted during conflict periods. Before World War II, most wartime innovation in 
defense was directed at increasing production of existing types of technologies, with 
some limited new time-based technological innovation occurring depending on the 
length of the conflict. While the Civil War and years following until World War I did 
see some advances in U.S. defense innovation that occurred within these time 
constrained environments, most conflicts were too short to drive much innovation. 
World War II was a different story.  There was a greater impact from more 
disruptive defense technological developments achieved as time became a dominant 
limiting factor on innovation.  While other inputs such as labor, capital, management, 
and knowledge were important, there was only so much one could do to use and 
incorporate them within a fixed amount of time.  Time focuses efforts and weeds out 
technologies and ideas that are not yet ready to operationalize.  It can, if allowed to, 
constrain bureaucracy, calling for a different type of industrial base and engineering 
incentives and methods.  As a result, significant advances were quickly made during 
World War II in the development and mass production of new military items using 
technologies such as radar, sonar, computing and code breaking, and of course 





The B-29 bomber illustrates how quickly new technology could be developed, 
prototyped, produced, and deployed during the war.  It eventually became the 
workhorse of the U.S. military in the Pacific during World War II.  The first contract 
was let in May 1941.  The first XB-29 prototypes flew in June 1943 and B-29 planes 
began to be deployed to India and China in April 1944. This was a little over 3 years 
from first contract to initial deployment.142  The Manhattan project took three and a 
half years from President Roosevelt authorizing the nuclear weapons program in 
January of 1942 to the first test detonation on July 16, 1945 at the Trinity Test Site in 
New Mexico.  The vast majority of U.S. technological advancements occurred in the 
less than four-year window from Pearl Harbor to the surrender of Japan in August 
1945. 
Senior wartime leaders recognized the importance of time in achieving these 
incredible advancements and the need to move at deliberate speed.  A 1945 letter sent 
by the Secretaries of War and Navy to the National Academy of Sciences emphasized 
the critical importance to national security of the “new weapons created by scientific 
and engineering research” underscoring that “the competitive time element in 
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Time-Based Innovation Data: The Early Cold War 
 
The early Cold War competition with the Soviet Union incentivized the U.S. 
military to maintain the World War II emphasis on time.  Innovation efforts 
conducted during the war, in the 1950s and then in the subsequent NASA space race 
with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, had several things in common: a focus on time, 
rapid experimentation, and rapid operational prototyping.  These efforts generally 
took less than 5 years to deploy something that was operationally capable and usable.  
It might have eventually taken a second, third, or more prototype iterations to finalize 
the model to produce in quantity, but each of the earlier prototypes were useful 
operationally.  These prototypes may have been all that were needed and there was 
never a need to produce more.  The first U-2 reconnaissance plane was flying nine 
months after signing a contract.144  After Gary Powers’ U-2 was shot down over 
Russia in 1960, work began on the U-2’s successor.  The A-12 protype flew in 1962 
and evolved into the SR-71, which flew in 1964.145   
Experiment, test, prototype, and test again were hallmarks of technology 
development in this period.  Most importantly, not every prototype or test was a 
success.  Missile programs were equated with many experimental launches, tests, and 
failures.  The first reconnaissance satellites failed 12 times before success.146  Still, 
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the success of what can be called a time-based developmental model led to incredible 
advances.  This model was initially developed based on urgency of need and limited 
by time. The U.S. detonated a hydrogen bomb on November 1, 1952, less than three 
years after President Truman announced on January 31, 1950 the U.S. plan to develop 
it.  NASA’s Saturn 5 rocket, which enabled the U.S. to achieve President Kennedy’s 
goal of going to the moon in a decade, took just six years to first launch (1961-1967). 
One of the first major programs to be developed after World War II was a new 
class of bombers. The development of the high-speed jet engine B-47 bomber was 
initiated by a letter contract in February 1945.  Even with the post-war mobilization 
and uncertainty of the future of the program, prototypes (XB-47) were built and flown 
in 1947-1948 and the first production plane was delivered in 1950, or 5 years from 
program initiation.  Further production issues would delay IOC until 1952, but 
nonetheless equate to a total of 7 years from first contract to design, prototyping of 
several aircraft, and operational use.147  Another way to view the B-47 program is as 
two distinct programs.  The XB-47 prototyping program delivered an operationally 
capable plane in 3 years while the next program to produce a B-47 in quantity took 4 
years.  This sub-dividing of programs is a critical distinction that needs to be made 
when comparing later programs that abandoned the idea of creating interim 
operationally capabilities through prototyping.  Data on the B-52 (to be discussed 
later) and the B-58 supersonic bomber each suffered from this data analysis problem 
of determining program start and finish.  Each program over a 10-year timeframe 
from concept to deploying operational squadrons had several interim initial aircraft 
 





with operational capability that were built, flown, and tested.  Despite issues in 
agreeing on a design, a B-58 a prototype was delivered within 4 years from initial 
contract.148 
Missile programs unconstrained by flight safety issues because they did not 
have a pilot in the loop went much faster.  The history of the U.S. Inter-Continental 
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program illustrates the importance not only of time to 
development, but of prioritization and leadership.  Once General Bernard Schriever 
was put in charge of the Air Force’s ICBM efforts, 4 programs were completed 
within a 5-year window of development to operations.  First contracts were awarded 
for both the Atlas liquid fueled missile and the Titan 1 liquid fueled ICBM in 1955 
with operational capability for both systems achieved in 1959.  The Titan II ICBM 
initial award occurred in 1960 and the missile was operational by 1963. The solid-
fueled Minutemen ICBM initiated development in 1957 and was operational in 1962. 
Initial follow-on ICBMs – the Minuteman II and Minuteman III – were delivered in 
comparable time frames from 1962-1967 and 1966-1970 respectively.149  The 
Minutemen III is still in the U.S. arsenal after 50 years. Brose noted that at the start of 
the effort to develop: 
 “an intercontinental ballistic missile that could deliver a nuclear weapon to 
the other side of the planet in a matter of minutes. This was not even close to 
being feasible in 1954.  Eventually, Schriever and his team did the impossible: 
they developed the Thor, Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman missiles that could 
deliver nuclear weapons to precise locations on the other side of the planet in 
minutes. They laid the technological foundation from which America first 
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went to space and then the moon. And they did it all, from start to finish, in 
just five years.”150 
 
The history of submarine development in the 1950s was a similar story of 
rapid development, testing, and fielding of new defense technology.  In just 7 years 
(from 1952-1959), the Navy transitioned from World War II submarine designs to 
nuclear powered ones.  As shown in Figure 4.1, 10 different submarine designs were 
ongoing during this time period, with each in essence an operational prototype that 
succeeded in bringing the Navy into the nuclear age. The navy nuclear reactor 
program that supported this effort under Admiral Rickover was approved to begin in 
December 1947151 and supported the delivery of the first nuclear powered submarine 
in less than seven years with the commissioning of the Nautilus.152 
The Navy’s submarine development model of the 1950s was similar to the Air 
Force “Century-series” approach that relied on rapid development and limited 
production runs of future aircraft.  The Air Force’s Century Series of fighter aircraft 
from the F-100 to the F-106 were all started in the early 1950s and achieved IOC in 
less than 5 years, resulting in 5,531 aircraft deployed to the Air Force.153  As one 
commentator mentions, the Navy was on the same pathway as compared to the Air 
Force:  
“In the 1950s, the Navy fielded front-line jets just as quickly: Grumman’s F-9 
Cougar and F-11 Tiger, the Douglas F-4D Skyray and A-4 Skyhawk, the 
McDonnell F-3H Demon, the Vought F-8 Crusader, the North American A-5 
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Vigilante, and three way-late-to-need variants of the F-86 Sabre, the North 
American FJ-2/FJ-3/ FJ-4 Fury series. Buried in the later years (1958) was the 
cream of the crop, the McDonnell F-4 Phantom II, arguably the best jet fighter 
built in the western world.”154 
 
Navy shipbuilding was also on a fast pace as the first nuclear aircraft carrier, the 
Enterprise, contract award occurred in November 1957, was launched in September 
1960, and commissioned in November 1961 – a total of four years.155  
Figure 4.1: US Navy Submarine Development and Prototyping 156  
Class Commissioned No. Advancements 
Tang class 1951-1952 6 Improved conventional WWII design 
Albacore 1953 1 Tear drop hull 
Nautilus 1954 1 First operational nuclear submarine 
Darter 1956 1 
Improved Tang; new acoustic sensors; 
new fire control; new maneuvering 
control 
Seawolf 1957 1 Tested liquid metal cooled reactor 
Skate class  1957-1959 4 
First production run of nuclear 
submarines; based on the conventional 
Tang class  
Barbel class  1959 3 
Tear drop hull; combined control room, 
conning tower, attack center in one 
space, bow torpedo tubes; diesel engines; 
hydraulic ballast controls 
Skipjack 
class  1959 – 1961 6 
Nuclear power; single shaft; tear drop 
hull 
Triton 1959 1 Nuclear powered fast surface radar picket submarine 
Halibut 1960 1 First guided missile submarine, carrying Regulus missiles 
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Time-Based Innovation Data Comparisons  
 
In the early 1960s, Peck and Sherer were concerned about lead time 
comparisons between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for systems that made it appear 
the U.S. was behind the Soviet Union.  These differences were actually quite minor.  
They were also incredibly short compared to what was to eventually become the 
norm for U.S. systems just a few decades later.  The differences between U.S. and 
Soviet lead times or time to market were likely based on comparing two different 
baselines.  This will be an important and recurring point in later comparisons.  Peck 
and Scherer attributed the differences in comparing time to development to the fact 
that the U.S. program start date was often the “gleam in the eye” date, while Soviet 
start dates (as determined by U.S. intelligence) were based on tangible evidence of 
production or development:  “Indeed, one reason why development time comparisons 
appear so consistently unfavorable to the United States is the tendency to assume that 
American weapons programs began when a feasibility study was requested or when a 
far-sighted military requirement was written, rather than when it was first recognized 
(often as a result of technical breakthroughs) that development of a desired weapon 
was technically feasible.”157 The reality is the U.S. at this time did not have a cycle 
time to development problem.  That would come later. 
The Defense Science Board (DSB) in 1977 studied acquisition cycle time and 
broke an acquisition into three parts:  
 





• Decision time – the time it takes to start development;  
• Development time – the time to develop a system; and  
• Production time.  
The DSB found that from the 1950s to the 1970s, development time had been 
relatively constant. Production time depended, for the most part, on budget and 
whether quantities were stretched out over longer time periods. Decision time, 
however, had grown dramatically.  This time had grown from 2 years in the 1950s to 
over 5 years by the early 1970s.  The DSB would blame the accumulation of layers of 
organization and management involved with decision-making for this increase.158  
This claim was opposed by OSD, which to no surprise was the source of all of these 
new layers and requirements.  
By 1986, the President’s Commission on Defense Management (Packard 
Commission) was on the cusp of understanding that program development times were 
increasing dramatically: 
“But a much more serious result of this management environment is an 
unreasonably long acquisition cycle --- ten to fifteen years for our major 
weapon systems. This is a central problem from which most other acquisition 
problems stem:  
• It leads to unnecessarily high costs of development. Time is money, 
and experience argues that a ten-year acquisition cycle is clearly more 
expensive than a five-year cycle. 
• It leads to obsolete technology in our fielded equipment. We forfeit 
our five-year technological lead by the time it takes us to get our 
technology from the laboratory into the field.  
• And it aggravates the very gold-plating that is one of its causes. Users, 
knowing that the equipment to meet their requirements is fifteen years 
away, make extremely conservative threat estimates. Because long-
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term forecasts are uncertain at best, users tend to err on the side of 
overstating the threat.”159 
 
In 1990, RAND completed a study that reviewed time to market data for 107 
aeronautical weapon systems (Figure 4.2).160  The methodology used was to measure 
the beginning of a program or initial program start at what was then known as 
Milestone 1, defined as the beginning of the technology demonstration phase of a 
program, and ending with the first delivery of a system.  Since Milestone 1 was not 
established under the acquisition process until 1970, start dates for earlier programs 
had to be estimated.  As the analysts admitted, this was a judgmental call and created 
some uncertainty over the older programs’ data start times.  
As a result, RAND threw out much of the pre-1970 data because the 
acquisition system had added a new phase, “the concept definition phase” that did not 
exist prior to 1970.  The time to complete this “phase” was not counted in post-1970 
data but those tasks would likely have not been required nor conducted in earlier 
programs. If equivalent concept definition processes were in place, it would have 
taken far less time to complete these processes than in later programs and would have 
been embedded in the time it took to complete these 1950s and 1960s program.161  
For these reasons, the older, faster programs would have essentially skewed RAND’s 
results and shown a much greater increase in cycle time than was presented in their 
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final analysis with what was actually happening in the 1950s.  Also, RAND did not 
address the DSB concept of “Decision Time” which DSB found to be the source of 
cycle time increase. This re-baselining of when a “program” starts or what counts as 
the length of a program has been one of the ways that the increase in time has been 
masked in later studies.  It has also made it difficult to make comparisons of time to 
market when looking across decades.  
Many of these 1950s programs were really the equivalents of what, in the 
1970s, would be covered somewhere between the duration of milestone 1 
(demonstration and validation) through the end of milestone 2 (full scale 
development).  The difference was that in the 1950s, these programs would then have 
deployed something operationally useful and a decision would have been made as to 
whether to produce more, develop the next generation of capability, or decide that the 
deployed operational prototype capability was sufficient to meet the mission.  It was 
not until the formal acquisition process under the 5000 series was created in 1970 that 
the demonstration and validation and full-scale development phases would become 















The estimations for programs that remained in the analysis from the 1950s 
were also problematic, as some, like the B-52 and B-58, contained multiple 
operational prototyping efforts incorporated into one program definition.  Still, the 
results of RAND’s analyses showed that time to deployment was increasing and that 
programs were taking two years longer to progress from Milestone 1 in the 1970s and 
1980s than in comparable programs from the 1950s and 1960s. While this is likely a 
significant underestimate because it neglects decision time, it still shows the 
 






beginning of a trend that should have generated significant debate – but did not.  The 
reality is the RAND study may have been commissioned and then used to counter the 
findings of the Packard Commission in attempt to show that things were not as bad as 
the Commission had reported. A couple of years is not a big problem, particularly if 
things are getting more advanced and complex. 
A decade later, senior officials were still concerned about the effect of long 
cycle times. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen stated, “When DOD fields a new 
weapon system today, many embedded subsystems are obsolete. DOD cannot 
continue to have 10-year weapon acquisition cycles when the underlying technology 
becomes obsolete in two to five years or less.”163  A 2001 DOD Inspector General 
audit report identified that in 1960, MDAPs required seven years for completion from 
program start to IOC. In 1996, this time had grown to 11 years.164 While the DOD IG 
had many problems with the quality of data, like RAND it used the start of Milestone 
1 as program initiation and did not consider “decision time.” In the 2004 annual 
SECDEF report to Congress, the Department provided data that corresponded to the 
IG’s report:  
“Acquisition cycle time is the elapsed time, in months, from program 
initiation until a system attains initial operational capability- that is, when the 
product works as designed and is fielded to operational units. A number of 
years ago, we began measuring the average cycle time across all major 
defense acquisition programs, or MDAPs …. We wanted to understand how 
quickly new technologies were moving from the drawing board to the field. 
This performance measure is a leading indicator of technology transfer-
typically, the faster a program moves toward fielding, the quicker associated 
operational improvements can be introduced to the force, and the easier it is to 
 
163 William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress Fiscal Year 
2000. p. 152. 
164 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, “Audit of Major Defense Acquisition 





control overall program costs. During the 1960s, a typical acquisition took 7 
years (84 months) from initiating program research and development activities 
to achieving initial operating capability. By 1996 a similar acquisition 
required 11 years (132 months) from program start to initial operating 
capability.”165 
 
Neither the IG nor OSD tried to make comparisons with programs that started in the 
1950s, when the Department had been moving even faster, presumably because SAR 
data was not collected until the 1960s. 
Over a decade later in 2015, the Senate Armed Services Committee relied on a 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) study brief that brought 
together data on time to market for U.S. Air Force programs and other commercial 
programs.  As the Committee reported: “A recent Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency study found that the current requirements process may be a 
significant hurdle to the Department being able to conduct short, iterative 
development and fielding cycles and innovate like the more agile sectors of the 
commercial market.”166 This study, unfortunately, was unpublished and is no longer 
available. The supporting data outlined the changes in the time it has taken to develop 
military and commercial systems since World War II.  The data that originated in this 
study was instrumental in supporting the concept of Mid-Tier acquisition, which is 
essentially a time to market concept that limited program times to a maximum of five 
years to deploy either an operational prototype or to rapidly field a system.  This 
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provision was included as section 804 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization 
Act.   
The following data in Figure 4.3 is an attempt to replicate from public sources 
some of the original data that was used by the Senate Armed Services Committee.167  
These systems are for new aircraft and do not include subsequent upgrades to these 
aircraft that may have triggered a second MDAP program reporting requirement.  
Also, this data’s starting point is from first contract award and thus does not address 
the time it takes to prepare, solicit, and award that contract, nor the requirements or 
budget process lag time to get to first contract award that corresponds to the 1977 
DSB’s concept of decision time.  As will be discussed in a later section, this time can 
be significant, so these data points are still an underestimate of the time to innovation.   
The data in Figure 4.3 presents time to market for military aircraft programs 
developed and deployed since World War II.   Specifically, that is defined for a 
military capability as the time it takes to deploy a major weapon system from 
program start measured by the first contract award to first operational deployment or 
IOC.  IOC is set at when there is the basis for an operational capability that is 
deployed and occurs before most program production begins.  As the DSB found, 
production time is essentially meaningless for these types of comparisons because it 
is a function of how many units one wants spread out over time depending on the 
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budget and time it takes to produce a unit.  The important thing to focus on from an 
innovation perspective is the time to get to first deployment or in DOD parlance, IOC. 
As can be seen in the data, the time to market data for U.S. military aircraft 
programs during the early Cold War periods was about five years for a typical 
program. Since about the mid-1970s, that time to develop and deploy significant new 
capabilities has been increasing at a rapid pace with start to IOC or deployment dates 
quadrupling.  From 1945 to 1974, the average time to develop a new aircraft from 
program start was about five years. In 1971, the DOD 5000-series acquisition policy 
was published. Since then, time-to-IOC for military aircraft has increased at rate of 
approximately five years per decade: the F-18 achieved IOC in 11 years (1985), the 
B-2 in 16 years (1996), and F-22 in 19 years (2005). The F-35, after over two decades 






























The second chart (Figure 4.4) adds comparable data for commercial aircraft 
and automotive industry programs.  This is measured from the initiation of a 
commercial program effort until initial market appearance.  This comparison can 
serve as a proxy to measure the innovation rate or time to market both in the defense 
and commercial markets.  While defense aerospace programs show significant time to 





growth during this period that are comparable to early DOD weapons programs in the 
1950s.  Trends in the automotive industry that actually show a decline may have been 
a result of the competition with Japan that arose in the 1970s and forced the auto 
industry to focus more on time to deployment.    
Based on this data, it appears that early Cold War innovation cycles were 
comparable to current commercial cycles (around five years) and much different from 
late Cold War and present defense innovation cycles. From what is known about 
other commercial development, such as the evolution of the product cycle in the 
integrated circuit/microelectronics industry operating at the speed of Moore’s Law for 
over 50 years, commercial innovation trends appear to be anywhere from 1-7 years 
depending on the class of product.  Commercial aircraft are currently at the higher 
end.  There are two anomalies in the data chart: GH stands for Global Hawk and MQ-
9 for the Predator unmanned aircraft system.  These are military aircraft and serve as 
a case example in the next chapter as they were developed under special authorities in 
a manner similar to the how the military developed systems in the 1950s. When 
comparing other weapons system data with comparable data for the development and 
deployment and initial market appearance of commercial technologies such as 
aircraft, time to market in defense can be seen to be lengthening significantly over the 













While this data is only for U.S. military aircraft programs, it does conform to recent 
statements by DOD officials.  For example, in 2018, DOD’s Chief Technology 
Officer stated that it now takes “the US on average 16 years to deliver an idea to 
 





operational capability, versus fewer than 7 for the Chinese.”169  This DOD validation 
for the rest of DOD programs is significant, but even more so is the comparison with 
the Chinese, who have adopted a military-civil-fusion innovation model similar to 
earlier U.S. approaches, but also implying adoption of military time-based innovation 
models and processes. Time focus alone at this rate would allow the Chinese to get 
two and a quarter turns on the technology cycle to every U.S. turn.   
 
Issues of Technical Complexity 
 
If time to market weapons system data for U.S. systems has been increasing, 
does that matter?  Was a shorter period of time to deployment appropriate in earlier 
history but now other factors require a longer time frame to achieve similar 
milestones or breakthroughs in defense innovation?  If U.S. adversaries and the 
commercial market are now faster than DOD, does that make a national security 
difference?  Are the Chinese merely catching up with their version of the F-22 (the J-
20) and is that pace merely the result of stolen technology from the U.S.?  Will future 
new “greenfield” project approaches undoubtedly take longer?  If the rate of 
innovation as measured by “time to market” has slowed over the years, the next step 
is to attempt to explain why and whether that variable is significant.   
If weapons system cycle time has been increasing since the 1960s, technical 
complexity could be driving this and thus increased time to market would simply be 
considered the new norm.  It is possible that it is more difficult now to do the 
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necessary systems integration and software development for these complex systems.  
Perhaps the U.S has reached the limits of knowledge and capacity, making it 
impossible to go any faster to bring new sophisticated defense systems into 
operational use.  On the other hand, there may simply be an issue with the way 
systems are developed. 
In an attempt to address these valid questions, a measure of complexity is 
needed for comparison.  As an example of systems integration complexity, the F-35 
stealth fighter has represented a bellwether of that complexity.  It is often called a 
computer with an airframe designed around it.170   The level of software or source 
lines of code (SLOC) for the operational system on the F-35 when it was first 
delivered after 21 years was 6.8 million lines of code.171  It also has thousands of 
complicated parts and systems to integrate.   And yet, when looking at commercial 
aircraft equivalents, which also have a high parts count, and using SLOC as a 
measure of complexity, that may not be the case.  The Boeing 787 Dreamliner had an 
equivalent 6.5 million SLOC and delivered in 7 years.  While the F-35’s SLOC has 
risen to 22 million SLOC as maintenance support software has been added, Google 
manages billions of SLOC to conduct its operations.   
Still, while defense systems may be more of an engineering challenge and 
therefore bound to take longer, it will be hard to prove that this complexity in itself 
requires three to four times the time. Another metric besides SLOC may be needed as 
 
170 Kris Osborn, “The F-35 Is More 'Flying Computer' Than Fighter Jet, And That's Changing How 
America Fights,” National Interest 2-19-2020; Dan Grazer, “The F-35: Still No Finish Line in Sight”, 
Project on Government Oversight, 3-19-18.  
171 Christian Hagan and Jeff Sorenson, “Delivering Military Software Affordably”, Defense AT&L. 





the comparison of SLOC or software lines of codes imply that commercial 
technological efforts such as the development of commercial aircraft can be equally 
as complex as defense programs.  The Defense Innovation Board’s SWAP study 
didn’t think SLOC was an adequate measure of complexity for DOD systems: 
“Source lines of code (SLOC) is not a measure of value and should not be used to 
evaluate projects in any case, as its use creates perverse incentives.”172 This is 
because not all software is created equal. Determining the impact of complexity on 
IOC is therefore challenging.  
 
Issues of Process Complexity 
 
If the data on general technical complexity is inconclusive, could process 
complexity have impacted DOD’s ability to innovate, as the 1977 DSB study 
implied?  DOD’s inability to innovate in a time-based manner likely came after the 
1960s, which marked the post-Sputnik period of innovation.  This period included the 
development of the first reconnaissance satellites launched in 1960 through the period 
of NASA’s Apollo program.  The barriers to time also likely occurred before the late 
1970s.  This would correspond to beginning of the second offset programs such as the 
stealth fighter that were classified and exempted from the traditional development 
management process.  The biggest process changes occurring in the period from 
1962-1978 were related to contracting, acquisition, budgeting, and requirements.  The 
issue is how to measure that complexity. 
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In contracting, Fox tried to illustrate process complexity by identifying that 
the original Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) measured 125 pages in 
1947 as compared to the FAR and DFAR, the successors to the ASPR, which now 
total over 2,000 pages.173  A similar argument used by Jacques Gansler to illustrate 
regulatory complexity over the years was to show the increase in the page count of 
the Code of Federal Regulations.  It is possible a similar data gathering exercise could 
be conducted for other variables.  The easiest may be to count the pages of the DOD 
5000 series as it has grown since 1971.  This would likely show a correlation to the 
time increase in Figure 4.1.  Another area to examine for process complexity is the 
budget process.  Budget process complexity could possibly be measured by a page 
count of the authorization and appropriations bills and reports and by the page 
numbers of budget justification documents that went to Congress over the years.  For 
example, the first NDAA in 1962 was just 1 page and the 2020 NDAA was 1,120 
pages long. Finally, an even more daunting data collection effort would be to review 
original requirements documents for each weapons system program and look for a 
correlation with time to market data.  Length of contracts for each program might also 
be a possible measure, if the data were available.  
While these proxies are all likely to have increased over time, the effort to 
collect them and perform the analysis still may not offer conclusive proof of process 
complexity. Each of these potential data sets may illustrate the idea that process 
complexity entered the innovation process during this time.  But while there may be a 
visible link between a rise in management complexity variables from the number of 
 





specifications and requirements or the regulatory impact of the acquisition and 
contracting process, there is, however, no conclusive proof that there would be an 
effect. These linkages would, at best, show that these systems likely added process 
complexity to the system that did not exist earlier.   
While statistical analysis will likely on its own to be inconclusive, the 
underlying complexity of process data as measured by an increase in pages of the 
outputs of these processes also may or may not be the best measure for complexity.  
Many of those regulations may just be guidance that can be ignored or provide 
options in specific situations that may not be applicable in each case. This extra 
guidance could actually reduce complexity and make it easier for practitioners to 
execute on a program.  Thus, this measure of complexity alone may not explain the 
increase in time but does provide an indication of where to look further for factors.  
Intuitively, the bend in the curve in Figure 4.3 begins in 1975 just a few years after 
the establishment of the 5000 process.  
While it is probable that there is a link between these types of data, I did not 
choose to collect a proxy for contract, acquisition, requirements, or budgetary 
complexity and explore a statistical analysis between each of these processes and 
time.  Instead, I chose to employ a much simpler and I believe, better analytical proof 
designed to explore the possible link between process complexity and time using 
other evidence related to process linearity described below.  A future quantitative 
study might be beneficial to explore further the relationships between these variables 
and attempt to test at what point process complexity may have specifically impacted 






Issues of Process Linearity 
  
In the absence of statistical evidence and analysis, the means I chose to 
address the impact of time was not to look for process complexity, but to look for 
process linearity by identifying measurements of the time each process takes to 
complete.  Measuring or estimating in a general sense the time it takes for 
management regime processes to be implemented provides a greater sense of how 
management regimes may have impacted the time it takes to develop a military 
capability.  As these processes did not exist in their present form in the 1950s, they 
are unique in their application to programs. 
The most significant drivers of process time in weapons system development 
are the requirements, budget, acquisition, and contracting regimes.  These regimes do 
adhere to a concept of linearity as they are conducted in a serial fashion with some 
limited concurrency.  The first step in this analysis is to collectively line up these 
processes, factor out where they overlap, and then compare the time taken, in general, 
to adhere to these processes versus the time taken to deliver capability when these 
processes did not exist.  This is a useful and demonstrable exercise. Doing so 
illustrates that it is nearly impossible to innovate at the same rate as the U.S. used to 
prior to the establishment of these processes, as they collectively take much longer 
than the five years it took to deliver many of the capabilities from the 1950s.   
While there is some concurrency in each of the processes, it is not as 
significant as one would first imagine.  A validated requirement initiates a program; 





new start for a program and then budgets for it.  Once money is available, the timing 
of the contracting process to actually begin work on a program becomes important.  
The issue of linearity becomes critical to the time cycle.  As the requirements, budget, 
contracting, and acquisition processes are primarily conducted in a serial fashion, it is 
fairly straightforward to ascertain why time has been increasing.  But first it is 
necessary to baseline the start of a program in the 1950s.  The PPBS/PPBE budget 
process and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
requirements process did not exist and services had flexibility to move funds among 
program efforts and start programs when they wished.  There was no formal 
acquisition process as mandated in the 5000 series.  Contracting was simpler and 
faster. This did not mean there were no processes, but the time required for those 
processes was measured in months, not years.  The DSB in 1977 stated it took two 
years in decision time in the 1950s to go from idea to validating technology, which 
actually included awarding a contract and bending some metal.  
Today is a different story (see Figure 4.5).  To demonstrate linearity, I will 
propose two examples to illustrate that the time it takes to conduct these processes in 
a linear fashion makes it impossible to innovate in the 5-year typical average that 
occurred in the 1950s and 1960s.  These examples will actually underestimate the 
time it takes to conduct the defense innovation cycle but are illustrative of how these 
processes impact time.  The first example examines three of the processes conducted 
in a linear fashion to follow the realization of a good idea to implementation in a 
program start that ends with the award of the first defense contract to actually initiate 





that follows the requirements, budget, and contracting processes, but does not account 
for technology validation.  This example will ignore acquisition process time as some 
of the acquisition process could be done concurrently with the contracting process.    
 






This first linear model would correspond to an estimated time spent before 
award of an initial contract and thus, is an estimate of time it takes to initiate a 
program prior to the time a program was started in Figure 4.4.   As the JCIDS and 
PPBE processes did not exist in the 1950s, the equivalent process to get to first 
contract were measured in months, so we can assume for purposes of comparison that 
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collectively, these processes to start a program in the 1950s took one year – which is 
likely an overestimate.174 Already in 1962, General Schriever was testifying that the 
new, soon to be called “concept definition phase” had delayed the start of new 
programs to comply with new systems analysis requirements required under PPBS.  
He implied that without this process it would have taken much less than the year or 
more delay that was then being seen from complying with this analytical new phase 
to start a new effort.175 
 The second comparison baseline is to look at the time it takes to travel only 
through the acquisition management process. This would roughly correspond to the 
equivalent of moving from the award of the first contract to deployment or IOC as 
was measured in Figure 4.3.   Except for the award of the first contract, contracting 
time is assumed to be embedded in acquisition time, as it would be conducted 
concurrently with the process to conduct program management activities.  Putting the 
two timelines together and subtracting the initial contract preparation time would 
correspond to a more comparable average time to market time with a program from 
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Time to Conduct JCIDS, PPBE and Contracting Process 
 
In the first example, merely going from the identification of a need or good 
idea (or the need to generate a good idea) to first contract has a 7-year time window.  
During this time, nothing is being done except for process and analysis to get to a 
final decision of award a first contract to a vendor to initiate development of a 
capability.  If, in the 1950s this was being done in a year’s time, one can see that 
DOD is already six years behind in its ability to move at the same acquisition speed.  
It is possible to reduce this time through concurrency of the processes but that would 
require significant top-down advocacy and a substantial bypassing of current rules.  
Even then, as will be illustrated in the second timeline, that would not guarantee a 
successful time-based outcome. 
Establish a Need:  In this example to be set at the beginning of 2020, the first 
step in the process is developing market or technical awareness.  This is the initial 
identification of a “need.”  Let us assume that a leading aerospace engineer who now 
heads their own company and has a terrific track record of deploying innovation in 
both the military and the commercial sector designs a new vertical lift engine 
technology that would provide multiple performance improvements over existing 
systems.  The engine is already being tested in the California desert and these tests 
have validated the technology concepts, but the engine has not flown on an aircraft.  
Most good ideas die at this stage because there is no military sponsor that wants to 
commit to such an idea and actually build something at scale.  Defense entrepreneurs 
spend years in what is called this proverbial “valley of death” trying to convince 





case, let us assume that General X has several meetings with this company and thinks 
the technology is mature and should be prototyped as a potential to serve several 
missions in an unmanned version of a new vertical takeoff and landing tilt rotor 
aircraft capability.  This market or technological awareness and gaining of a sponsor 
could take many years to achieve, but for sake of argument, let’s assume this was 
accomplished in a one-year process of briefings, site visits, and Pentagon meetings. 
JCIDS Process: To start a program, however, one needs funding. To be 
eligible to receive funds, one needs a validated requirement.  The JCIDS is a 
multiyear process, but we can assign a two-year period to accomplish this goal.  In 
2010, the Army estimated that it takes on average 15-22 months to get a requirement 
approved.176 More recent data for 2015 found that JCIDS personnel approved zero 
needs in fewer than 250 days and one in 894 days with the median JCIDs approval 
time of 506 days.177  Both of these data sets may be looking at different baselines of 
when the requirements process actually started.  A 2-year estimate will likely be an 
underestimate, as in order to enter the joint requirement process and get JCIDS 
personnel to start looking at something, this effort will need to start with one of the 
services preparing the paperwork to justify the requirement.  That will also add 
additional time, perhaps years in coordination unless General X can move it faster, 
but we can safely assume that 2021 and 2022 will be spent getting JCIDS approval. 
 
176 “Army Strong: Equipped, Trained and Ready” Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review 
Chartered by the Honorable John M. McHugh Secretary of the Army. P. 94. 
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PPBS Process: Once the performance requirements are validated and it is 
determined that it makes sense to have something that is perhaps twice as good as 
what the Department currently has, now comes the hard part – trying to find enough 
money to allocate to the program over the course of the program.  This budget 
process takes 2-3 years, 2 years if the requirement is completed at the most auspicious 
time in the cycle and money happens to be available.  We will assume this is the case 
so another year is not lost waiting to enter the following years’ service Program 
Objectives Memorandum (POM) cycle, which is a key segment of the PBBE process.  
That extra year is probably more likely than not.  Still, under this analysis the 
assumption is that 2023 will be spent in the Service POM cycle for insertion into the 
2025 President’s budget. That budget is sent to the Congress in 2024 to wind its way 
through the authorization and appropriations processes and to receive a new start 
designation from Congress.  Without this critical new start designation, the 
Department cannot spend any money on it.   
The likely outcome is that the appropriations bill will not be completed and a 
new start designation not be made until after the fiscal year starts in October, which 
would most likely be at the start of calendar year 2025.  Past history reflects the 
inability of Congress to pass a budget on time and then be forced into a series of 
Continuing Resolutions (CR) to start the fiscal year.  CRS has noted that “regular 
appropriations were enacted after October 1 in all but four fiscal years between 





years to prevent one or more funding gaps from occurring.” 178  Since CRs limit 
expenditures to programs that were funded in the prior year, no new effort can 
commence unless what is known as an “anomaly for the program” is included that 
authorizes the new start and provides funding passed in the CRs.  Those anomalies 
are not easy to get and most programs need to wait until passage of the defense 
appropriations bill. 
Contracting Process: Finally, and optimistically, after five years, funds are 
apportioned to the services and they can use that funding to obligate money for a 
program.  These funds are obligated upon contract award.  As the program enters its 
first (of many) future contracting actions, so much time has lapsed since this 
illustrative engineer had the initial great idea that the initial sponsor has long moved 
to another position or retired. Nonetheless, a full and open competition needs to be 
conducted to determine if there are other ideas out there that are now better than this 
one.  That contracting process, following the FAR, could take almost two years, 
according to the GAO.179  In the Army, for example, a competitively awarded 
contract between $50 million and $250 million was estimated to take 600 days.180 A 
program such as the one in this hypothetical example would have a high risk of a bid 
protest as it could threaten existing programs in production, which might take it to the 
higher end of GAO averages. 
 
178 U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and 
Practices”, R42647, Updated April 19, 2019 p. 9-11. For further information on the funding gaps that 
occurred during this period, see CRS Report RS20348, Federal Funding Gaps: A Brief Overview. 
179 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Should Develop a Strategy for Assessing Contract 
Award Time Frames, GAO-18-467: Jul 16, 2018. 





Funds, however, will still need to be obligated within a 2-year timeframe as 
these initial funds to begin a program will be for Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation (RDTE) funds, which expire in two years.  If the contracting process is not 
completed in that period, the funds expire and eventually go back to the Treasury. 
The length of the contracting process will lead to likely program start by the end at 
the end of 2026.  And if everything goes right, the contractor starts can start work in 
the beginning of 2027 – a full 7 years since a good idea was proposed.   
 
Figure 4.6: DOD Process Comparison: 1950s Time to Complete Program to 





Thus, the linear time it takes to go from identification of an idea, through the 
requirements, budgeting, and contracting processes to simply begin work on a 
program is seven years, or two years longer than to deliver an entire capability under 
the old regime – pre-PPBE, 5000 and JCIDS. (See Figure 4.6). This assumes a five-





probably a high estimate.  This time is only for the front-end linear processes that is 
rarely factored in to any assessment on acquisition cycle times.  None of the examples 
in Figure 4.2, 4.3 and 4.8, or in other studies factor in this time (with the exception of 
the 1977 DSB study) but it is extremely important to DOD’s ability to compete in the 
future against more advanced adversaries than Al Qaeda, ISIS, or the Taliban.  
This process can take much longer.  For example, something as seemingly 
simple as a sidearm for the Army that could theoretically be bought as a commercial 
off the shelf product from Cabela’s181, took the Army 13 years to award the first 
contract for when replacing the Beretta M9/11 pistol.  The Army began the program 
in 2004 and after being unable to agree on a requirement for nine years finally 
adopted the Air Force’s requirement in 2013.  It then took almost two years to release 
a Request for Proposal (RFP) to initiate the contracting process in August 2015, and 
then award a contract in January 2017.  This was for something that was sufficiently 
small that it did not need to go through the systems acquisition process, yet it still 
took 13 years just to get to a contract and start the program.182 
 
Time to Conduct Acquisition Process 
 
If the time to go from zero to a contract is longer than the time DOD used to 
deliver capability prior to the Kennedy Administration reforms, what happens when 
 
181 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark A. Milley when he was the Army Chief of Staff once 
threated to do just that. See: Kyle Jahner, Army chief: You want a new pistol? Send me to Cabela's 
with $17 million. Army Times, March 27, 2016. 
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the systems acquisition process is added?  The U.S. Army conducted a very helpful 
study in 2015 to estimate how long it would take to just do the paperwork required by 
the 5000 series acquisition process at the time (Figure 4.7).  This was called the Army 
“null” study and it looked at how long the process would take without ever buying 
anything and then compared that with a typical development time for a low-risk 
incremental program. 
The Army found that it took 10 years just to comply with the acquisition 
process.  This 10-year process is, of course, longer than the time it took to deliver 
capability in the 1950s and it is above and beyond the requirements, contracting, 
budget, and new start processes previously outlined.  Contracting could be conducted 
concurrently once funds are appropriated by Congress, so perhaps the time added to 
the previous process is “just” eight years, but since this is only the time to perform the 
paperwork and get through the process, the actual time it takes to deliver capability is 
in fact much longer.  Either way, the acquisition process time alone is longer than 






Figure 4.7: Army Null Study Results183
 
 
Another noteworthy data point from this analysis is that the time it took to 
develop the technology was very similar to process time – 11.4 years vs. 10 years.  
What that likely means is that knowing how long it takes to conform to the process, 
the services had the opportunity to continue to concurrently develop technology while 
waiting on the process requirements to be completed.   Otherwise, they would have 
been forced to use 10-year-old technology for all of their future systems.  The other 
interesting comment that can be made from this chart is that the real development 
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time once technology is mature is 5.1 years, which conforms to earlier time-based 
data (16.5 years in total development – 11.4 years in technology development).  This 
implies that the military still can innovate like it did in the 1950s, but it cannot do so 
unless the 10-year paperwork process is abandoned or significantly reduced.  
Ultimately, what we see from the Army null study is that the data they 
analyzed estimates a 16.5-year time frame to get to a decision to enter full-scale 
production for a relatively risk-free solution. This would correspond to getting to IOC 
with limited production.  There is no room or time for a risky disruptive solution like 
the targets of 1950s innovation efforts. This study’s output does conform with an 
MDAP acquisition timeline of about 15-25 Years.  The extra 10 years comport to the 
time to continue producing the system at scale.  Adding the Army’s estimate of the 10 
years it takes for the acquisition process to the 7 years it takes to get to first contract 
and then subtracting for a concurrent 2-year contracting cycle equals 15 years – again 
fitting within the parameters of a 15-25-year acquisition program.  Still, both the 
Army’s null program (10 years) and actual estimate (16.5 years) ignore pre-program 
decision time, so it is quite possible it would take 23.5 years to get to IOC in this 
example if the 7 years in decision time were added to the program. 
When a program takes that long, the whole idea of predictability is called into 
question.  Can one really set a cost, schedule, or performance baseline that is tied to 
the budget over such an excessively lengthy period?  These long timeframes make it 
extremely problematic to establish a meaningful baseline and process to monitor and 
document cost overruns.  The requirement to establish such a baseline in the Nunn-





innovation, but it becomes increasingly out of touch with reality as a positive tool for 
management.  It is extremely difficult to maintain baselines over a longer period of 
years, and in fact may be counterproductive to try and do so.  Changing budgets, 
priorities, and technology – particularly if the military is not the only source of 
technological advance – will drive instability in programs.  The original cost 
baselines become meaningless as time, threat, and technology changes, but 
nonetheless they serve as the basis for a false sense of accountability that, when 
subsequently measured by the criteria of long-ago estimated baselines, are often 
measured as failures.    
DOD over time has tried to adjust to these realities by setting new baselines 
when things changed.  Congress, on the other hand, believed this was just a case of 
moving the goalpost and subsequently mandated in section 802 of the 2006 NDAA to 
force DOD to adopt measurement from the original cost baselines.  This makes one 
wonder if Congress was politically just setting DOD up to fail, because if DOD takes 
on any risk in a program, or inserts new technology, it will likely be met with greater 
cost overruns for the program as these changes were not contemplated in the original 
baseline and will register as cost overruns. The actual effect of this policy is to force 
DOD to limit risk, adopt limited evolutionary innovative change over a longer period 
of time, and deploy technology that is likely inferior to that an adversary would 





Cold War and lasted for almost 25 years,184 this could be a legitimate policy.  In a 
different era, it appears foolish.  
 
Issue with Baselines 
 
Baselines are critical as the foundational criteria of measurement.  Pick the 
wrong baseline and you get a different answer.  The difficulty in choosing which cost 
baseline criteria for Nunn-McCurdy measurement to use leads to a logical question 
about the correct baselines for measuring when to start and end the calculation of 
cycle time or time to market.  This is extremely important and will lead to a different 
view of reality depending on the baseline chosen.  As was seen in the two earlier 
measurements of time for aeronautical programs, RAND choose to start with the 
beginnings of technology demonstration and the data in Figure 4.4 begins with the 
initiation of a contract.  Each of these ignores the likely now 7-year upfront time it 
takes to move through the budget, requirements, and initial contracting processes.  
A 2016 IDA study and a 2020 study by CSIS on time to development 
unfortunately muddy the water a bit further and drive home the importance of 
baselines and methodologies.185  Still, upon closer examination these two studies 
cannot reject the thesis that time to development is increasing unless one buys into 
their initial assumptions.  The results generated by these studies are helpful in 
 
184 This corresponds to the recognition by the Obama Administration of the threat from China and 
Russia after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2014 and the subsequent militarization of disputed 
islands in the South China Sea by China. 
185 Morgan Dwyer, Brenen Tidwell, and Alec Blivas, Cycle Times and Cycles of Acquisition Reform. 
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supporting the cycle time debate and would be even more helpful if they would 
publish their data and not just their results. 
The first issue to address with these two studies is their timeframes.  The IDA 
study covers the period between 1990-2015, well after the main problem of increased 
cycle time had been identified.  The best takeaway from this study was that the 
problem hasn’t gotten worse in this timeframe nor has it gotten better. The reality is 
the problem has worsened, but to determine that relates to the studies choice of 
baselines.  On the positive side, both studies collected data that includes all MDAPs 
not just those in aircraft programs.  The CSIS data goes back to 1960, which is much 
better than 1990 but still does not include 1950s data or comparisons when the U.S. 
did cycle time execution well.  CSIS then subdivided the data to correspond to 
various sub periods that relate to acquisition reform cycles (See Figure 4.8 and Table 
4.1).   
The next issues relate to baselines.  Both studies primarily compared these 
programs from Milestone B to IOC.  Milestone B refers to what is called engineering 
and manufacturing development. The results of these studies generally correspond to 
a statement made in October 2020 by Ellen Lord, the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Sustainment who also used Milestone B as a start date to measure 
cycle time: 
 
“For 100 of our largest programs at that time, the median duration from 
milestone B -- the decision point to enter development of a product and 
generally considered the start of a program of record -- to initial operational 
capability was nearly eight years.”186 
 







Figure 4.8: Cycle Time Program Data: CSIS 1960-2020 MDAP MS B to IOC 
 
 
Using Milestone B as the baseline to start a program may be an analytical 
scoping issue due to the limitations of available comparable data, but that decision 
skews the analysis and mask the overall time to market problem.  Each of these 
efforts, by choosing to collect data to begin a program at what is now defined as 
Milestone B, has chosen a baseline that is, unfortunately, extremely late in the 
process.  It effectively discounts the tremendous amount of time necessary to get to 
Milestone B.  Milestone B would correspond to Milestone 2 in the earlier RAND 





Milestone 2 and Milestone B, which, while called different things – full scale 
development vs engineering and manufacturing development – is roughly the same 
data point.   
This implies most significantly that the cycle time situation is much worse 
once pre-Milestone B time is added to these programs.  Not wanting to add in or 
emphasis this time is what advocates for those portions of the process – in the early 
requirements, budget, and contracting that are slowing things down in the pre-MS B 
phases -- would want to emphasize. But, even in these studies they are not counting 
the technology development time to go from Milestone A to Milestone B.  When 
competing with the U.S., the Chinese are not looking at the time it takes to go from 
Milestone B to IOC, but how long it takes the U.S. to deliver capability – which is 
much greater than that.  That is why is it important to include and consider all phases 
of the process.  Policymakers need to be cognizant of study baselines and what is 
covered and what is not. 
I will propose adding pre-Milestone B linear time estimates to CSIS’s data to 
reflect a truer picture of today’s reality when innovating to compete against a near 
peer such as China. The first adjustment to be made to programs since the mid-1990s 
will be to add in the seven years of decision time for market awareness, requirements 
and budgeting process and then add the two years (26 months) that the Army 
estimated was the time for a program to progress from Milestone A to Milestone B 
for just the paperwork.  The second adjustment will be made for those programs in 
the 1960s where there is data for additional decision time according to the 1977 DSB 





time underestimate as there is no readily available comparable estimate for the time it 
took to go from equivalent measures of Milestone A to B during these time periods.  
For 1980s and early 1990s programs, I will propose to split the difference between 
pre-Milestone B time at 5 years in the 1970s and 9 today, and mark that adjustment at 
7 years. Adding those adjusted time frames to the CSIS data table corresponds to a 
minimum of 15 years to complete a program.   
 
Table 4.1: CSIS Time to Market Numbers Adjusted for Pre-Milestone B 








Mean	 Max	 N	 Mean	 Max	 Adj	
FY	1963-1969	 5.0	 11.5	 13	 7	 13.5	 2	
FY	1970-1976	 6.1	 15.7	 30	 11.1	 20.7	 5	
FY	1977-1982	 6.3		 12.3	 38	 11.3	 17.3	 5	
FY	1983-1989	 7.1	 21.2	 48	 14.1	 28.2	 7	
FY	1990-1993	 6.4	 14.5	 15	 13.4	 21.5	 7	
FY	1994-2009	 8.0	 18.7	 90	 17	 25.7	 9	
FY	2010-2018	 6.0		 12.3	 26	 15	 21.3	 9	
 
MS-B: Milestone B (Engineering and Manufacturing Development Start) 
IOC: Initial Operational Capability 
N: Number of cases 
Max: Length of longest program in time period  
Adj: Decision time and pre-Milestone B adjustment 
 
 
The most critical step to attacking time to market addresses the time it takes to 





from Milestone B to IOC, the likely longer period to get to that point is even more 
important to assess.  If it takes 9 years to just get to Milestone B and experimentation 
and prototyping are not a part of that equation, there are two potentially negative 
outcomes: technology will not be as mature at Milestone B as it should be, or perhaps 
worse from a national security perspective, operators will be denied an operational 
step change that could be created during that transition to a traditional MDAP 
program.  
While both of these studies and Undersecretary Lord’s statement serve as a 
positive contribution to generating public data for evaluation, they ignore a large 
segment of time to development and in doing so any conclusions could lead to the 
adoption of poor management practices that leave the U.S. military further behind 
technologically.  Nonetheless, these studies are important steps in getting more data 
into the public space even if they require more refinement and analysis.  What is most 
striking is that there may be an ideal time that could serve as a goal for future 
Milestone B to IOC programs.  This could be set at five years or less as is the current 
requirement in the Rapid Fielding pathway of the Section 804 Middle Tier authority.  
This authority closely corresponds to a Milestone B to production program and is 
much shorter than the current time frame that is the source of Undersecretary Lord’s 









Issues with Innovation Quality 
 
Reviewing the defense budget each year for new programs and technologies 
can lull one into a false sense of security, as it would appear that DOD is always 
innovating and focused on new technology.  That would be a true statement and one 
could legitimately ask whether there is a problem.  The key questions are, what types 
and quality of innovation is DOD pursuing?  Is it disruptive, sustaining, 
revolutionary, incremental, or evolutionary?  How does time impact the quality of 
these innovative approaches? 
The next set of issues relate to many of the studies that have to rely on MDAP 
SAR data, which is a data analysis problem. Having more data is better, but the first 
problem with the data is it needs to be differentiated.  Mixing first of class and new 
types of technology endeavors with incremental limited upgrades to existing 
equipment makes it difficult to draw the right conclusions from the data.  It should be 
expected that incremental programs with limited new technology will take a shorter 
period of time to complete and there will likely be more of these kinds of programs, 
particularly if that is what oversight frameworks are incentivizing. For that reason, the 
aircraft data in 4.3 is differentiated by new aircraft and does not include subsequent 
upgrades to these aircraft that would be included in a consolidated MDAP data set. 
The problem with using aggregated MDAP data to measure time is that no 
matter which baseline is chosen, it is ignoring this discussion of quality.  The quality 
of the innovation being pursued is an important clarifying concept that should be 





problematic when data is aggregated as there was, for example, no differentiation in 
size or complexity in the IDA or CSIS analysis.  Unfortunately, each MDAP is 
unique and despite statutory classifications addressing dollars spent, there is no one-
size fits all description of an MDAP program.  Many of these MDAPs have a size and 
quality of innovation problem.  They are not something disruptive or even new.  
Many are upgrades of existing equipment and because they trigger the statutory dollar 
threshold, even a minor upgrade of electronics in a combat vehicle program that could 
take a year to complete would be classified as an MDAP.  Thus, a distinction in the 
data should be made between first in a class of innovation (lead ship, new aircraft) 
and those that are incremental improvements to an original innovation.  Then, within 
those first in their class new developments a further, more subjective distinction could 
be made of how many of these are truly disruptive or not.   
The quality of innovation should matter and intuitively one would think that 
an increase in time to development would increase quality.  Similarly, a time-based 
strategy would seemingly incentivize incremental innovation that truly couldn’t be 
disruptive.  But what is counter-intuitive is that the greatest disruptive sources of 
defense innovation – ICBMs, reconnaissance satellites, nuclear submarines, and 
stealth aircraft – occurred during a time-based approach.  And while in the post-
McNamara data that CSIS collected there is a need to differentiate between small 
incremental efforts and more challenging new programs, little has been developed 
since the late 1970s (with the exception of stealth and a few other Second Offset 
technologies) that can accurately be classified as disruptive when compared to 1950s 





and taking one’s time to “get things right” led to less disruptive technologies rather 
than more. 
While process protections against failure may have stretched out time, even 
more importantly, they may have created a risk-averse culture and incentives in the 
budget and acquisition systems that encourage incrementalism in innovation.  
Weapons developed under this system over a long space of time counterintuitively are 
not the most disruptive if past history is a guide.  The reason for this is that in trying 
to adhere to the checklist mentality of the 2008 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform 
Act (WSARA) and other NDAA legislation that has embedded very specific 
Milestone A/B/C criteria into law and then to be able to meet the stringent original 
estimated cost baselines of the Nunn-McCurdy Act, a program to be successful would 
need to focus on very limited incremental innovation.  Anything else would trigger 
the inability to move beyond milestones or a likely a Nunn-McCurdy breach. 
The current acquisition process discounts experimentation, prototyping, and 
disruption as reform criteria to oversee the acquisition process have incentivized 
incrementalism in MDAPs.  Thus, under the current defense innovation system, 
disruptive innovation may be procedurally being driven out of the system through 
these reforms and DOD has been pursuing limited incremental innovation such as 
seen in the army’s continual upgrades of its large systems developed in the 1970s – 
the so called Big 5 – M1tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Apache Attack Helicopter, 
Patriot air defense system, and Blackhawk helicopter once they were first deployed in 






Rapid Incrementalism as an Alternative Developmental Strategy 
 
What did earlier major disruptive technologies have in common?  Rapid 
experimentation and prototyping that were based on a bedrock of scientific progress.   
The ability to fail and learn from these failures.  This leads to a very interesting issue 
regarding the types and definition of incrementalism.  Incrementalism need not stifle 
innovation if it is limited by short bursts of time and classified by innovation goals. 
Serial incrementalism can be highly disruptive as will be argued by earlier cases of 
successful time-based serial incrementalism. One could classify incremental MDAP 
programs pre- and post-McNamara into categories of either rapid serial 
incrementalism or planned incrementalism. The post-McNamara planned incremental 
systems conform to the linear requirements, acquisition and budget processes.  
Technology is mature at Milestone B and thus fewer technical problems can delay the 
fielding of the program while this new technology insertion can be completed in a 
one-time innovation turn according to CSIS data in 6-8 years after earlier decision 
time is completed.  The quantity of innovation as measured by serial iterative 
prototyping and what is now known as agile development in the commercial world 
was a foundation of earlier innovation practices.  This could be described as rapid 
serial incrementalism and several innovation turns can occur in a limited time period.   
Multiple prototyping turns conducted in a rapid fashion can have a level of 
quality all its own and can be seen by the experience of the development of the B-52.  
This is an example of rapid incrementalism or the success of a developmental effort 





may not have been the first, but is one of the most significant examples of agile 
development, as we can still see the results today.  How to classify this program is a 
methodological challenge in itself.  As can be seen in Figure 4.2, RAND believed that 
time to deployment for the B-52 was around 11years.  In Figure 4.3, this number is 
seven years.  The difference again has to do with how a program is defined.  
Incremental turns of innovation that occurred in the B-52 program were counted as 
one program by RAND and multiple efforts in Figure 4.3.   
Development of the B-52 may well have been the 1950s equivalent of the 
iPhone that turns out a new version every year, as it was conducted in a very similar 
agile manner.  First, the B-52 underwent multiple rapid design iterations beginning in 
1946 and ending in 1951 with a new designed being produced roughly each year. 
Then, two prototypes were built with the first being flown in 1952.  Starting with the 
B52A, eight different models went into production with a new model coming off the 
production line and achieving IOC roughly every year until the Air Force stopped 
production on the B-52H.  Each model was designed to have an increase in 
performance and all models were delivered by 1963.187  The plane is still in active 
service with the Air Force today with plans to continue flying for many decades to 
come. 
While initial efforts correspond to a rapid design and developmental 
prototyping and testing, the eight production models correspond to a concept of rapid 
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operational prototyping with each model evolving into better capabilities and service 
life.  Such a concept of rapid time-based incremental development prototyping and 
operational prototyping that puts out a new product each year can be highly disruptive 
over the course of multiple innovation turns. A turn would be defined as whenever a 
new product is introduced.  Even if the innovation turn rate was greater than 1-2 
years, a focus on achieving a 3-5-year innovation turn cycle DOD could vastly impact 
the quality of innovation by getting 3-4 turns of innovation in a time-based manner 
rather than in one longer 15-20 year centrally managed program.   
Planned predictive innovation could be an improvement as long as it is 
conducted in a time-based basis.  While this incremental approach could be criticized 
as being not revolutionary, a time series of this type of innovations may provide 
greater and more innovative capability than one 20-year planned program.  As was 
described above, both 1950s submarine development and the Air Force’s Century 
Series subscribed to a time series model similar to the B-52 experience.   
 
The Bifurcation of Industrial Base 
 
The next issue with time relates to the difficulty in attracting to the defense 
industrial base those firms that still innovate on a time-based basis.  In the immediate 
period World War II, there was some decline in CMI that began with the creation of a 
dedicated defense industrial base, but this bifurcation picked up in the 1960s and 
1970s with the development of unique government processes and requirements than 





eventually split off and differentiated itself from the underlying civilian commercial 
base from whence it came.  As this base became more defense unique and integrated 
with the government run defense industrial base, barriers developed that would 
eventually limit the cooperative ties with the rest of the civilian commercial industrial 
base.  
The origins of the current CMI structure can be traced to decisions made 
during and immediately after World War II.  The existential threat of World War II 
resulted in an almost complete integration of the U.S. military and civilian industrial 
bases as the country converted commercial production capability to military uses.  
The evolution of this industrial model in the 1950s created what Eisenhower 
described in his January 17, 1961 farewell speech as the military-industrial 
complex.188  This complex was a hybrid – not quite completely commercial in 
practice, but not quite a government enterprise, as was the case with the publicly-run 
arsenals.   Even though the industrial part of the military-industrial complex was 
predominantly privately run it ultimately became more and more government unique 
in its outlook and orientation, drifting away from its commercial roots – in due course 
looking more like a privatized version of the public arsenal system.   
At the time of Eisenhower’s speech, dual-use commercial entities were still a 
part of the industrial base.  As time progressed, a greater, and depending on the 
criteria used for evaluation, almost complete, separation between the private sector 
portion of the military-industrial base and the rest of commercial technology 
industrial base eventually prevailed in the post war experience.  Ultimately, this 
 





“privatized arsenal” approach looked similar to the old public arsenal model with 
defense-unique private companies relying only when needed on the rest of 
commercial industry for raw materials like steel, titanium, and some “off the shelf’ 
commercial products.   
But how and when did the defense-unique industrial base and commercial 
industry go their separate ways?  As management systems evolved, other values 
embedded in these management processes such as compliance with a rules-based 
system, enhanced accountability and oversight, security, competition, fairness and 
geographical dispersion in place of performance replaced disruptive innovation and 
speed as the dominant criteria to be achieved. These processes and values ultimately 
significantly altered the types of companies that bid on and won defense contracts. 
As the 1960s cost-based processes grew more linear they would eventually 
serve as barriers to new entrants in the defense market.  Still, it was likely that the 
cost-based accounting and government-unique contracting process related to price 
began the bifurcation of the industrial base in the 1970s.  The passage of the Truth in 
Negotiations Act of 1962 (TINA) was the first defining moment. The embrace of 
TINA and its establishment of the government’s rights to internal contractor pricing 
and cost data forced companies to decide whether to specialize in defense contracting 
or not.  Not surprisingly, some firms and parts of firms began to specialize in these 
military products while others pursued commercial markets.  This process took about 
a decade to take hold. 
TINA traces its origin to the Vincent Trammel Act and to late 1800s audit 





when TINA was first passed into law, this requirement was a rather reasonable one 
that companies should certify that the prices and costs that they gave to the 
government were correct.  At this point that certification was based to a great degree 
on trust and policing by internal company employees who could file a Qui Tam suit 
as the TINA certification requirement triggered a legal requirement covered by the 
False Claims Act. In 1968, Congress didn’t trust that certifications were enough to 
deter fraud and added enhanced government audit rights for TINA.  But then auditors 
were confused by the proliferation of different cost accounting systems at companies 
that made it difficult to audit. 
The creation of CAS in 1970 completed the government-unique CAS/TINA 
process. It was argued that CAS was needed to effectively implement TINA as the 
government could not make sense of all of the data it now had a right to have.  Each 
company’s accounting system was different and it was difficult, if not impossible, to 
make comparisons.  The driver behind this system, ironically, was the individual who 
did the most to ensure the Navy’s earlier time-based success on nuclear submarine 
development.  Admiral Rickover is credited with spearheading the creation of the 
CAS system based on his congressional testimony.189 Once his focus moved to how 
to build submarines at scale after submarine class designs stabilized, the Admiral 
focused on production and price.  And while Rickover had a problem with 
maintaining competition and incentives to perform, what really seemed to rankle him 
was not knowing how much money a contractor was making.  Ultimately, this came 
 
189 U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, A Bill to Amend the Defense 
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down to a lack of trust of the private sector and the desire to drive down profits. In 
testimony before Congress Rickover stated: 
 
It should be clearly understood that under existing procurement rules it is not 
possible to tell just how much it costs to manufacture equipment or just how 
much profit a company actually makes without spending months 
reconstructing the supplier’s books.  Large additional profits can easily be 
hidden just by the way overhead is charged, how component parts are priced, 
or how intercompany profits are handled… Thus, profit statistics are 
meaningless unless measured in accordance with a uniform standard.”190 
 
This was all perfectly true under a cost-type contract where the government 
reimbursed a company for all of its costs.  Rather than focus on negotiating a fixed 
price, the dislike of profits made this option even more distasteful.  Rickover, again: 
“Under fixed price contracts, a contractor has virtually unlimited flexibility in 
deciding how he will keep his books and how he will assign costs among a number of 
individual contracts.”191  As a result of Rickover’s testimony, Congress created the 
Cost Accounting Standards Board in 1970.  The obsession with managing costs and 
profits on government-unique contractors was adopted not just at DOD, but 
government wide.  The harmonization of a company’s accounting system to support 
government auditor and pricing requirements from then on necessitated the creation 
of an entirely government-unique accounting system that was not useful in the 
commercial marketplace.  
Companies were forced to choose.  Cost contracts under CAS became a 
specialized way of business with firms that chose to do business with the government.  
 
190 Ibid. p. 26. 





These firms essentially became privatized versions of the old arsenal system. The 
procedures requiring firms to manage on a cost basis was instrumental in not only the 
bifurcating of the industrial base but the maintenance of this separation until the 
present time.  They also had an impact on future innovation that would come out of 
the defense industrial base.  Profit margins were managed to the levels comparable to 
a publicly regulated utility, which in essence these firms are, and that are lower than 
the more dynamic portions of the economy.  The management of costs and the 
limitations on what the government would eventually reimburse for engineering talent 
put the defense industry in a comparative disadvantage with other high technology 
companies.  Low profits and cost reimbursement rules have disincentivized R&D 
investments beyond what can be reimbursed through allowable overhead rates on a 
contract. There is little to no incentive for a defense company to invest in any R&D, 
above that it is reimbursed, as that comes right out of already lower profits margins 
than obtained in the rest of the commercial market. 
The Vietnam War era thus became a turning point in the path to the 
bifurcation of the civilian and military industry bases and the development of greater 
barriers to commercial firms’ participation in the DOD market. The cost-based focus 
of the government had several other unintended consequences.  As companies were 
forced to specialize in either defense or commercial sectors, there eventually became 
limited discussion or understanding of trends in the commercial marketplace.  In the 
1960s and 1970s when DOD was driving R&D innovation, this did not have an 
effect, but it did impact the culture at DOD, which was to always assume that 





specifications on producing goods for the military.  Even once DOD fell behind the 
commercial marketplace it was never able to change its attitude that defense solutions 
were superior to commercial ones.  
Several other requirements to include security and the treatment of intellectual 
property also underwent significant changes since the 1960s that served as barriers to 
commercial participation in the defense market.  Security brought unique process that 
contractors had to create compliance programs. The government’s treatment of 
intellectual property in a way that favoured the government raised the stakes for a 
company as whether to participate in a government contract or not.  From a 
commercial perspective, the worst provision was the authority to allow the 
government to transfer a company’s intellectual property and technical data to 
competitors to further competition.  This drove those companies that paid for their 
own R&D and wanted to capitalized on that investment out of the government 
market.  Still, the most significant barriers to commercial company participation in 
the defense market have been CAS and TINA.  These factors embedded within the 
contracting regime have created a very complex set of often contradictory 
propositions that serve as barriers to those commercial industries such as those in 
Silicon Valley and within the commercial aircraft industry that have adopted a time to 
market philosophy and approach.  Thus, the decline in CMI of the defense industrial 
base that these regimes have encouraged has kept out of the traditional defense 
industrial base precisely those firms that are incentivized to focus on rapid or agile 





The defense industrial base appears to have merely adapted to government-
imposed process change rather than being a driver of it.  There was no widespread 
lobbying to impose greater regulatory checks and balances on the defense industrial 
base.  There was no industry support for TINA and CAS or limitations on industry 
data rights, and in fact there was resistance over the years. Still, those companies that 
wished to do business with the government adapted these constraints into business 
practices.  Ironically, the industrial portion of the military industrial complex that was 
the source of worry when President Eisenhower first warned against the rise of such 
an entity, actually benefited tremendously when processes were created to regulate it.  
The defense industry actually did quite well out of new management regimes while 
those commercial firms who chose not to comply left the market or never entered in 
the first place.   
Management changes in budgeting, personnel, technology security, and 
acquisition since the 1960s furthered specialization in the defense industry.  This first 
led to the creation of stand-alone defense units within corporations designed to deal 
with unique rules of the government defense market and then to the eventual sale and 
consolidation of these units as specialized defense-only companies.  The end of the 
Cold War and the collapse of defense expenditures furthered this consolidation. By 
the end of the Cold War, it was recognized that the two industrial bases (defense and 
commercial) had indeed bifurcated and were completely separated, which led to a 







The Commercial Industrial Base Time-Based Legacy 
 
The true time frames to complete a new defense innovation program in 
today’s environment is probably now around 15-20 years.  This would include seven 
years of pre-program efforts, technology development and demonstration, full scale 
development, initial low-rate production and then a follow-on effort that leads to 
production at scale.  This is not an ideal system if one’s adversary is able to make 
faster innovative turns and adopts a serial prototyping strategy similar to DOD 
practices of the 1950s.  Since this old approach is similar to today’s commercial 
approach displayed in the development of the iPhone, it should not be surprising if 
China were trying to develop weapon systems the same way.  Although what might 
be lost now is that today’s best practices look surprisingly similar to the B-52 
strategy.   
The current DOD weapons system process is also not an optimal market for a 
fledgling new commercial AI or robotics startup if it takes 7 years to just get into the 
door and to start earning revenue. Still, why is the commercial marketplace fixated on 
time and DOD is not?  In the Post-Cold War era, the time-based experimentation, 
prototyping and development model that the Defense Department once used was 
maintained in the commercial sector.   Why has the commercial market done such a 
consistent job in deploying capability though history as time to market for the 
commercial sector has corresponded to what DOD used to achieve in the 1950s and 





economy, the commercial aircraft industry and Silicon Valley, the culture of faster 
innovation might be found in the legacy of the origins of these industries. 
The history of the origins of the commercial aircraft and IT industries may 
suggest that they are the direct decedents of the time-based defense innovation model 
that, while no longer being used effectively in the government, has been adopted by 
these leading enterprises of commercial innovation.  One has to only look at Silicon 
Valley’s philosophy of “fail fast” to see the significance of time.  These industries 
actually owe much of their rise to 1950s and 1960s investments by DOD.  
Commercial sector adoption of the model was encouraged by significant government-
sponsored industrial policy actions that helped incubate the commercial jet aircraft 
and information technology industries.  DOD demand, its dominance of research and 
development in the 1950s and 1960s, and an activist industrial policy of being the 
first buyer for new technologies was instrumental in helping these industries grow.   
Advance purchase agreements for technologies still being developed allowed 
companies to build up necessary capital and successfully demonstrate technology to 
expand in the commercial marketplace.  These purchases of such items as the Boeing 
707 jet192 that served as the basis for the KC-135 tanker still in service today, and 
advances in integrated circuits and microelectronics led to commercial dominance or 
greater competitiveness for those companies and industries that kept to a time-based 
innovation model.193 During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Defense Department 
 
192 The U.S. military provided significant R&D for commercial aircraft in the post war period, 
particularly for jet engines: Mowery, David C, and Nathan Rosenberg. Paths of Innovation: 
Technological Change in 20th-Century America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
193 R. Miller, D. Sawers The Technical Development of Modern Aviation Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London (1968) p.193-94. Importance of production contracts the electronics industry cited by 





provided a “path to commercialization” for a number of potential dual-use 
technologies.194  This was in common with an industrial policy of the time to nurture 
new companies and ideas and then transfer to the commercial sector advances created 
by the nuclear and space programs. The NASA manned moon program in the 1960s 
served as another mechanism to transfer technology to the commercial sector.   This 
type of industrial policy would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conduct 
under existing constraints as current export control thresholds would now likely be 
triggered by an item being classified as a military product through military first use or 
by receiving research and development money from the Department of Defense.195  
But in the early 1960s theses type of export constraints were not written into law and 
the government was not yet empowered to serve as a brake on dual use defense 
innovation.  
The commercial information technology industry arose from its military roots 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, driven by a need to miniaturize electronics to fit 
within advanced missile, aircraft, and radar systems.196  This industry, once freed 
 
product innovation in the electronics industry (1966) Unpublished D.B.A. dissertation, George 
Washington University. 
194 For another example of the past use of a military lead customer that provided the capital for a 
commercial provider to dominate an industry see the use of military contracts for the use of containers 
for shipping in Vietnam cited as a huge catalyst for the revolution in shipping: Levinson, Marc. The 
Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
195 For this reason, U.S. commercial firms now go out of their way to ensure the commerciality of the 
application of new technologies before applying that technology to a national security need.  There are 
also other constraints such as intellectual property contracting requirements and WTO trade subsidy 
rules that have made it more difficult for DOD to play the role of first buyer of commercially 
developed technology or to create partnerships to create that technology. 
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from its largely forgotten military roots, is now a multi-trillion-dollar market 
generations ahead of the military in technological development.  It should not be 
surprising that before it was called Silicon Valley, the area south of San Francisco 
was the epicenter of the military transistor and radar technology industrial base of the 
1950s and 1960s.  What has happened since in Silicon Valley is just the most recent 
example of the phenomenon of military technology moving to the commercial market 
and being refined and improved upon in ways that military planners did not 
anticipate. 
It appears that these commercial companies and individuals behind the 
miniaturization of electronics and the development of the air defense and command-
and-control systems of the 1950s escaped from the path to pseudo-nationalization and 
control by first working with NASA, which was more reminiscent of the early 
Pentagon programs. These companies formed the basis of Silicon Valley and the 
Massachusetts Route 128 commercial computer and electronics industries, chasing 
and eventually capturing the higher returns to be found in those sectors. But Silicon 
Valley was eventually to dominate Route 128 as innovation moved to Silicon Valley 
away from the military. Not only was it the defense contracts and defense electronics 
infrastructure that was in place in Silicon Valley in the 1950s and early 1960s, but 
Silicon Valley adopted a number ways to out-innovate not only the military in the 
intervening years, but also other potential innovation clusters. 
These traits that enabled Silicon Valley to dominate innovation in the world 
can be argued may have been passed on from the 1950s defense innovation model 





duplicative, and wasteful.   The first is that the history and culture of 
experimentation/prototyping conforms very well to the “fail fast” Silicon Valley 
culture.  This process of agile development and serial operational prototyping was 
adopted to keep moving new products to the marketplace on an annual basis, similar 
to DOD’s 1950s weapons systems program. The second was the role of an incubator 
of technology by making many bets of different multiple pathways to a solution.  In 
the place of DOD programs of the 1950s, Stanford University and the growth of the 
venture-capital community took over in making these initial bets.  
The third trait was the ability to pick winners.  The 1950s government model 
allowed the government to be the first customer after using research funding to 
compete many solutions.  This was essentially emulated and replaced by the venture 
capital (VC) industry.  Success in an A round leads to subsequent B, C, and D rounds.  
But picking winners was not about technologies and companies, but people. At least 
in the early days of the Cold War, the government was able to encourage senior 
engineers from one company to start their own company and award them a sole 
source contract.  This process may have reached its height when Eisenhower 
appeared to be personally picking winners, such as when Simon Ramo was 
encouraged to leave Hughes aircraft due to security concerns with the parent 
company and create TRW to manage the ICBM program. 197 This is an example of 
something that would likely never happen today in government due to procurement 
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integrity concerns, but in Silicon Valley many an engineer can be tempted by VC 
capital.   
Finally, what is probably the fourth most important driver of innovation that 
made Silicon Valley what it is today it is the focus on time to operational deployment.  
VC funding only lasts so long. It is either succeed or see the money run out.  A 1950s 
defense program was something similar.  There were always other alternatives to 
spend the government’s money.  The 1950s defense innovation model moved on from 
time-based, flexible funding, multiple pathways, entrepreneurial risk taking, and 
picking winners to one based on order, one predictive long-term path, processes 
designed to limit risk and ensure fairness for all.  Is it any wonder where innovation 
would eventually come from? 
The commercial aircraft would take a less risky route but would detach itself 
from defense by creating separate business units that were culturally and 
economically distinct.  One would be defense-facing and adapted to the new defense 
management culture of compliance and the other commercial-facing and operating 
under a separate set of rules.  Most importantly in the development of commercial 
aircraft, engines, and subsystems, there remained a culture of time-based 
development that was lost in the defense context.   
The evolving role of what are now referred to as non-traditional sources of 
innovation is a key piece of evidence in the impact of the post 1960s management 
regimes as applied to defense.  Both commercial aerospace and Silicon Valley were 
once a part of that greater defense industrial base in the Early Cold War and post-





focus on compliance.  Collectively, this framework impacted the ability to innovate in 
many perhaps unintentional ways.  The attempt to manage the innovation system 
through greater centralized planning, pricing and cost management controls, and 
linear processes did not achieve the results that were originally intended.  They did 
not achieve the advertised efficiency goals and negatively impacted innovation by 
driven out a time and civil-military integration of the industrial base. 
During the acquisition reform efforts of the early 1990s, the industries 
Congress was most concerned about were the commercial aircraft and computer 
industries that either were not working with DOD or had created separate methods for 
doing so.  The inability to effectively access these firms though the management 
process barriers in a failed CMI approach serve as a validation of how far the current 
defense innovation model has evolved from its origins. Neither Silicon Valley nor the 
commercial aerospace industry wanted to innovate on behalf DOD because their 









Chapter 5:  Defense Innovation Case Examples: When 
Time-Based Innovation Becomes Important Again 
 
 
“You are remembered for the rules you break.”  




This chapter explores cases when the U.S. government decided to resurrect 
time as a key variable and place it higher in priority to other values previously more 
important than speed in the defense innovation system.  There is a history of 
temporary or alternative workarounds of management regimes that support the 
defense innovation system.  These were created when it was determined that DOD or 
the military services needed to either develop capability faster on a time to market 
basis or to access new sources of innovation that had been or could be developed 
from a faster commercial system that values shorter development times.  This same 
dynamic transpired at NASA once the Space Shuttle was retired and the U.S. lost its 
own access to space and was forced to rely on Russia.  
In response to these political demand signals, the most reliable solution to a 
time-based challenge is to construct or take advantage of laws, regulations, policies, 
and practices that bypass time-intensive public management regimes.  Alternative 
pathways for time-based development are established, but inevitably these pathways 
become limited exceptions (usually for an emergency or when funding is limited) and 
are subsequently pared back either entirely or to a degree. These pathways do not 





processes based on cost that remain in place for the vast majority of defense 
innovation efforts. 
 
The Case for Remaking the Rules 
 
As demonstrated in the evidence from the last chapter, time to market or time 
to deployment has been increasing for defense systems since the mid-1970s.  This 
time appears to have been impacted by the new management regimes that were put in 
place beginning in the early 1960s, which stressed process linearity.  These processes, 
when lined up end-to-end, added time to a development effort for a weapon system 
that far exceeded the development times from the early Cold War period.  Linearity 
impacted most significantly the requirements, budget, acquisition, and contracting 
regimes.  There is also evidence that segments in commercial industry maintained a 
more time-based product development focus that was similar to earlier defense 
development times.  Commercial sources of innovation that took advantage of 
expanded private sector R&D expenditures have created industries and technologies 
that are far more advanced than those in current defense capabilities.  Barriers to CMI 
emanating from DOD management regimes have continued to limit access to this 
time-based commercial innovation. 
Still, these longer innovation time trends in defense would not be considered a 
problem if Congress and DOD valued other benefits that derived from these 
management regimes and processes despite adding time or causing defense to fall 





economic support to state and local jurisdictions, the ability to exercise control over 
resources, and the political value of being perceived as a defender against fraud, 
waste, and abuse – whether real or imagined. For senior DOD leadership, political 
control over resources and the security that arises from solutions produced in a 
secure, autarkical U.S.-controlled industrial base are other potentially more beneficial 
value factors.   
High levels of defense spending can also mask or offset any increased cost 
from implementing unique oversight regimes as long as more weapons platforms can 
be deployed, especially in comparison to the rest of the world.  The U.S. has 
consistently outspent the world in defense.198   As long as threats remain relatively 
low and spending high, an inefficient and non-innovative system can continue to 
operate with limited concern.  This situation only becomes undermined when a gap 
appears, as for example when another country achieves a quantitative or qualitative 
advantage.  In the absence of a gap, whether real or imagined as with the missile gap 
of the late 1950s, longer management process times can become the norm as 
innovation time is not valued.  This results in a greater focus on security, economic 
welfare, and oversight compliance benefits. The resulting defense innovation system 
serves in this scenario as an expensive insurance policy that may not necessarily work 
in an emergency without major changes, or as history shows, significant lead time to 
ramp up the industrial base.  This is similar to the situation the U.S. has faced 
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throughout its peacetime history, although DOD is now spending over $700 billion 
annually on this baseline peacetime system.  
The April 1986 Packard Commission report was the last major defense study 
commission to focus on defense management issues during the height of the great 
power competition with the Soviet Union.  In retrospect, the Commission was a 
missed opportunity to address time to innovation.  Unfortunately, the 
recommendations made by that commission and eventually put into legislation were 
aligned with the cost-based, centrally planned, management framework that had 
grown up in the 1960s, but had the effect of increasing process linearity.  This may 
have been the result of missing the significance of successful classified programs 
DOD had initiated beginning in the late 1970s that had minimized and blurred the 
problem of a general movement away from time-based development. These classified 
programs either never adhered to the emerging management regimes or were able to 
pay these regimes negligible attention because they were still nascent and evolving 
and did not yet threaten programs that were managed at a highest level in the 
Department. 
Regardless, from that point forward in the mid-1980s, management and 
acquisition reform efforts focused on two paths.  The first, and primary, path was to 
build on the cost-based linear management regimes established in the 1960s and 
reinforced and reinvigorated by post-Packard Commission legislation to address 
criteria other than time to market.  The second path, explored in the case examples in 
this chapter, was to focus on time and provide exemptions to “break the rules” of 





of military capability.  Thus, in an emergency or when it feared it was falling behind 
technologically, DOD (with Congressional support) circumvented established 
management regimes just as it did in earlier in its history, such as in the aircraft 
experimentation programs of the 1920s, in World War II, the early Cold War, and in 
the Second Offset Strategy of the 1970s. While there is a general historical cycle of 
creating alternative management regimes during an emergency dating back to the 
War of 1812,199 the last 30 years’ experience have had to address a much more 
complicated management system.  To be successful in a time-based manner, DOD 
had to be more explicit in ignoring its own cost-based linear based management 
systems rather than only relying on emergency contracting authorities.  What has not 
been successful or seriously considered was to call into question the underlying 
system that was being circumvented.   
 
The Missed Opportunities for the Packard Commission to Address Time 
 
There have only been a few opportunities to address the reform of defense 
management regimes in a comprehensive way rather than in a piecemeal fashion.  
The 1960s offered that opportunity when the application of a presumed more superior 
data driven, predictive, fact-based scientific management approach to innovation was 
created with the goal of not only being more efficient but improving results and 
further innovative outputs.  Program budgeting, systems, and cost analysis and a step-
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by-step criterion for managing systems through the life cycle of innovation was seen 
as the pillar of effective and competent defense management that would prevent cost 
increases and schedule slippages and lead to greater performance of weapon system 
outcomes.  
When these results were not achieved after a quarter century of 
implementation and institutionalization in the Pentagon and Congress, a second 
opportunity for comprehensive reform arose in the mid-1980s.  At the height of 
increased defense spending in the Reagan Administration, similar complaints arose 
about the management of U.S. defense weapons systems acquisition and the inability 
to control costs. This debate led to the creation by Executive Order 12526 of July 
15,1985 of the President’s Commission on Defense Management headed by David 
Packard, Chairman of the Board of Hewlett Packard and a former Deputy Secretary 
of Defense.   
Obviously, the creation of such a significant commission indicated that 
something had not quite gone right and DOD’s acquisition process was seriously 
flawed.  Program managers from the 1950s testified before the Commission that they 
could no longer innovate as they had 25 years earlier.  The most prominent of these 
were General Bernard Schriever, the so-called father of the U.S. ICBM program in 
the 1950s, whose time-based development approach was instrumental in leading U.S. 
efforts during the missile race with the Soviet Union.   In his letter to the Packard 
Commission in 1986, he argued that the system at the time would have made it 
impossible to innovate as he had in the 1950s.  Included are some excerpts that are 





• “I strongly believe that the timely application of technology to provide 
qualitatively superior weapons, second only to people, is the most important 
ingredient to our National Security.” 
 
• “However, during the last several decades we have lost the way. As a result, 
the timely fielding of qualitatively superior weapons is not being achieved.” 
 
• “We have let the acquisition time from laboratory to Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) more than double and costs inflate enormously.” 
 
• “We are inhibiting technological innovation, the cornerstone for maintaining 
qualitatively superior military systems.” 
 
• “We are not moving rapidly enough in putting new technologies into systems 
and we are no longer taking the prudent risks or using “concurrency” as we 
did in the 50’s.” 
 
• “We have more rules, requirements, documents, people, reviewers and 
checkers than ever before involved non-productively in the decision-making 
process.” 
 
• “We have reached a point in history where we should create a new set of 
policies and procedures along with a management environment whereby 
technology can be brough into the weapon systems process earlier and the 
IOC affected on a more timely basis.”200 
 
The Packard Commission seemingly agreed that the nature of the problem was 
that long acquisition cycles were the “central problem from which most other 
acquisition problems stem”201 and that past management regimes were more 
successful: 
“This technique -- establishment of strong centralized policies implemented 
through highly decentralized management structures -- has its legacies at 
DOD. On this model, for example, Navy-industry teams working together as 
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one brought the Polaris submarine-launched missile system from initiation to 
successful operational test in one-third the time it would take now.” 202 
 
The establishment of the Commission was an opportunity to address time and re-
evaluate what had been institutionalized in the preceded decades. 
In the end, however, the Commission would choose to operate within and 
reinforce the same top-down management approach from the 1960s.   On the issue of 
long acquisition cycles, it did nothing to actually remedy the problem, and while 
identifying the need for a strong program manager such as Schriever or Rickover to 
be given broad authorities to manage programs and be held accountable for them, the 
Commission never fully addressed the increasing constraints on program manager 
discretion and authority.  Despite the continuing failure in results, the underlying 
basis for the collective defense management approach was never brought into 
question by the Commission.   
The Packard Commission instead opted for a stronger centralized military 
joint requirements system and supported other organizational recommendations to 
create a new centralized authority in OSD (the Undersecretary of Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics) to manage defense innovation.  These recommendations 
cemented the 1960s management framework.  The Commission’s recommendations 
were put into law by the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, subsequent National 
Defense Authorization Acts, and the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986.   
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Despite calls by Packard to empower program managers, the trend of putting 
further limits and controls on program managers’ authority and autonomy continued 
with the rise of an independent test organization (established in 1983) and the 
empowerment of independent contracting officers.  The creation of new checks and 
balances in the acquisition and contracting system served as additional brakes that 
further slowed the innovation process and ensured conformance to linear, step-by-
step management processes. These processes were intensively audited by the GAO, a 
newly empowered Inspector General established in 1978, the services audit agencies, 
and the Defense Contract Audit Agency established in 1965 – each of which spent a 
significant amount of time reviewing weapons acquisition.  The rise of a new bid 
protest process and criteria after the passage of the Competition in Contracting Act 
(CICA) of 1984 furthered the linear oversight framework.  CICA had the effect of 
empowering contracting officers to ensure that contracting process compliance was 
more highly valued than programmatic output, as a means to avoid protests.  The 
protests themselves delayed contracting time, but the process created to avoid protests 
stretched contracting time out even longer.  Legislative requirements such as the 1981 
Nunn-McCurdy regime to oversee cost overruns and the requirement for live-fire 
testing in 1985 established additional new compliance regimes. Each of these 
processes led to increasing constraints, the diminishment of the program manager, 
and a crowding out of time as an important factor in development. 
Packard missed an opportunity to swim against the tide, but the reality is that 
the data was not completely visible to the Commission to support a different path.  





culture and values that had permeated both government and the private sector of the 
time.   The Commission, supported by the leading acquisition thinkers of the day, 
looked to the problem as one of implementation and emphasis and did not try to 
recreate or understand what had made Schriever and others successful in the 1950s.  
In hindsight, that would have included flexible funding, a culture of experimentation 
and prototyping, a tolerance for failure, the funding of multiple competitive paths to a 
solution, and the empowerment of a single point of accountability in a governmental 
program manager who had a long enough tenure to be responsible for the delivery of 
a capability. 
What had changed in that intervening period was that the foundational 
management oversight constructs still in use today were established and would 
ultimately undermine each of these successful attributes.  Program managers’ 
authority was diminished by a vast array of new bureaucratic entities that could all 
say no and were effective in slowing down the process. The budget process became 
inflexible and focused on predictive programing years ahead.  Experimentation, 
prototyping, and multiple pathways were seen as wasteful and duplicative and so 
were not funded in a program budgeting concept because they were too immature, 
didn’t meet the criteria to be a program, and thus couldn’t compete for limited funds. 
Program budgeting became mismatched and incompatible to acquisition needs.203   
The Packard Commission did not address these problems or even try to put a 
constraint on their manifestation in impacting cycle time.  It did not recognize the 
 
203 This is not to say that program budgeting is not appropriate in some cases.  Where acquisition 
needs are predictable and stable and disruptive innovation is not needed it makes sense.  When rapid 
innovation is needed, program budgeting becomes more than just a hinderance it becomes a threat to 





problem of process linearity and in fact, compounded it by centralizing the 
requirements and acquisition oversight processes.   It did recognize the problem of 
budget instability that was inherent in an annual review of program budgets in the 
PPBS and the appropriations process, but except for a recommendation for a two-year 
budget, it did not question the underlying appropriateness of program budgeting.  
Thus, program budgeting continued and each year the flexibility to move money 
around to experiment and prototype diminished.  Meanwhile, the reinvigorated 
centralized requirements, acquisition, and contracting processes continued to 
lengthen.  
In the late 1970s, it was much easier for William Perry, then Undersecretary 
of Defense for Research and Engineering, when he laid the groundwork for Second 
Offset programs to bypass linear processes that were still being established and 
gaining acceptance.  The Packard Commission missed the significance of this as the 
successful rapid developments of stealth aircraft (F-117A), GPS, and precision 
targeting technologies and munitions had already been or were just being deployed 
while the Commission was reviewing defense management issues.  These systems 
may have masked the impact of emerging management processes created in the 1960s 
as they were able to, through senior leadership direction and classification of the 
programs, essentially sidestep these evolving processes.  This would prove to 
observers with high levels of security clearances at the time that there was nothing 
wrong with the system.   To reformers, organizational changes and more rigor in the 
process was needed to address the failures of programs not adhering to cost, schedule, 





The lessons that could have been learned from these on-going classified 
weapon system acquisition efforts were not assessed.  Stealth aircraft such as the F-
117A and GPS were operationally prototyped within a short period of time in less 
than five years.204  What was not appreciated at the time was that these systems time-
based success may have owed more to their ability to be classified and managed in a 
way that separated them from the more ridged budget, acquisition, and requirements 
regimes.   As Brose observed:  
 
“By the late 1970s, innovators in the DOD found themselves compelled to 
work around the acquisition system, rather than through it, to get good 
technology fast. Indeed, many of the weapons that debuted in the Gulf War, 
such as stealth aircraft and precision - guided munitions, were developed this 
way: William Perry, the Pentagon’s leading technologist until 1981 and later 
secretary of defense, gave these programs such a high level of classification 
that most of the bureaucracy did not even know they existed.”205 
 
This allowed these so called “black” programs to operate similarly to a 
developmental program from the 1950s.  Thus, Commission members and staff who 
may not have been privy to information on how these classified programs were 
managed could argue that time was not yet an issue and that the early problems of 
lengthening acquisition cycle time, such had just occurred on the F-18A program, 
 
204 The GPS demonstration and validation phase of the program was conducted pretty much in the 
same manner as a 1950s defense program.  The program was initiated in December of 1973. The first 
phase of the program was completed in June 1979 and deployed a fully operational satellite 
constellation to support increased accuracy of the Navy’s submarine ballistic missiles comprised of 6 
satellite to do that. See Jeffrey A. Drezner, Giles K. Smith. “An Analysis of Weapon System 
Acquisition Schedules” R3937, RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, December 
1990.p. 181. It took five years for GPS to move from a concept to an operational capability.   The 
program then entered the more formal acquisition process at Milestone 2 in 1979 where it continued to 
evolve in various incremental iterations and new programs. 





could be fixed by greater centralized oversight through a joint requirements system 
and a strong and empowered acquisition head in DOD. 
Finally, the Packard Commission had the first insight that something new was 
happening in the commercial market.  This makes sense because Packard was one of 
the last senior defense officials (along with Perry) to straddle both DOD and the 
historical nexus between Silicon Valley in its developmental days as a segment of the 
defense industrial base.  He was still working in an industry that valued time to 
market, but he unfortunately missed the counter-trend that was happening at DOD. 
Nonetheless, the advice of the Packard Commission on moving the Department away 
from unique requirements when there is a commercial alternative was sound: 
 
“No matter how DOD improves its organization or procedures, the defense 
acquisition system is unlikely to manufacture products as cheaply as the 
commercial marketplace. DOD cannot duplicate the economies of scale 
possible in products serving a mass market, nor the power of the free market 
system to select and perpetuate the most innovative and efficient producers. 
Products developed uniquely for military use and to military specifications 
generally cost substantially more than their commercial counterparts. DOD 
program managers accordingly should make maximum use of commercial 
products and devices in their programs.”206 
 
While recognizing the advances being made in these new commercial companies, the 
idea took hold that these firms did not want to do business with DOD because of the 
low volumes of DOD purchases.  Other barriers to participation were not identified 
until another Congressional Committee, the section 800 panel, looked closer at that 
issue.   
 
206 President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission), June 30, 





The Packard Commission almost got it right by focusing on program manager 
authority and accountability, but unfortunately also empowered new actors to enforce 
time-intensive hoops for program managers to jump through.  Inevitably, the cost, 
schedule, and performance problems continued to worsen subsequent to Packard.  Yet 
in later years, the vast critiques of defense innovation and the programs that were 
created to bring that innovation to market never placed time to market as an important 
criterion for success.   For 35 years since Packard, the criteria for evaluating the 
success of major defense acquisition programs has been a predetermined cost, 
schedule, and performance metric initiated at the start of a program after receiving a 
validated joint requirement and a positive long-term budget allocation in the PPBS 
budget process.  Management regimes became more complicated to support 
optimization for these goals while time to endure these processes lengthened. 
The importance of accessing the commercial innovation that David Packard 
saw was not addressed sufficiently in the report and the mechanisms used exacerbated 
the problem of time while doing nothing to recognize or address the barriers to 
commercial innovation.  The calls for reform that Schriever made were essentially 
dismissed as anecdotal.  Efforts to empower the program manager were never put in 
place and new power centers arose to limit the program managers’ authority and 
flexibility.  In this systems-based data focused world it is no surprise that the changes 
made in response to Packard only exacerbated the problem by increasing the time it 







Bypassing the System: Case Examples 
 
With no relief generated from the Packard Commission or Congress, one of 
the consistent truths of the last 30 years of acquisition practice is that, if the 
conditions are right and the military needs something important, a mechanism would 
be created to bypass the traditional acquisition process and use a more streamlined 
approach.  These end rounds of management regimes can be classified into two 
categories based on the effects of management regimes within the traditional 
innovation pathway. The first set addressed those management regimes that were 
driven by linearity and created a serial development process that directly impacted 
time.  The second set of workarounds addressed those regimes that, while in part or 
not necessarily linear, created barriers to entry to those commercial firms that pursued 
time to development as a practice.  These barriers to CMI, or barriers to the 
participation in the defense market by non-traditional contractors, required 
circumvention of management regimes to enable superior technology and practices to 
be incorporated faster into military systems. 
The first large-scale case example from the last 30 years of bypassing 
management regimes occurred not in an emergency but in an era of declining 
budgetary resources in the period immediately after the end of the Cold War.  This 
occurred in the 1990s during what can be classified as the first wave of commercial 
IT dominance.  New acquisition pathways were created by Congress through 
commercial item procurement reforms that focused on taking advantage of the rapid 
innovation skills of the commercial sector.  Three types of pathways were created by 





commercial products; the second to encourage the use of commercial practices to the 
development of weapon systems such as resulted in the Joint Direct Attack Munition 
(JDAM) missile; and the third to establish in defense prototyping, authorities 
previously given to the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) that led to 
the development of unmanned systems such as the Predator and Global Hawk.   
In the early 2000s, as a counter to address concerns over an accidental launch 
of a nuclear ICBM and the growing missile capabilities of North Korea and Iran, 
Congress and DOD gave the Missile Defense Agency the ability to bypass traditional 
budget and acquisition regimes in a manner that addressed process linearity.  
Similarly, in the period after 9/11, linear processes were subverted by the 
establishment of rapid acquisition authorities and programs that relied on standing up 
alternative requirements, acquisition, and budgetary processes granted through new 
legislative flexibilities.  After the retirement of the Space Shuttle, NASA used 
longstanding, but little used production OTA authority under the Space Act of 1958 
to create new space launch capabilities, most notably by SpaceX, that were eventually 
transitioned to DOD.  The SpaceX example addressed both linearity and CMI and 
served as the basis for later legislative action advocated by the late Senator John 
McCain that carved out new alterative pathways for DOD around the traditional 
management regimes and tried to reinvigorate many of these older authorities.   
The behavioral evidence from these case examples suggests that the way for 
DOD to effectively innovate when time becomes critical is to sidestep current 
management processes and regimes.  This supports the case that management 





criteria.  These case examples not only validate the theory that management processes 
serve as a barrier to innovation, but also provide clues into which processes are most 
problematic, as those are the ones that are consistently evaded.  In each of these cases, 
the innovation model was deemed to be insufficient and actions were taken for at 






Table 5.1. Case Examples 
 
 
Case Objective Effect Example 
FASA FAR Part 12 Access Commercial Products CMI Computers 
FASA Acquisition 
Pilots 
Access Commercial Business 
Practices CMI/Linearity JDAM 
DARPA Other 
Transactions 
Replicate Cold War 
Development Practices Linearity 
Predator 
Global Hawk 
Missile Defense Agency Replicate Cold War Development Practices Linearity 
National Missile 
Defense System 
9/11 Rapid Acquisition Replicate WWII Rapid Acquisition Practices Linearity MRAP 
NASA Space Act Replicate Cold War Development Practices Linearity SpaceX Falcon 
McCain Reforms All of the Above CMI/Linearity Mid-Tier/OTA Programs 
                                                                                                 
 FASA: Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 
 FAR:  Federal Acquisition Regulation 
 CMI: Civil Military Integration of the defense and commercial industrial base 
 DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition 
MRAP: Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles 
OTA: Other Transaction Authority 











This first case illustrates what happened when DOD needed to access a part of 
the industrial base that no longer could or would do business with it.  In the mid-
1980s, the realization began to dawn on defense policy makers that commercial items 
were important to DOD and that commercial market technology (particularly in the 
computing industry) was being developed faster and cheaper than in the DOD 
innovation model.  This fact was helpfully pointed out by the Packard Commission.   
Increased commercial R&D and a time-based innovation model incentivized by the 
rise of venture capital in Silicon Valley resulted in cheaper and more advanced 
technology emanating from the commercial market.    
Many of the barriers to the commercial sector participating in the defense 
market were already established by the late 1970s.   As Jacques Gansler stated: “… 
that the Department of Defense is no longer the predominant user of high technology 
now that the civilian sector has gone into high-technology products makes it clear 
that, for those firms that have a choice, defense is considered an undesirable business 
area.”207  The commercial market was already seen at this time as more attractive 
from a profitability and ease of doing business standpoint than the government 
market.   It was not until more than ten years later that attempts were made to address 
these issues.  
By this time Silicon Valley and other commercial companies were refusing to 
sell items to the Pentagon because of the burdens of the acquisition system.  The 
 





procurement process was sclerotic, overburdened with regulations and government 
unique requirements.  It permeated the entire system, from advanced technology to 
the mundane, as DOD had even developed unique 700-page specifications for things 
like chocolate chip cookies that precluded buying an item that was sold in a grocery 
store.208   In his report “Computer Chaos” Senator Cohen outlined the nearly 4-year 
process for the government to buy a computer one could buy at Radio Shack, which, 
by the time the government was able to obtain that computer was then several 
generations out of date.209  Selling such items opened commercial firms to oversight 
requirements and compliance regimes that were not worth the cost from the benefits 
of government sales. When the government might be less than one percent of your 
sales the burdens of CAS, TINA, government unique intellectual property regimes, 
and other compliance burdens did not make a lot of busines sense. 
The only way around this conundrum was to remove barriers to participation 
by these commercial companies in the system.  That process began with the 
establishment of the Section 800 panel.  Congress established this panel in 1990 to 
review and assess the efficacy of existing laws impacting the government’s 
procurement system.210 The Section 800 report, published in January 1993, 
recommended a different acquisition approach to commercial-items acquisitions by 
explicitly stating a preference for acquiring commercial items and waiving acquisition 
 
208 Gore, Al, and National Performance Review (U.S.). Common Sense Government: Works Better and 
Costs Less. New York: Random House, 1995 p. 1. Thinking that this specification was long ago 
abolished through the work of Vice President Gore and Secretary of Defense Perry, research for this 
paper found this specification to be still alive and well, but at a more streamlined 26 pages. 
209 William S. Cohen, Computer Chaos: Billions Wasted Buying Federal Computer Systems: 
Investigative Report of Senator William S. Cohen; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994. P. 13. 
210 The Section 800 Panel, the DOD Acquisition Law Advisory Panel, was required by section 800, 





laws, regulations, and rules for the purchase of these items. In the 1994 Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) the Congress implemented these 
recommendations by creating significant exemptions to a class of items defined as 
commercial. The FASA recommendations addressed several significant barriers 
addressing unique accounting rules, contract pricing, intellectual property and socio-
economic requirements – requirements that had been created since the 1960s, 
although a few of the socio-economic provisions traced their origins to the 1930s.  In 
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Congress would expand the definition of commercial 
items and decentralize the oversight of information technology to overcome the 
slowness of the centrally managed governmentwide process led by the General 
Services Administration by repealing the requirement for that process established in 
the Brooks Act of 1964. 211 
During this reform period, statutes were eliminated and those that remained 
provided commercial items with broad-based exemptions.  While the most significant 
exemptions of importance to commercial companies were the exemptions to TINA 
and CAS, it was the creation of a new process for small purchases of items that may 
have had the most immediate effect.  This process was significantly streamlined and 
the vast majority of these purchases would eventually be for commercial items bought 
with a government credit card.  A preference was established to buy such commercial 
items whenever available and any new law passed had to explicitly state that it 
 
211 This requirement for centralized oversight was put in place by Congress to break the IBM model of 
leasing time on their mainframes that Congressman Jack Brooks thought was wasteful.  In his mind it 
was cheaper and more efficient for the government to own these computers and managed centrally by 
the GSA. For decades the government owned and operated its own data centers and agencies waited 
for GSA approval to buy computers.  Cloud computing in one sense is really a return to the old 1960s 





applied to the acquisition of a commercial item rather than automatically apply.  This 
was done to try and protect against future backsliding, as the expectation was that 
Congress could not help itself in using the procurement process as it had been used 
for decades to impose unique processes and socio-economic requirements.  In the 
course of 2-3 years and for a certain class of items this all came tumbling down.   
The Defense Department then addressed military unique specifications.  
Secretary of Defense Perry began his own acquisition reform efforts by attempting to 
move DOD away from its dependence on unique military specifications and by 
adopting commercial specifications wherever possible.  The so-called Perry memo 
repudiated the use of inflexible military specifications that limited competition, stifled 
innovation, increased costs, and delayed the fielding of new systems.212  Secretary of 
Defense Perry outlined further Departmental goals in a 1994 paper “Acquisition 
Reform A Mandate for Change.”  This criticized DOD’s inability to acquire state-of-
the-art commercial technology and overpayment of what it did acquire.213 
The application of commercial item reforms under FASA and Clinger Cohen 
has been one of the government’s true success stories, with over $47.6 billion in 
commercial items being purchased by DOD in 2016 despite a decline from $82.7 
billion in 2007.214 FASA and Clinger-Cohen were successful by allowing DOD and 
the rest of government to quickly buy the exact same commercial goods (even with a 
 
212 Perry, William. J.  Department of Defense Memorandum. Specifications & Standards – A New 
Way of Doing Business. June 29, 1994. 
213 Perry, William. J.  Department of Defense Memorandum. Acquisition Reform - A Mandate for 
Change. February 9, 1994. 
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credit card) just like an American consumer could at Walmart and Best Buy.  Still, 
even for these commercial off the shelf items, DOD has been backsliding on these 
reforms in the last 25 years.  Unfortunately, even these successful commercial 
acquisitions have suffered from an accretion of new restrictions that have been 
applied to commercial contracting in the last two decades.   
The first class of new restrictions that have impacted commercial items is the 
creep of government unique contract clauses.  As the section 809 panel observed:  
 
“Since FASA was implemented, the number of DOD‐related commercial 
buying provisions and clauses has increased by 188 percent, and the number 
of commercial clauses that may be flowed down has increased five‐fold. In 
1995, the FAR and DFARS contained a combined total of 57 government 
clauses applicable to commercial items. Today there are 165 clauses, with 122 
originating in statute, 20 originating in executive orders, and 23 originating in 
agency‐level policies.” 215 
 
This “clause creep” occurred despite legislation that prohibits the application 
of a new law to the procurement of commercial items unless explicitly stating in the 
statute that it applies to commercial items.  The problem is, each political party 
enamored by the government’s purchasing power wants to use government 
contracting as a means to achieve other policy ends.  The reality is the government no 
longer moves markets, and these new requirements, if not adopted elsewhere in the 
commercial market, merely keep the government from purchasing the best 
solution.216 
 
215 United States. Department of Defense. Section 809 Panel. Advisory Panel on Streamlining and 
Codifying Acquisition Regulations: Section 809 Panel Volumes 1 Report, Arlington, Va.: Section 809 
Panel, 2018, p. 17.  
216 To see how this process works see: Steve Kelman, “Here we go again: 'diversity training' and 





These new restrictions and regulations have incentivized a new generation of 
commercial companies to stay out of DOD contracting and those commercial 
companies that currently sell to the military increasingly face the choice of opting out 
of the government marketplace or radically changing their structure to conform to 
these new requirements.  In recent years it has become harder to comply with new 
commercial items clause mandates.  There has been a rise of resellers who stand 
between the government and commercial companies to provide a layer of protection 
after the incessant whittling away of the commercial item exemptions.  DOD has also 
begun to increase the number of unique military specifications that precluded the use 
of commercial items to and overturn the intent of the Perry Memo to such a degree 
that Congress put the Perry Memo into law two decades later in section 875 of the 
2017 NDAA. 
 
CASE 2:  Acquisition Pilots (JDAM) and Commercial of a Type 
 
 
FASA and Clinger Cohen were immediately successful when buying what are 
now known as Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) items – products already sold in 
substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace.  What the Department also 
needed was to buy things commercially that were not identical to COTS but were 
modified or developed in a similar fashion.  The importance of commercial items to 
U.S. military strategy was much greater than being able to buy the latest computer 
from Best Buy.  This was outlined when then Undersecretary of Defense Paul 
Kaminski stated in a testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services 





military advantage goes to the nation who has the best cycle time to capture 
technologies that are commercially available; incorporate them in weapon systems; 
and get them fielded first.”217  
A strategy beyond COTS was needed to get modified commercial products 
incorporated into weapon systems rather than just buying stand-alone commercial 
products that had already been sold on the global commercial market.  In 1994, the 
Congressional U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) described the factors 
driving the need for a beyond COTS CMI strategy in the following manner:  
 
“Confronted with declining budgets, many government officials and private-
sector executives advocate the increased use of the commercial technology 
industrial base (CTIB) as one strategy for preserving adequate technological 
and industrial capability to help meet future national security needs. This 
increased use of the CTIB, dubbed civil-military integration (CMI), can take 
many forms, including purchasing commercially available goods and services, 
conducting both defense and commercial research and development in the 
same facility, manufacturing defense and commercial items on the same 
production line, and maintaining such items in shared facilities.”218   
 
CMI would not be achievable unless barriers to its use were eliminated and 
incentives were created to encourage participation by the commercial sector in 
working on defense needs. The bifurcation of the industrial base driven by the need to 
comply with unique government requirements had caused those commercial 
companies that also did business with DOD to be forced into establishing separate 
 
217 Statement of The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,” Paul G. Kaminski 
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business production lines – one for commercial and one for the military.219 This was 
done to comply with the requirement for detailed cost data on weapon systems 
demanded by the cost contracts typical of defense procurement that then triggered the 
requirements of TINA and CAS. Government auditors would not accept companies’ 
commercial accounting practices that did not exactly break out the cost for a military 
part of a commercial part in a specifically mandated government way.  This was 
particularly a problem in those companies such as Boeing, Honeywell, and Collins 
Aerospace, which built and supplied similar parts to commercial airlines.  
Thus, companies in the 1970s set up separate defense and commercial 
production lines and, in the case of Boeing, to actually sell the U.S. government a so 
called “green” aircraft from its commercial division in Seattle and then fly it to its 
military division in Wichita, Kansas to be disassembled and reinstalled with military 
unique features.220 This was incredibly expensive and wasteful, but auditors were 
more concerned about precision in costs and not estimates of costs where a 
commercial company might be hiding profits.   
Budget cuts at the end of the Cold War finally tipped the scales.  DOD could 
no longer afford to prop up these secondary production lines and the issue was how to 
allow commercial companies to consolidate their production lines without triggering 
unique government auditing requirements.  Congress, in FASA and Clinger-Cohen, 
tried to address this larger problem rather than just getting the government to buy 
 
219 For a listing of the major drivers of regulatory cost for these companies in their government unique 
plants see – Coopers and Lybrand that identified at least an 18% cost premium to implement 
government oversight.  Coopers and Lybrand. The DoD Regulatory Cost Premium: A Quantitative 
Assessment. 1994. Others thought this premium was over 40%. The later experience of SpaceX ability 
to compete in the national security launch business implies the premium may even be higher. 





exactly what was out in the commercial market.  It needed an alternative to a 
commercial item definition beyond what was sold in substantial quantities in the 
commercial market that was the easiest for government auditors and contract 
specialists to price.   
The solution Congress found to this problem was to create several different 
classes of commercial items beyond COTS.  The first was for making minor 
modifications to COTS items and the second for those commercial-like items that 
were produced in a dual commercial and military production line called commercial 
“of a type.”   
The minor modifications definition was just that.  If DOD wanted to have 
commercial companies make minor modifications to their COTS products, these 
items could be treated as commercial items with all of the exemptions to law.  Even 
this definition provoked some challenges as the government had to figure out how to 
price these items, but since they were by definition, minor, in theory this could be 
easily overcome in contract negotiations.  The second type of product the government 
wanted to buy was much harder to address.  This entailed encouraging commercial 
companies to design and build items that were similar to items that they were being 
produced in the commercial marketplace but customized for DOD purposes.  FASA 
addressed this by creating the commercial of a type definition that allowed for 
“modifications of a type customarily available in the commercial marketplace.”  
Precisely what this meant has been the source of much angst and cost ever since.  
Commercial contractors customize their products all the time, creating new 





for DOD, but implementing the “commercial of a type” definition is still a hot topic 
of debate and resisted by the DOD IG and many contracting officers because of the 
difficulties to price these solutions.  In 1994, Congress disagreed with the oversight 
community and tried to establish true CMI to allow the building of military and 
commercial units on the same production line and allow commercial companies to 
modify their products or build products using their same commercial process for the 
military.  
Some in Congress at the time wanted to go even farther than authorizing and 
treating commercial of a type like products as commercial items.  These advocates 
wanted to reform the way traditional defense contractors had been doing business and 
allow them to develop entire weapon systems as commercial entities and operate on 
commercial basis.  This did not happen, but in section 5604 of the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Congress authorized the establishment of five 
pilot programs to waive acquisition laws to test streamlined acquisition approaches 
with traditional defense contractors. The result was an adoption of commercial 
practices by these traditional contractors on a number of programs, which led to 
significant advances in technological innovation and reduced costs. For example, 
commercial practices such as those used on the JDAM program (which was the most 
successful FASA pilot) enabled DOD to radically lower costs and improve 
capabilities.  
Then Under Secretary of Defense Paul Kaminski described this success: “We 
made JDAM a pilot acquisition reform program and we did that procurement again. 





initiatives. We went from an RFP that had a 100-page work statement to an RFP with 
a two-page performance specification—not how to build this, but what we wanted it 
to do with no mil-specs required. The winning bid on that round was $18,000 a kit: 
less than one-half the original cost.”221 
Greater efficiencies generated by the effective use of commercial private 
sector practices was proven successful in defense programs such as the JDAM.  Not 
only did unit costs decrease from improved commercial production techniques, but 
the increased number of units that could be bought by using commercial production 
techniques would provide greater security through greater survivability in conflicts.  
In other words, the increase in the numbers of systems deployed have a quality in and 
of themselves and focusing on cost efficiencies is as important as focusing on quality 
efficiencies.222 
Reforms made in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and the 
Clinger Cohen Act of 1996 made it easier to sell to the federal government, and for a 
while, commercial firms tiptoed into the federal market.   Firms like Honeywell and 
Rockwell Collins made the investments to combine their commercial and military 
production lines.  The KC-45 Tanker, the P-8 Maritime Patrol aircraft, avionics 
subsystems, and other aerospace components all began production on commercial 
lines.  These reforms led to radical changes at the Pentagon that continued for about a 
decade in the traditional procurement system. Commercial companies began to wade 
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into the defense market, and barriers between the defense and commercial portions of 
firms began to evaporate. While the reforms did not go far enough for some 
commercial firms, they did open the door for enough firms to make a difference. 
The benefits to the DOD included access to the latest technology, faster 
delivery, lower prices, integration of the defense and commercial industrial bases, 
access to commercial support services, and elimination of the need to fund the 
development and support of unique items. The use of commercial contracting 
practices allowed commercial companies to enter the government marketplace and 
provide products to both commercial and military customers using common product 
lines and workforces. Internal investments to develop commercial products benefitted 
both commercial and military customers and created a larger production base with 
lower prices because of economies of scale. The R&D for these products was paid for 
by these commercial companies, which freed up funding for DOD to pursue other 
priorities. 
However, during the mid 2000s, the contract pricing community and the 
auditors fought back in what can be called the revenge of the cost and pricing 
framework.  No new FASA pilots were forthcoming and the idea of buying 
commercially derivative aircraft as a commercial item came under intense scrutiny, 
particularly after a procurement ethics scandal was uncovered during a Congressional 
investigation into the proposed sole-source Boeing tanker lease in 2003 that was to be 
leased under a commercial arrangement.  This undermined support in Congress for 
some commercial item procurements.   Some pricing specialists and audits continued 





exact costs in the belief that the government received a better deal in a non-
commercial cost contract basis and that knowing these costs was the only way to hold 
down profit margins. Many in government could not separate the concepts of 
corporate profit from corruption.  As a longtime observer of the system testified 
before the House Armed Services Committee: “Culturally we have evolved to a point 
where the system would rather pay $1 billion and 5% profit for a defense good, than 
$500 million and 20% profit.” 223   
The problem of determining a fair and reasonable price and profit margin 
dominated this decade.   The bureaucracy wanted to return to collected cost-based 
information through the use of TINA and CAS on all commercial contracts.  
Congress acquiesced to allow the government the option to ask for non-certified cost 
and pricing data under TINA.  Many commercial contractors refused, rightly saying 
that their accounting systems did not break out the difference in costs between their 
commercial and military products.  This left these firms at risk of being accused of 
hiding profits and overcharging the government.  Commercial protection of data 
rights continued to be an issue as well.  The FASA concept of the presumption of the 
rights of commercial company’s intellectual property rights on commercial items was 
challenged by some in the contracting community who wanted to return to pre-FASA 
days and believed that government contracts should trigger automatic rights to 
technical data and company IP rather than have this data be negotiated. 
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Thus, in recent years, the process by which the government acquires goods 
and services from the commercial market has been destabilized and suboptimized. 
Much of this rollback can be attributed to the lack of budget pressures and the 
reemergence of a preference for a return to a centralized command-and-control 
approach in the Pentagon and Congress. A steady stream of legislative and regulatory 
changes, some initiated in the annual defense authorization process and others driven 
by internal Pentagon audit findings and policy changes, have undermined commercial 
buying reforms by imposing new defense-unique acquisition oversight requirements 
that are inconsistent with commercial practices and threaten the commercial 
procurement model.224 This steady erosion of the government’s use of the streamlined 
approach to commercial acquisition incurs both monetary and innovation costs. 
Ironically, after almost two decades of delivering improved JDAMs at lower 
cost to the military, DOD ultimately forced the prime contractor to convert this 
program from a FAR Part 12 to a FAR Part 15 contract in order to extract exact cost 
data through CAS and TINA. This action on the JDAM program symbolically 
illustrates how far the Pentagon has fallen from its acquisition reforming tendencies 
and marks the end of an era. 
The reality is that while the Pentagon was tightening up, for many commercial 
firms the FASA-Clinger Cohen reforms did not go far enough, as they were too easily 
undermined by the bureaucracy. For example, the changes failed to completely 
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remove the requirements to comply with expensive to implement unique government 
accounting standards that are vastly different from commercial practice; they failed to 
completely protect commercial intellectual property rights; and they failed to limit 
government audits designed to elicit data such as cost and pricing information that the 
government is not legally entitled to.  With the passage of time and absent senior 
leadership support, bureaucratic inertia set in and resulted in the re-imposition of old 
requirements, in the creation of new barriers to doing business with the government, 
and in a de facto preference for government-unique rather than commercial solutions.   
So, Silicon Valley did what it does best:  ignore the U.S. government and 
make a lot of money elsewhere to include working with China and other potential 
adversaries. The effect was profound, as Brose pointed out: “[DOD] missed the 
commercial space revolution. It missed the move to cloud computing. It missed the 
advent of modern software development. It missed the centrality of data. And it 
missed the rise of artificial intelligence and machine learning. “225 
By 2015, the easy pathways for commercial companies that innovate on a 
time-based basis had been closed off.  COTS could still be bought by the government 
but a new pathway was likely needed or reform of the old commercial item pathway 
was needed for the DOD to keep up with the commercial market.  The easier buying 
of COTS was vitally important as it allowed DOD to catch up to decades of 
commercial innovation, but the time for DOD to commit to COTS items imposed a 









CASE 3:  DARPA’s use of Other Transaction Authority for Unmanned Systems 
(Predator and Global Hawk)  
 
 
At the end of the Cold War, Congress had additional concerns about DOD 
innovation beyond accessing the commercial market that it addressed with the 
commercial item exemption or the FASA acquisition pilots.  It wanted to provide a 
pathway for DOD with new entrants or entities like Lockheed’s Skunkworks division 
(the source of the U-2 and SR-71) to innovate as they once did earlier. This meant 
allowing for the waiver of rules beyond those in FASA for special situations.   It did 
this by giving DOD Other Transactions (OTA) authority.  OTAs allow for the non-
applicability of most acquisition rules by starting off with a clean sheet of paper in 
determining the business relationship between the government and industry.  Most 
importantly, OTAs are designed to return to the rapid prototyping that resulted in 
residual operational capabilities.  The NASA Space Act of 1958 is the original source 
of OTA authority, passed in response to Sputnik to give NASA the ability to better 
compete in the space race with the Soviet Union.   
In 1958, DOD was not included in the Space Act because it already had 
similar authority and was using it.  Experimental authorities with providence going 
back to the Army Air Corps Act of 1926 were already authorized in law and DOD did 
not need a new authority.  By the late 1980s, however, the disuse of experimental 
authority (now codified in 10 USC 2373) led Congress to look again at the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act to spur DOD innovation.  Congress, concerned about the 
lack of experimentation and prototyping at DOD, first gave a limited research version 





prototyping authority and eventually expanded to allow other DOD entities beyond 
DARPA to use OTAs.  
The issue that Congress was trying to address was how to experiment, 
prototype, and innovate as with the U-2 and SR-71, but also how to avoid a formal 
acquisition development process or highly classified environment.   These earlier 
efforts, much like the National Reconnaissance Office’s Corona satellite program, 
were prototyping efforts that left the government with a useful operational capability 
that would meet some, but not all, requirements.  DARPA’s unique development 
approach led to such advances over its history as the Internet, and its later use of 
authorities such as OTAs was instrumental in the development of unmanned systems. 
The Global Hawk and Predator programs were launched using a similar approach to 
major operational prototyping programs of the past.  DARPA was the ideal place to 
use OTAs for the development of these unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).  This was 
particularly the case when the Air Force had no interest in the movement to autonomy 
as it was seen as potentially threatening manned aircraft programs. 
 DARPA was already heavily involved in trying to bring UAVs into the 
mainstream.   Prior to receiving OTA authority: “In 1984, DARPA initiated the 
Amber program. The Amber concept traced back to 1978, when a small firm, Leading 
Systems Incorporated, headed by innovative UAV developer Abraham Karem, 
approached DARPA with ideas for developing a long- endurance UAV.” 226 The 
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success of Amber led Congress to push the Department to develop UAVs and to 
eventually give DARPA OTA authority.  Amber would eventually become Predator, 
but not in time to initiate funding for Karem, who had to sell his design and concept 
to a larger defense contractor.   
DARPA then seized the initiative with the new OTA authority. Subsequently, 
a small business unit under a larger non-defense conglomerate company, Teledyne 
Ryan Aeronautic, innovated like it was 1959 and developed the Global Hawk.227  The 
Amber-Predator concept by this time was also being funded under a new concept 
called an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) project, which 
essentially was a throwback to how DOD used to develop systems.   
 
“On the Global Hawk program, DARPA pioneered several new acquisition 
methods to speed technology transition. Like Predator, the program was 
designated an ACTD. It also used Section 845 Other Transaction Authority 
(OTA), which allowed DARPA to waive almost all traditional acquisition 
rules and regulations in favor of a tailored program structure with increased 
contractor design responsibility and management authority.”228 
 
Each of these developmental efforts went from contract to design to flight and 
a useful operational capability in the same time frame as comparable commercial 
aircraft development (see Figure 4.4 GH and MQ-9 data points).  Thus, using OTA 
and ACTD authorities led to what could be called disruptive operational capabilities 
in half or a third of the time it would take to deliver something under the traditional 
system.  
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One lesson learned from the DARPA efforts in comparison to a traditional 
program was that traditional programs at Milestone B had evolved to the point that 
they rarely built a prototype built for that milestone.  There may have been some 
piece parts and component demonstration that in some earlier plane was hoped to be 
integrated into a working prototype.  But, typically due to funding limitations, they 
had never flown, shot, drove, sailed, or been tested or used by operators before 
proceeding toward low-rate production.  Despite historic support for “fly before you 
buy” and competitive prototyping strategies, 229 there has rarely been money available 
to build such prototypes on MDAP program of records – another casualty of the 
incentives of the PPBE process where there is a desire to fund too many programs at 
one time without enough funds to adequately do that. To continue to fund these 
programs over the course of decades, certain tasks are jettisoned early in a program to 
include the option to prototype.  This is perhaps one of the singular problems with 
defense acquisition.   If the Global Hawk and Predator were not taken outside of the 
system it is highly doubtful they would have been developed at all.  These resulting 
operational prototypes could, and eventually did, form the basis of a “program” as 
 
229 While even just developing one operational prototype would be a sound strategy, Congress has 
waxed and waned about going even farther by trying to ensure at least two prototypes would be 
completed, but rarely funding this strategy. The 1987 NDAA required a competitive prototyping 
strategy for MDAPs. This requirement was repealed by FASA with the expectation that DoD would 
continue considering prototyping as an option in the acquisition planning process and to use 
competitive prototype strategies where appropriate. However, DOD policy did not reflect this until a  
September 2007 USD(AT&L) policy memorandum required competitive prototyping through 
Milestone B. WSARA strengthened this requirement and then the 2016 NDAA provided greater 







both Global Hawk’s and Predator’s successful performance created demand for 
additional units.  
The one glaring problem with the OTA authority of the 1990s was that 
innovative companies had nowhere to go after developing their successful operational 
prototypes.  To start additional production, one had to enter the traditional 
contracting, acquisition, requirements, and budgeting processes. There was no 
production OTA authority at DOD, unlike what NASA had in the Space Act.  To 
comply with all of the complexities of the acquisition process and work the budget 
process, these companies (Landing Systems and Ryan) were forced to sell to and be 
incorporated into a larger, more traditional defense contractor to keep their programs 
moving to the next stage of the process.  This was not a model that was sustainable, 
as innovators and companies learned from this lesson and were not incentivized to 
spend money and effort on OTA prototypes in the future.  
Eventually, OTAs gravitated in their use to traditional contractors.   Congress 
wanted to spur innovation from new entrants and subsequently, in section 803 of 
NDAA FY01, provided an incentive to their participation by limiting DOD’s 
authority to use OTAs with traditional defense contractors by requiring a cost share 
for defense companies that receive OTAs unless they partnered with non-traditional 
contractors.  This cost share requirement, though limiting, actually had a positive 
impact on DOD innovation by forcing traditional firms to work with these non-
traditional firms without spending their own money.  Still, Congress never could 
agree on fixing the production disincentive that was a barrier to non-traditional 





but this merely allowed production items to be bought under commercial item 
authorities under FAR Part 12 and such product be considered as a commercial item 
for acquisition purposes.  As was seen in the discussion about commercial of a type 
and the JDAM example, those kinds of contracts were coming under fire in the late 
2000s and early 2010s for a lack of transparency into contractor costs. 
Eventually, the use of OTAs would decline for about decade after some in 
Congress objected to the Army using a broad-based OTA with a large traditional 
contractor to develop the failed Future Combat System (FCS). Given the scope and 
size of the FCS effort, some considered the use of non-traditional robotics contractors 
on this OTA unsatisfactory.  Still, the robotics company iRobot, that was the leading 
non-traditional company in this OTA, gained significant experience and was highly 
successful in spurring on the use of ground based robotic solutions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Eventually though, the barriers to working with DOD became too great 




Case 4: The Deployment of a National Missile Defense System 
 
The role of missile defense in American defense policy has been highly 
politically contentious since the missile defense debates of the 1960s.  The dispute, 
leading up to the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, centered on concerns that any 





Mutually Assured Destruction concept.230  Twelve years later, Ronald Reagan 
attempted to resurrect that debate by creating the Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization (SDIO) and the so-called “Star Wars” missile defense approach.  Post-
Reagan, research would continue into missile defense, particularly as tactical missiles 
were proliferating beyond Russia and the U.S.  SDIO was renamed in 1994 as the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to reflect that change. In 2002, it became the 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA).231 
A transition to a new administration in 2001 changed the view of what types 
of missile defense programs should be considered a priority.  While the Clinton 
Administration endorsed a National Missile Defense system (NMD) “when feasible” 
that caveat would keep any expenditures on such a system from growing too large. 
Rather than focus on medium range and tactical missile defenses, the Bush 
Administration wanted an NMD to defend against a rogue missile from North Korea 
or an accidental nuclear launch from either Russia or China.  The issue became how 
to rapidly deploy such a missile defense system and the answer was to essentially 
experiment, prototype, and innovate on a defense program similar to the early ICBM 
programs. 
Ultimately, a Republican controlled Congress agreed with this policy and 
provided MDA with streamlined budget and acquisition authorities that were used to 
not only deploy an NMD, but were helpful in the development of shorter-range 
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missile defense programs as well.  This was a politically acrimonious development 
effort that culminated in the passage of section 222 of the 2004 NDAA.  In this 
provision MDA was authorized to use funds available for RDTE and use those funds 
for “the development and fielding of an initial set of ballistic missile defense 
capabilities.”  This authorization allowed DOD to quickly be able to deploy an 
operational prototyped system. CSIS best described this initial deployment as:      
 
“In 2004, Lt. Gen. Henry “Trey” Obering, III, USAF, the Director of MDA, 
declared limited defensive operations including five GBIs in silos at Fort 
Greely, Alaska; an upgraded Cobra Dane Radar at Eareckson Air Station in 
Shemya, Alaska; and an upgraded radar at Fylingdales in the United 
Kingdom.”232 
  
This was significant in that the authorization eliminated the “color of money” 
issue in which research money cannot be used for procurement or procurement 
money for operations or construction. Having this ability to flexibly move money 
around for different purposes allowed for the rapid deployment of the NMD system.  
Since this system was essentially a prototype system, that funding flexibility was 
needed to enable the building of launch sites, and to develop, test, and produce a 
limited number of missiles something under existing budget and financial laws and 
regulations MDA would have been prohibited from doing. 
Up until then, the Bush Administration had used all of the acquisition 
flexibilities it had in law and provided these to MDA for this program.  Previous 
authorization authority allowed greater budgetary flexibility to move money between 
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various missile defense programs within larger RDTE accounts and to allow 
programs to be stopped and started. Thus, MDA was able to go around the 
requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes and in doing so deployed an initial 
NMD system in less than 3 years based on previously conducted research and testing 
of similar systems.  Going around the system not only allowed for the rapid 
deployment of country wide missile defense system, but it copied the concept used in 
the Manhattan project and other 1950s development programs of being able to fund 
multiple pathways for technologies and programs.  This ability to start and stop 
efforts if they were not working eventually would lead to the development and 
deployment of the Aegis and THAAD ballistic missile defense systems. 
The deployment of an NMD system was in essence one large operational 
prototype system and came into being because of the budgetary and acquisition 
flexibilities granted to MDA by Congress at a critical moment.  These flexible 
authorities were eventually rolled back by Congress.  This kind of funding flexibility 
has not been authorized for any other mission since then, although there was a Senate 
proposal by Senator Kirk(R-Il) on the 2017 NDAA to do something similar for 
electronic warfare programs, but it was not agreed to by the House of 
Representatives.233  Many of these undifferentiated or mission pots of money are 
referred to derogatorily as slush funds and the appropriations committees have been 
loath to create these types of accounts over the years.  What was significant about the 
NMD example is that DOD can deploy capability and innovate in a time-based 
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manner, but only if give a fast-track development authority to do so that bypasses the 
linear management regimes that form the basis of the requirement, budget, and 
acquisition processes of the Department.  As the system currently stands that would 
likely require Congressional authorization and the appropriations of flexible mission-
based funds to do so.  
 
   
 
CASE 5:  Post 9/11 Rapid Acquisition Pathway 
 
 
After 9/11 and the beginnings of the conflict in Afghanistan, the need arose to 
rapidly get new technology in the hands of the warfighters in the ongoing conflict.   
As a result, rapid acquisition authorities were enacted by Congress in Section 806 of 
the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (10 USC 
2302 note).  A key provision subsequently enacted on the 2004 NDAA as an 
amendment to section 806 of the previous year allows the Secretary of Defense to 
waive procurement law to meet combat requirements that have resulted in, or could 
result in combat casualties. These authorities helped support the creation of a number 
of rapid acquisition entities and processes that did not have to conform to the 
statutory linear acquisition process enshrined in the DOD 5000 series or in the FAR. 
Many of these new organizations emulated the acquisition buying practices of the 
Special Operations Command, which has had its own long-standing special 
acquisition authority contained is section 167, Title 10, United States Code that was 





Next, DOD created a special requirements process to bypass the JCIDS 
process.  This rapid requirement process rested on acting quickly on theater 
commanders’ requirements.  These requirements called Joint Urgent Operational 
Need (JUON) and Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) statements were 
established and allowed for a quicker process.  The final piece in this puzzle was the 
establishment of flexible funding through the creation of large flexibly mission funds 
that Congress provided such as for counter- improvised explosive device (IED) 
purposes and the much larger Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding.  
Existing emergency contracting procedures such as the use of un-definitized 
contracting actions (UCAs), directed sole source contracting, and higher emergency 
thresholds for the use of simplified acquisition procedures supplemented the section 
806 rapid acquisition authorities and completed the alternative system to the 
traditional management regimes for rapid acquisition. Collectively, these end-rounds 
of the acquisition, requirements, budgeting, and contracting processes allowed DOD 
to focus on deploying new equipment and technology solutions to the field in 1-2-
year timeframes and many times in just a few months.   
These authorities allowed former Defense Secretary Robert Gates significant 
latitude to create programs to support combat personnel.  For example, when Gates 
decided troops needed better protection from IEDs, acquisition rules were waived 
under new rapid acquisition laws to get new vehicles, counter-IED equipment, 
advanced battlefield medical solutions, and surveillance assets into Iraq and 





provide the political cover and will to circumvent the entrenched liner management 
regimes. 
In a well-named chapter called “Waging War on the Pentagon,” Gates 
outlined how he had to overturn the requirements and budget process and “At the end 
of May I approved putting the MRAP program in a special, very small category of 
Defense procurement, effectively setting aside many bureaucratic hurdles typical of 
military programs.”234  The result was that Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected 
vehicles (MRAP) were being shipped to troops and saving lives in less than a year’s 
time. 
 MRAPs are a special case in many ways.235  This was likely the largest rapid 
large-scale production program since World War II.  It was comparable to the 
aircraft, vehicle, and Liberty ship programs of the 1940s.  In addition to using rapid 
acquisition authority, an alternative requirements process, and large flexible funding 
accounts, Gates focused on multiple pathways of MRAP solutions (nine companies 
were awarded contracts to develop prototypes) and providers to ensure success.  If a 
company could meet the requirement and build an MRAP, the government would buy 
it.  Ultimately, some 27,000 vehicles would be supplied to the military. 
Initially, as U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan began to decline, the ad- hoc 
organizations and processes created to address these rapid needs began to wind down 
as well. Since hostilities never completely ended though, and troops remain deployed 
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in harm’s way in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the Sahel, the Department has 
maintained a network of innovative buying commands that has evolved into reaching 
out to non-traditional buyers such as SOFWERX, AFWERX, and the Strategic 
Capabilities Office (SCO) that was established to focus on near term rapid acquisition 
deployments of capabilities. Still, the army has decided to wind down its rapid 
acquisition organization, SCO was downgraded from its position reporting to 
Secretary of Defense’s office, and flexible funding has been under pressure or 
abolished.   
 
 
CASE 6:  Space Act and SpaceX: NASA OTA Production Authority 
 
 
The retirement of the Space Shuttle and budget limitations at NASA that 
limited the government’s new launch capability led to a conundrum at NASA.  To 
maintain access to space it needed to experiment, prototype, and innovate as before 
but the government did not have the money to do so in the typical cost-plus 
reimbursement contracting environment.  What NASA did have was its legacy 1958 
Space Act OTA authority to create new business relationships with the private sector 
and most importantly, unlike at DOD, NASA had the ability to use this OTA to not 
only prototype a new solution but also to move into production. 
  The idea was to create new, cheaper launch capabilities and providers starting 
first with launch satellites but eventually creating human-rated capabilities to perform 
the Space Shuttle mission of transporting astronauts to the Space Station.  The first 





agreement between NASA and SpaceX was 26 pages long.236  It was essentially a 
cost-share R&D agreement in which NASA made a series of milestone payments to 
SpaceX for meeting performance goals and required SpaceX to continue to self-fund 
its development efforts.  NASA OTA authority did a number of important things.  
First, NASA could commit to buying launch services from companies (i.e., there was 
a guarantee of production if these companies could deliver) if they were successful.  
This was similar to the industrial base incentives that DOD used of being the first 
buyer for semiconductor companies and Boeing in the 1950s and 1960s and is also 
similar to an authority rarely used in the DPA for advanced purchase agreements.237  
This prospect of a market created a positive business case for companies like SpaceX 
and Orbital to invest the capital to build a new rocket.  So, in this sense, the budget 
process was subverted. Then, most importantly to a company like SPACEX, an OTA 
allowed them to disregard the government-unique acquisition constraints that would 
have added cost and time to the development effort.  By not-applying socio-economic 
laws and regulations, SPACEX was allowed to concentrate its efforts at its California 
plant and vertically integrate its operations without spreading subcontracts all over 
the country to meet small business participation requirements.  It did not have to 
comply with CAS or TINA and its IP was negotiated with the government under the 
OTA.  The results were that the SPACEX rockets were completed in similar 
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timeframe as innovations of the 1950s.  Orbital’s Antares development experience 
was much the same --- getting to first launch in five years’ time from the signing of 
their Space Act agreement. 
In 2006, NASA when it signed its COTS agreement with SpaceX it did not 
have to contend with the growing backlash at DOD and in Congress to the loosening 
of management regimes that were described in the previous case examples.  The 
efforts to circumvent the traditional innovation system were all under threat by the 
mid 2000s – with the exception of NASA’s commercial launch program.238  Defense 
budget increases after 9/11 took the pressure off of the need to save money in the 
commercial marketplace and the oversight focus shifted to addressing fraud, waste, 
and abuse in overseas contingency contracting.    
The rapid acquisition, commercial item, and other transactions pathways 
began to run into head winds even as the need for rapid acquisition developments in 
theater was gearing up.  MDA’s budget authorities were limited and the ability to 
transfer the benefits of the JDAM experience to commercial derivative aircraft such 
as the tanker were closed off.   Thus, the political dynamic of trying to break down 
barriers to greater CMI and experimenting with time-based development lasted for 
about 10 years after the passage of the Clinger-Cohen Act.  The roll back of these 
reforms led to a resumption of the bifurcation of technological advancement and a 
lack of focus on time to development. 
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While perhaps not its original intent, the congressionally-sponsored Services 
Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) Panel served to further undermined commercial 
procurement.   The SARA panel (officially the Acquisition Advisory Panel) was 
authorized by Section 1423 of the Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003, that was 
enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 to 
further contracting reform government-wide and address commercial contracting. The 
panel made several positive recommendations related to building up the acquisition 
workforce and increasing performance based or value-based contracting.  Since both 
of those issues were difficult to implement, they were mostly ignored and the other 
areas that the panel focused on such as improving pricing, transparency, and 
accountability led to new legislative and executive branch measures that made it more 
difficult to access the commercial market.  
The 2006 DAPA panel was established in response to continued concerns 
with the cost, schedule, and performance of major weapons systems.  While it 
recognized the importance of integrating and reforming as a whole the budget, 
requirements, acquisition, and contracting regimes it continued to be focused on the 
problem as one of prediction: “This creates a cycle of government-induced instability 
that results in a situation in which senior leaders in the Department of Defense and 
Congress are unable to anticipate or predict the outcome of programs as measured by 
cost, schedule and performance.”239 Next, concerns about rapid acquisitions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan led to the establishment of the Wartime Contracting Commission in 
2008, which issued a series of reports up until 2011. These reports outlined examples 
 





of waste and fraud and led to a slowing down of rapid innovation authorities.   In a 
series of NDAAs, Congress reacted to these reports with legislation that began to roll 
back the reforms of the previous 15 years.  In the area of major systems acquisition, 
this included the adoption of specific Milestone A B and C criteria and requirements 
for certifications that slowed down the acquisition process.  Finally, the 2008 
WSARA adopted a methodology for MDAPs that encouraged incrementalism rather 
than disruption. 
This trend continued in the executive branch.  Senior leadership set the tone 
with President Obama’s so called “culture of corruption” speech on federal 
procurement in March 2009.240 While it is not clear that the President was targeting 
more than a small subset of acquisition issues related to wartime contracting abuses, 
the application of his concern was much wider than the limited number of overseas 
contracts that have been winding down as the U.S. extricates itself from Iraq and 
Afghanistan. For better or for worse, this speech and the policy memos issued as a 
result established an atmosphere of distrust for the procurement community, resulting 
in adversarial relations with industry, a return to government-unique oversight 
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Wilson, Scott and Robert O'Harrow Jr. President Orders Review of Federal Contracting. Washington 






mechanisms not applicable to commercial contractors, a reinstatement of 
government-unique requirements, and a prevalent culture of risk aversion.  
This congressional and Presidential pressure empowered the oversight 
community.  Commercial item procurement was rolled back and socio-economic 
contracting clauses proliferated.  The use of OTAs declined and WSARA limited 
innovation to incremental step changes that could easily meet the confines of the 
predictive system.  CMI was moving backward and slow linear processes advancing.  
The commercial item experimentation of the 1990s had ended and a counter-
revolution to restore the traditional management regimes and ways of innovating had 
gained traction in the early 2010s and had seemingly won by 2015. 
At the height of this tightening of defense management regimes, in 2014 
SpaceX filed a lawsuit protesting that DOD was limiting it from competing to provide 
launch services.  SpaceX’s commercial time-based innovation business model based 
on selling a service and not being linked to the traditional budget, acquisition, 
requirements, and contracting processes for research and development, production 
and operations and maintenance was in jeopardy when SpaceX tried to expand its 
market beyond NASA and enter the DOD market for launch.  DOD wanted to impose 
CAS and TINA and treat SpaceX like a traditional contractor and ensure that all of 
the requirements imposed on the Lockheed-Boeing origin merged launch provider 





required SpaceX to change its business model and become a traditional defense 
contractor.  SpaceX refused and sued to be treated as a commercial provider.241   
As SpaceX’s case was making its way through the courts, collectively, the 
process for innovating in a time-based manner and acquiring goods and services from 
the commercial marketplace that innovated based on time was limited and sub-
optimized by these many legislative and regulatory changes.  The pathways to time-
based innovation were either closed or were closing fast.   
And then Congress changed its mind again.   
 
CASE 7: The McCain Management Reforms (2015-2016) 
 
Under the leadership of the late Senator John McCain (R-AZ), a new set of 
authorities designed to avoid each of the linear management regimes and enhance 
CMI was initiated in 2015.  These efforts are the primary source of the 
experimentation with time-based innovation currently taking place at DOD and they 
also provided the tools for DOD to better access Silicon Valley, which was a goal of 
Secretaries Hagel and Carter through the Third Offset and Defense Innovation 
initiative.   
Senator McCain, who had previously been part of the attempt to roll back 
many of the earlier authorities to bypass entrenched management regimes, became a 
convert of the need for these flexibilities and put into law authorities that far exceeded 
 
241 SpaceX would eventually prevail and the path of suing your customer to continue to operate as a 
commercial provider was followed first by Palantir (a data analytics company) and then by AGI (a 





many of the original exceptions.  His change of mind came as China began to 
militarize the islands in the South China Sea after President Xi assured President 
Obama that he would not, and Russia annexed Crimea in 2014.  The Senator 
understood that the acquisition system was not capable of moving fast enough to 
address a growing threat and he was impressed by how quickly SpaceX was able to 
develop its launch system when the traditional rules were not applied.  The issue for 
him became how to quickly create many more companies like SpaceX.  The Senator 
thus moved to significantly reform defense management policy and practices through 
actions in the 2016 and 2017 NDAAs.  These changes created new acquisition 
pathways around the traditional requirements, acquisition, and budgeting systems that 
were specifically designed to spur innovation at the Department and were influenced 
by the debates over the Third Offset Strategy. 
McCain’s time-based reforms tried to address process linearity and CMI and 
were in the tradition of each of the above case examples while building on them.  On 
the linearity path, section 804 established a pathway around the statutory process for 
MDAPs that were strengthened in WSARA.  It did this through a legal fiction. Just as 
an OTA is a legal fiction in that it is legally defined as not a contract and thus no laws 
that apply to contracts apply to an OTA, section 804 was designed in a similar 
fashion.  Section 804 Mid-Tier authority as amended in the 2017 NDAA defined any 
program that can be deployed as an operational prototype or rapidly fielded in 2-5 
years as not being classified as an MDAP even if it met the legal criteria for an 
MDAP.  By doing this, all of the acquisition process and laws that applied to MDAPs 





exempting these programs from the JCIDS requirements process.  To address budget 
linearity, a Rapid Prototyping Fund was created to serve as the mechanism for bridge 
funding to initiate new prototyping efforts.   
The other major reform that occurred in the 2016 NDAA was the granting to 
DOD of production OTA authority.  This was a nod to the ability of NASA to 
effectively use the Space Act to create new space launch capabilities.   Experimental 
authority – another OTA authority with its root going back to the 1926 Army Air 
Corps Act was expanded as well.  As a result of this authority, OTA contracting has 
increased significantly. This is because these OTAs are now seen as a pathway to a 
program of record and because of that more and more companies are interested in 
working for the federal government. This path to production OTA authority 
immediately opened up interest in Silicon Valley as now there was a path to a 
program and revenue.  Defense was no longer a customer that you were sure to lose 
money on while you gave away all of your intellectual property 
Production OTAs than can address CMI and the problem of approaching 
Silicon Valley.  The problem with the government’s regulatory approach to 
acquisition is that top engineers, innovators, and firms do not want to focus their time 
on rules-based compliance and have other places to work beyond the defense market.  
Even if they could have been convinced to use an OTA prototype they would have, 
like the Predator and Global Hawk, been forced back into the traditional system.  
Most firms previously decided to stay away. Production OTAs now provided a 





The Operation Warp Speed COVID-19 vaccine development contracts 
managed by DOD on behalf of the rest of government are using these new OTA 
authorities, most likely because of the production authority that would allow the 
government to immediately buy a vaccine that works.  There is perhaps is another 
case study on COVID that may provide future insight into the process of going 
around existing rules in an emergency, but it is far too soon to see the effectiveness of 
the current use of OTAs to speed vaccine development and distribution. 
The McCain reforms also tried to reverse the issues related to commercial 
item “of a type” acquisitions.  It strengthened that law and bolstered the commercial 
item preference.  Finally, Congress tried to address culture by doing two things that 
attempted to reverse the legacy of the Packard Commission.  First it tried to bring the 
operators back into the acquisition process by empowering the military service chiefs 
and giving them a role again in the acquisition process rather than just in the 
requirements process.  Secondly, the position of Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics was abolished and its duties split and 
authorities delegated to the services.  These were both designed to decentralize 
decision making and break up the power of the center but also to focus OSD on 
innovation that the services with their inevitable parochialism might not fund. 
All of these authorities are currently being implemented and in a sense are the 
experimental phase of either an alternative management system or just another end-
round of the system that will be abandoned as the threat decreases or a counter-
narrative of risk averseness, process compliance, and potential waste, fraud and abuse 





growing Chinese threat and the need to address a second wave of commercial IT 
dominance is currently subject to a bipartisan agreement.  Still, that same bipartisan 
agreement existed during the passage of FASA and Clinger Cohen and after a decade 
or so that went away, much as the bipartisan agreement over loosening the rules on 
aircraft experimentation in the 1920s only last for a few short years.  It remains to be 
seen how successful these reforms will be and what the next steps will be.  
 
Will Agile Software Be the Next Case? 
 
Unlike in the first wave of commercial IT technology dominance in the 1990s, 
which was primarily a hardware phenomenon, the second wave of commercial IT 
dominance that crested in the 2010s was software dominated.  The phrase “software 
eats the world” generated by Marc Andreessen, venture capitalist and co-founder of 
Netscape had not made it to DOD.242  While commercial item reforms could be 
adapted to DOD buying and incentivizing commercial software producers to build 
DOD the next generation of software, the business models now being used by 
commercial companies are completely different than what was used in the 1990s. The 
experience of non-traditional commercial software companies such as Palantir and 
AGI (both of which had to sue the U.S. government like SpaceX to try and enter the 
DOD market) to sell their self-financed software as a service solution has not been a 
promising advertisement for DOD’s ability to adopt to this new world.  The Palantir 
 
242 This phrase entered popular culture in a 2011 Wall Street Journal Op-ed: Marc Andreessen, “Why 






and AGI problem returned to the issue of pricing as government contracting officers 
want to price software as they price hardware, which is not even close to current 
commercial practice and provides commercial companies no opportunity to generate 
commercial profits off their R&D. 
As with many things within the government, the budget, acquisition, and 
contracting process rules complicate the ability to incentive innovation.  Silicon 
Valley companies with their own investment can build superior software solutions at 
a fraction of the cost to anything DOD currently uses.  Still, these companies are 
running into difficulties bringing them to market as DOD does not know how to price 
these solutions or how to pay for them.  This led to Congress on the 2018 NDAA to 
come up with a new idea that is built on the concept of the section 804 Mid-Tier 
pathway.  This was to authorize a new software acquisition pathway and require a 
study on how that pathway should look.  This study by the Defense Innovation Board 
called the Software Acquisition Practices or SWAP report recommended a time-based 
approach and a way around the budgetary process by proposing a new software color 
of money.  This, as in the MDA example, would allow software programs to mix and 
match software dollars for RDTE, procurement, operations and maintenance, and 
perhaps even construction dollars to build data centers.  The Congress and OMB are 
now considering whether to grant the DIB’s recommendation for such a software 
“color of money” – which would also be a way to evade the linear budget process as 
these funds would be fungible and able to move from project to project.  The success 












U.S. defense innovation approaches prior to World War II were cyclical and 
heavily influenced by limited spending during long periods between conflicts.  A 
peacetime approach dependent on government-run defense arsenals and tempered by 
a wide-ranging suspicion of the private sector and profits has predominated 
throughout most of U.S. history.  The model of innovation in this peacetime process 
was price-based with little incentive for new advancement in defense technology.  
This changed with the onset of World War II and the Cold War, as a new U.S. 
defense innovation system was created to counter the existential threats posed in the 
1940s and 1950s.  In retrospect, that system was based on time exhibited by speed.  
While government-run enterprises did not go away and in fact increased in both 
number and size, the private sector’s role in weapons development and production 
would eventually dominate.   
This time-based innovation system developed and built ad hoc solutions using 
rapid procedures, experimentation, prototyping, and flexibility in budgeting to 
support swift technology development and deployment.   Time to development and 
deployment was perhaps not explicitly expressed as a goal in this system but it was 
understood as the constraining factor that permeated the work of all who supported 
 





the war effort. This mission focus on time to capability was subsequently adopted in 
the early Cold War weapons competition with the Soviet Union.   While in the midst 
of a global conflict, time was a key constraint, but it also became a measure of 
success that resulted in new advanced and disruptive defense technologies to include 
radars, jet engines, computers, microelectronics, missile systems, satellites, nuclear 
submarines, and nuclear weapons that were the source of decades of U.S. military 
advantage.  Each of these new technologies were initially developed and deployed on 
rapid timelines.   
This time-based approach to delivering military capability fundamentally 
changed, beginning in the early 1960s.   The current innovation system is much more 
structured and process-oriented than that of the post-Cold War period.  The attempts 
to institutionalize and bring order to the 1940s and 1950s system of innovation that 
some saw as wasteful and duplicative undermined the time-based model during the 
1960s and 1970s when policy makers wrestled with the goals of overseeing, 
protecting, and replicating in standard processes, but also improving upon, the 
successful disruptive technological advances the U.S. had achieved in the previous 
decades.  New approaches to both public and private sector management were 
gaining prominence in academia and business practice at the time, which resulted in a 
step-by-step linear approach to weapons system development and budgeting.  These 
concepts were heirs to the scientific management tradition and included systems 
analysis, program budgeting, and systems engineering approaches and thinking that, 
when applied to defense scientific and technology research, engineering, and program 










Four primary conclusions can be made from this review and analysis of the 
defense management literature, historical record, case examples, and available 
developmental time data and studies for both defense and commercial programs.  
These are: 1) time is a significant factor in shaping defense innovation; 2) over the 
last five decades, time to deployment of new capability at DOD has increased 
significantly while innovation quality has been incremental; 3) linear processes that 
implement defense management regimes have lengthened the time to conduct defense 
innovation; 4) government-unique processes mandated by defense management 
regimes have narrowed the defense industrial base by creating barriers to entry to 
those companies that innovate on the basis of time.  
In general, the public management framework used to guide and oversee U.S. 
defense innovation since the 1960s has deemphasized and crowded out the 
significance of time as an incentive to invention while emphasizing values such as 
cost, price, technology maturity, fairness, socio-economic factors, and perceived 
efficiency.  As a result of an excessive focus on linear implementation of this 
management framework and compliance with processes to ensure these values, 
system development time increased and time-based constraints to innovation were 
lost.  Time was relegated in the cost analysis worldview as a schedule issue that could 





of adaptable innovation. Time to development and deployment ultimately increased 
to adapt to the length of linear management processes that collectively made it 
impossible to innovate in the time spans of the 1940s and 1950s.  Management 
regime impacts on civil military integration caused commercial companies that value 
time-based innovation to face significant disincentives to deploying that innovation in 
a more agile and rapid manner in the defense marketplace.  These conclusions call for 
a reevaluation of defense management regimes and a reconsideration of the criteria 
used in guiding and evaluating successful defense innovation.   
 
Time Can be a Significant Factor in Shaping Defense Innovation 
 
The prioritization of time has been a significant factor in shaping past defense 
innovation and could be used again as a means to influence and guide future 
innovation efforts.  Defense innovation, like all innovation and invention, is neither 
linear nor predictive.  It is first based on a bedrock of scientific research and then 
furthered by iterative risk-based experimentation and prototyping.  Time-based 
development from an orderly planning perspective can look chaotic as scientists, 
engineers, and managers focus on meeting constrained deadlines that incentivize 
innovation and are the source of potential progress.  In its earliest incarnation, when 
focused on hard “never been solved before” problems, this approach may look 
duplicative when pursuing multiple paths to a solution that often lead to failure and 
dead ends.  However, it is these multiple paths that provide a greater chance of 
ultimate success, as many of these time-based experiments and efforts should be 





Perhaps most importantly, with regards to early time-based experimentation 
there is a need to develop a tolerance for potentially repeated failures. In Silicon 
Valley parlance, this is to accept the need to “fail fast” and then quickly move on to 
another alternative.  Unsuccessful experiments or prototyping efforts can be viewed 
as inefficient and even wasteful by those who subscribe to a more predictive 
management approach.  Missiles blowing up during testing – something that occurred 
with some frequency in the 1950s – or failed satellite deployments in the 1960s were 
not wasteful exercises of governmental excess that were the result of poor 
management, but were a result of time constraints based on an urgent need acting on 
the experimentation and innovation process.   
For the most significant milestones in defense innovation, time constraints 
either in an emergency or due to perceptions of high threat levels have furthered what 
is thought possible with regards the delivery of new capabilities. These solutions may 
have only achieved 80 percent of what may have been aimed for, but they were better 
than anything before.  This dynamic occurred in World War II, during the height of 
the Cold War and in the series of case examples described in Chapter 5.   The key 
lessons from these efforts were to fail early, learn from these failures, and have 
flexibility to quickly move in another direction. In addition, something should not be 
branded as a failure if it didn’t meet 100 percent of an initial, and perhaps, 
unobtainable goal.  The criterion for success is utility.  Is it useful and better than 
what came before? 
Time constraints can become an even greater factor and shaper of innovation 





defense innovation.  Serial, time-based incremental improvements conducted after an 
initial successful operational prototype can lead to disruptive innovation after 
multiple rapid iterations.   Multiple serial operational prototyping was demonstrated 
in the military in the 1950s in the bomber, nuclear submarine, fighter aircraft, and 
missile programs.  In the commercial sector, the similar iPhone development model is 
being pursued not only in the digital world but in the automotive and other sectors.   
The 1940s and 1950s process of focusing first on limiting time to experiment, 
prototype, and test different versions of a product and then incrementally 
operationally deploying new versions of that product on a rapid time-based serial 
schedule is perhaps one of the greatest innovation practices that was created and 
adopted by the federal government, but for the last half a century has no longer been 
used by DOD.   
 
Time to Development at DOD Has Increased Significantly as Innovation 
Became More Incremental 
 
 
The significance of this time-based innovation model was never fully 
recognized by DOD in the 1950s and subsequently DOD embraced a predictive 
incrementalism that was most successful in delivering new modifications to older 
platforms in time-frames exceeding a decade or more.   DOD now faces innovation 
cycles for anything more than a minor incremental upgrade to an existing system that 
are 15-20 years in duration versus 2-5 years in World War II and the early Cold War.  
It has lost the systemic ability to carry out rapid experimentation, operational 
prototyping, rapid incremental prototyping, or to develop greenfield disruptive new 





exemptions from current rules.  Long acquisition cycles are currently a fact of life and 
the data implies that development times even for incremental modifications to 
existing technology have continued to increase.   
It appears that in the 1960s, once the lesson of the importance of time could 
have been learned, it was forgotten, or as is more likely, the exigencies of the day 
never allowed this experience to coalesce as other values such as the promise of 
efficiency through predictive management came to dominate.  While Peck and Sherer 
in their 1962 analysis understood the importance of time, it was not then a particular 
problem and they and others focused on other issues.  Academia and the Pentagon 
were moving in other directions to address greater efficiencies in the innovation 
process that focused on measuring and predicting cost.  The analysis that emerged 
from RAND and was adopted by DOD focused on premature prediction and cost 
estimating efforts that were inapplicable to the types of prototyping and 
experimentation that was occurring in the 1950s.  These efforts were highly 
unpredictable by definition as they were pursuing disruptive knowledge or 
capabilities.   
Longer term predication can be made to work and programs managed under 
stringent cost baselines only if technical risk is reduced.  Planned predictive cost 
estimates and schedules can be realistic and achievable if technology risk is reduced 
to near zero, but by that time the objective is not very innovative.  Yet, in fact, the 
goal of GAO’s knowledge-based criteria and technology readiness levels that are 
embedded in statutory requirements for Milestone B and C decisions are designed to 





attempting to remove technical risk out of programs results in these programs 
focusing on low-risk incremental innovation.  The results of this legislated oversight 
framework are long procedural time frames married to low-risk technical incremental 
programs. 
This outcome of favoring incremental low risk innovation may not have been 
the intent of the original cost-based analysts and program budgeters.   However, over 
the years the effect of the management regimes that implemented the cost-based 
innovation model was to continue to emphasize planned schedules and predictable 
goals and annually modify five years of future budgets through the PPBE process.  
Each subsequent improvement to the overarching management regimes was designed 
based on delivering these programs within their predictions and improving cost 
estimation, which required more data – usually from program managers and defense 
contractors, which slowed down the process even more.  There was no room for any 
time-constrained goals in this system that could lead to a failed test that would likely 
lead to a funding cut and potential cost overrun.  Failure was to be avoided, but in 
doing so, learning and discovery were limited as well.  The possibilities for disruptive 
innovation were seen as far too politically risky.   
The lesson to be learned from this experience is that the criteria used for the 
evaluation of the measurement of success of a program or effort is extremely 
important.  What is measured will likely be emphasized, and often with unintentional 
consequences.  Today’s cost-based criteria or focus on technology readiness levels if 
applied to the development of the first ICBMs, reconnaissance satellites, and nuclear 





inability to predict costs and specific technological progress.  This would have likely 
led to their early cancellation after a failed test even though these efforts were some 
of the most successful innovations in defense history.  That kind of innovation would 
not be tolerated under the current management system at DOD and in Congress. 
 
Management Regimes Are Constraining the Ability to Reduce Time to 
Development  
 
While changes in threat, budget and requirements instability, and 
technological challenges can all lead to increases in time to development, the initial 
baseline process time to initiate and manage a current defense program would make it 
impossible under today’s traditional management regimes to reduce innovation cycle 
time to the levels of the 1950s.  Collectively, several defense management regimes 
account for a longer period of time than needed to ideally develop defense capability, 
if using the 1950s as a benchmark.  The same can be said about other benchmarks of 
the time it takes to develop comparable items in the commercial market and by some 
indications, what our potential adversaries are able to achieve.   
While legitimate debate can be had over the reasons behind these longer 
timeframes, focusing on the linear process of the requirements, budget, acquisition 
and contracting regimes alone illustrates that these processes do not comport with a 
focus on delivering capability within a less than 5-year framework unless they are 
ignored.  The time to comply with these processes now takes a minimum of 15 years, 
with 5 years allocated for the requirements and budget processes and 10 years for the 
acquisition process that includes multiple 2-year contracting cycles embedded within 





Many processes, particularly in the acquisition regime, have been created to 
adjust to the realities of a longer 15-20-year developmental cycle. Given the length of 
time to deploy new capability, it makes sense to conduct certain processes to ensure 
quality, as subsequent changes will further drive cost and schedule.  The desire for a 
certain predictive outcome in several decades actually drives the need for even more 
time to be added into the process to allow for additional testing and to address, for 
example, future maintenance and operational issues.   
With more discipline, it is possible that the traditional system may be able to 
accommodate a 5-year development cycle as is demonstrated by the current time it 
takes to progress from Milestone B to deployment or IOC at between 6-8 years.  The 
time-based problem that currently exists with these programs is the amount of time it 
takes to get to Milestone B.   A 7-year front-end “decision time” that accounts for 
requirements, budget, and initial contracting process time add such significant time as 
to question the efficacy of DOD ever meeting a five-year time-based cycle for 
development.  At its best, achieving a 5-year Milestone B to IOC would still leave 
such an effort at 12 years in time to development.  This is perhaps better than current 
timeframes but probably not sufficient for a future competition with a near-peer 
adversary.   
 
Management Regime are Narrowing the Industrial Base 
 
 
The extraordinary complexity of the linear management processes has made 
the defense market less attractive to those companies that innovate on a time to 





interested in a technology, validate a requirement, obtain budgetary resources, start an 
acquisition program, and then compete a contract is largely beyond the time horizons 
of most commercial firms and the private capital backing them.   Beyond the linear 
process regimes are other management regimes that serve as barriers to civil-military 
integration of the industrial base, making it difficult or even impossible to break into 
the market for those commercial firms that may have an interest in working with 
DOD.   
Despite work arounds described in Chapter 5, such as FAR Part 12 
commercial item exemptions and OTAs, there are increasing process barriers to using 
these authorities to attract those companies that innovate quickly rather than 
specialize in government process.  There are also many other incentives and barriers 
dealing with security, export controls, intellectual property, finance, and oversight 
that continue to make the defense and the government market as a whole unattractive 
for the most innovative companies in the U.S., particularly those backed by private 
venture capital that are currently the source of advancements in AI, robotics, big data 
analysis, and quantum computing.   Until these barriers are addressed, commercial 





Collectively, these conclusions call for a reevaluation of current defense 
management regimes and a reconsideration of the criteria used in guiding and 
evaluating successful defense innovation.  DOD currently has a cost and price-based 





the price-based system originates prior to World War II.  The time-based system that 
developed during World War II and the early Cold War has found little use since the 
1970s.   
The case examples in Chapter 5 illustrate that, on an exception basis and for a 
very few programs, there is the possibility that the U.S. government can innovate in a 
time-based fashion as it once did.  These examples illustrate that bypassing or 
streamlining the requirements process, having access to flexible sources of funding, 
using more flexible contracting procedures, streamlining competitive procedures, and 
not using the traditional acquisition management processes allows decision makers to 
start and end programs more quickly.   The innovation model needs to change to be 
able to attract new entrants and technology and deliver capability faster on a grander 
scale rather than can occur through one-off workarounds and on an exception basis.  
This becomes critical if other nations learn from the U.S. experience and focus on 
time-based innovation – as they appear to be doing. 244 
To counter rising threats and maintain the competitiveness of its military, the 
U.S. should reestablish an alternative time-based innovation system at a larger scale.  
This new system should build upon the past examples of successful time-based 
development and civil-military integration models. Future DOD weapons 
 
244  It can be argued that China, Russia and even North Korea have already come to this conclusion and 
their military development programs show significant evidence of time-based iterative prototyping. 
The Chinese development of the J-20 fighter and Russian air defense systems show signs of rapid 
iteration and deployment in time periods much faster than comparable U.S. systems.  North Korean 
missile test failures are the mark of progress being validated by the successful deployment of new 
more advanced capabilities as they make incremental improvements to technology -- a lesson the US 
learned in the 1950s under its own missile program but has somehow seemingly forgotten. The U.S. 
keeps being surprised by these advances, but they all look unsurprisingly similar to the U.S. model 






development should focus on delivering operational capability in a maximum of 5-
year increments – from concept to actual hardware that can be tested and used in the 
field.  In an attempt to change the innovation model back to one that adopts a more 
time-based development approach, a series of recommendations are made. These 
recommendations suggest modifying management regimes to: 1) focus on time by 
addressing process linearity; and 2) incentivize the civil-military integration of the 
industrial base.  
Based on past data, it appears that large hardware projects ideally take 4-7 
years to start a program and bring it to market.  It does not seem to matter if a product 
is a new disruptive operational prototype or an incremental modification to existing 
technology.  It may be quite possible to shorten that cycle to the 2-4-year timeframe 
demonstrated in the 1950s, but focusing on a five-year cycle for innovation would 
provide a vast improvement over current outcomes.  Software is an entirely different 
developmental effort. New software changes, unlike in the past, can be accomplished 
within months rather than years, and management processes must change to 
accommodate this new world of agile software development.  This change could be 
enabled through an iterative open-source software development process based on 
time.   
To maximize the most advantageous system and time-based goals, the 
modernization or replacement of existing platforms or systems with a lifetime of 
greater than 10 years would ideally be faced with two types of incremental 
developments working simultaneously.  The first would be a continuous five-year 





envision a one-year or even faster rate of continuous software upgrades on the 
platform.  New disruptive solutions would form a different pathway that relied on 
time-based rapid experimentation, multiple solution options, the flexibility to move 
from one option to the next, and serial operational prototyping that leads to either 
stand-alone capability or a decision to produce at scale.  
Several new tools are used in the commercial sector that further enable time-
based development and could be adopted by DOD to help in implementation of such 
an approach.  In addition to iterative prototyping and agile development, digital 
engineering and modelling, modularity, component reuse, common architectures and 
open systems design are all emerging approaches that can be used enable time-based 
development.245  Advances in 3-D printing and additive manufacturing will likely 
make it easier to prototype and bring to market an initial operational system faster 
than current techniques.  
This first set of recommendations addresses the issue of linearity. In one 
sense, DOD could continue its past management practices with a new system of ad-
hoc end-arounds of the current management regimes, but that would be insufficient.  
Progress has been made in the last five years through the beginnings of the 
implementation of the 2015-16 NDAA Mid-Tier acquisition reforms that provide for 
an alternative pathway around some of the management regimes.  Section 804 Mid-
tier authority is a time-based authority that allows a path around the requirements and 
acquisition process if capability can be delivered in 2-5 years.  While the success of 
 
245 For a primer on some of these new tools see: Will Roper, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Take the Red Pill: The New Digital Acquisition Reality, 





this authority still remains to be seen (as of March 2019 35 Mid-Tier programs 
existed),246 it should only be a few more years before data can be collected to identify 
best practices and determine any changes that need to be made to this authority.  The 
measures used to gauge that success or criteria for evaluation will be critical in that 
evaluation.  There are now ongoing program efforts and potential capabilities that 
wouldn’t have existed such as the new fighter prototypes, command and control, 
missile and hypersonic programs, if not for this authority.  The head of the Army’s 
Futures Command “observed that the Army had been on 10-15-year timelines to 
introduce new equipment but these are being shortened to four years in some recent 
programs.”247   The U.S. military is one step closer to being able to compete against 
China because of the use of section 804.  Still, even now these programs only cover a 
very small amount of the military’s development budget and are subject to an 
increase in initial decision time to gain funding, a growing call for new restrictions, 
and a return to the traditional developmental process.248  While rising in significance, 
these programs have not achieved a critical mass and without further reforms will 
continue to lag behind what a nimbler adversary can do in less time.   
Mid-Tier authority is a first start in moving to a time-based framework and is 
now part of the new Adaptative Acquisition Framework (AAF) that, as of October 
 
246 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Acquisition Reform: Leadership Attention Needed 
to Effectively Implement Changes to Acquisition Oversight, GAO-19-439, (Washington, DC, 2019), 
26. 
247 Center for New American Security, Fireside Chat with General John M. Murray, September 10, 
2020, https://www.cnas.org/events/virtual-fireside-chat-with-general-john-m-murray.  
248 For example, In the Senate Report to accompany the FY 2021 Defense Appropriations Act (p. 161) 
there are several new reporting requirements and restrictions proposed to be applied to Mid-Tier 
acquisitions conducted the Department of Defense. GAO has provided several recommendations for 





2020 is embedded in the latest DOD 5000 series rewrite.  The new AAF (see Figure 
6.1) has the potential to move DOD to a more time-based development approach as it 
has put time schedules into several of its acquisition pathways.  Three of the 
pathways, Mid-Tier (2-5-year), software (1-year), and urgent capability acquisition 
(this conforms to the legacy authorities and practices outlined in case example 5 from 
chapter 5 that have a 1-2-year acquisition cycle) are now constrained by time.  
However, these pathways are the exceptions to the traditional pathway, which will 
likely continue to dominate.  While under the AAF, the Department has begun to put 
in place a framework for a time-based acquisition system it must go much farther in 
the other pathways. 
 
Recommendation 1: Modify the acquisition system to focus on time by 
addressing linearity and establishing separate innovation pathways that can be 
completed in five years or less to address low-volume disruption or high-volume 
incremental improvement  
 
This first recommendation is designed to better use time in the acquisition 
system as a mechanism to control its cost-based system.  To do this, the next step is to 
put time constraints on the rest of the acquisition pathways described in the AAF and 
further subdivide acquisitions within these pathways depending on whether they 
should focus on low-volume disruption or high-volume incremental improvement.  
Low-volume disruptive capabilities would be developed under the Mid-Tier authority 
while high-volume incremental improvement programs would be conducted under the 
traditional pathway, but whose initial capability deployment would likely have been 









DOD must apply time-based constraints on major capability acquisition, 
which is the new name for the older traditional acquisition model. There is no reason 
that any major capability acquisition should take longer than 5 years or that DOD 
continue with its overly lengthy 15-20 systems acquisition time cycle. Even as larger 
volumes of capability are bought under the major capability’s pathway, these 
purchases should continue to be limited by time. Five years to produce a block of new 
capability should be sufficient based on past production histories.   New technology 
 
249 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Instruction 5000.02: Operation of the Defense Acquisition 






can continue to be planned for the next production version block buy just as new 
iPhone versions are planned for release today.   
To further encourage the development of evolutionary platform developments, 
Congress may want to consider that DOD only approve programs at Milestone B that 
will be initially deployed in less than three to five years.  These types of platforms 
may still be purchased over a 20-year span but a shorter deployment requirement will 
have the benefit of breaking programs into smaller production increments and 
spreading out riskier technology insertions over several iterations. DOD should be 
thinking of separating future programs into a number of programs along the lines of 
the block upgrade concept used on the F-16 and some missile systems.  DOD can be 
held accountable for Nunn-McCurdy cost and schedule baselines established for each 
block or increment rather than a decades-long life of program effort where the first 
production article may have little in common with the last.  
If this process for major capabilities works as intended it will force 
evolutionary, less risky alternatives to meet the shorter time for deployment and the 
ability to meet stringent milestone B and C requirements.  Milestone B – IOC 
programs will likely focus on incrementalism and cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives can be easier to manage if riskier programs are moved to the Mid-Tier or 
the urgent pathway.  This process should be adequate for most of DOD’s incremental 
system development buys.  While no one size fits all, the major systems acquisition 
framework can work for these large buys of non-innovative platforms that one keeps 
for decades.  It is probably best to limit those given the inevitable rapid advances in 





DOD will need to design-in flexible and adaptable new technology insertion options 
either on a hardware or software side based on open systems interfaces. 
For less mature programs, it is necessary to distinguish whether the 
acquisition need is for a low-volume disruptive solution or an eventual high-volume 
incremental solution.  Each of these solutions should be first tested and prototyped 
using the Mid-Tier pathway.  Mid-Tier acquisition should be a preference for most 
developmental programs and the initial roll out of operational capability.  If the 
Department is only looking for a low-volume disruptive solution, then a second or 
multiple follow-on Mid-Tier programs could be established using the rapid fielding 
authority or a follow-on serial prototyping authority within the section 804 authority.  
If a capability is planned to be widely produced in large quantities, then the major 
capability acquisition pathway should be used, but even under this pathway for the 
initial prototyping phase and perhaps the initial block of capability produced at a 
lower volume, the Mid-Tier authority should be exercised first. 
Thus, in the place of most traditional 15-year major development programs, 
DOD should focus on building operational prototype systems that can be deployed 
within one- to two-year (urgent capability pathway) and three- to five-year (middle 
tier) timeframes. These operational prototype systems should provide U.S. forces 
with real capabilities and not be technology demonstrators designed to sit on a shelf. 
This “fly before you buy” approach is different in the sense that these systems not 
only demonstrate capability but can be used in a conflict. They also have the added 
benefit that if only a few are needed (and if they work) the acquisition program could 





capabilities but can also serve as the basis for future programs that can enter the 
traditional evolutionary process at the milestone B or C point or continue with a 
follow-on Mid-Tier program.  
For urgent capability acquisition and middle tier acquisition, an alternative 
requirements system has been created that should limit the linear time it takes to 
move through the requirements process. Although even here it will be necessary to 
reduce or monitor the time those new alternative processes take to initiate these 
efforts. The traditional requirements JCIDS process should either be streamlined or 
scrapped for major capability acquisition and an alternative process created.  The 
requirements management regime should be reformed to emphasize time to 
development and initial deployment leading up to a transition to a system that a 
decision has been made to buy in large quantities or in the cases of ships – identical 
follow on to new ships in a class. Thus, only for these technology transition programs 
should what is legislatively defined as an MDAP programs be established and the 
current JCIDs process, program budgeting, and the major capabilities pathway 
procedures apply.   
The AAF has set up the policy framework for this to happen.  The problem is 
that there existed under the old 5000-acquisition series the possibilities for this 
flexibility and none was forthcoming.   The same could be said about this new rewrite 
of the 5000-acquisition series and the key will be found in implementation.   As with 
previous rewrites that allowed for incremental and evolutionary acquisition, the 
failure of the stated process to conform with the actual process has led to a mismatch 





There is also no reason that what used to be called MAIS – Major Automated 
Information Systems, now classified as the Defense Business Systems pathway – 
should take longer than 2-5 years as well.  Within the acquisition of services pathway 
there may be room for longer contracting timeframes for public private partnerships 
under, for example, Energy Savings Performance Contracts, but most of these 
contracts should not last more than 5 years and the time it takes to acquire that service 
should be relatively short and measured in months, not years.   
The other benefit from a time-based approach that is focused on 2-5-year 
increments for each of these pathways is that the cost-based system can be focused on 
near-term actuals that the budget can accommodate.  Not only will programs be time 
constrained but they will be cost constrained as there will only be so much money 
that one can spend in such a 2-5-year period.  One will very quickly determine the 
feasibility of execution in this timeframe and as long as there are incentives to move 
money around, these shorter programs can be more readily cancelled and new 
alternatives pursued.  Still, the greatest budgeting problem at the moment is the 
waiting for funds to initiate new experimentation and prototyping projects.   
 
Recommendation 2: Establish flexible budget pathways to accelerate new 
innovations through experimentation and prototyping new systems in the 
software, Mid-Tier and urgent operations pathways.   
 
The most significant change that remains to enable time-based acquisition is 
to address the upfront linear problem of the budget process.   The current use of OTA 
and Mid-Tier authority has suffered from the same inability of the budget process to 





to create a bridge fund for prototyping and experimentation is still needed to prevent 
urgent capability, Mid-Tier programs and software programs languishing first for 
three-years in the PPBE process.   
Even with the ability in Mid-Tier authority to go around the MDAP 
acquisition process and the JCIDS requirements process, the Department suffers from 
the inability to rapidly start one of these programs due to the constraints of the budget 
process.  The military services have had to wait the 2-3 years for the PPBE process to 
work before getting section 804 programs into their budget.  This gap in funding was 
proposed to be addressed by the creation of a Rapid Prototyping Fund authorized as a 
part of section 804 in 2016 but DOD and the appropriators did not operationalize the 
fund.  Thus, the three-year wait to begin these efforts. 
DOD budget processes have become the structural impediment to change and 
are the last remaining item to address in acquisition reform.250  Change will require a 
multi-faceted solution that includes agreement and buy-in from the congressional 
appropriation and authorization committees, DOD, and the Office of Management 
and Budget.  Current DOD funding is inflexible particularly for research and 
development activities, where prototyping and experimentation is most needed.  The 
innovation budget (RDTE and Procurement) is still focused exclusively on programs, 
does not encourage experimentation, and does not allow for the rapid movement of 
funds when experimentation provides answers that an alternative path is needed.  The 
infamous “valley of death” can only be bridged by a 2-3 year wait for funds.  This is 
 
250 George Mason University’s Center for Government Contracting held an August 20, 2020 event 






too long for a design and prototyping team to stay together at any commercial 
company with no revenue except for a dedicated defense firm that receives IR&D 
subsidies from the government due to its other DOD cost contracts. The Air Force’s 
recent attempt to use more flexible Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) funds 
(which are not subject to appropriations control)251 to immediately initiate tech efforts 
is an example of how to provide some interim funding.  Still, this is insufficient as the 
SBIR contracts are too small to make a significant difference.  Pooling SBIR funds 
into large amounts is one workaround to this but may invite political backlash in 
Congress based on the original intent of this small business program. 
In order for the acquisition system to focus on time, more flexible budget 
processes need to be created to address linearity at the beginning of an innovative 
effort.  A 6.4 RDTE budget classification is probably the correct classification of 
money, but what is needed is to fund these prototypes in mission areas rather than on 
a program or project basis, which is the source of the budget wait time.  Thus, 
Congress and DOD should work together to establish a series of flexible mission area 
funds to initiate new innovative efforts in the software, Mid-Tier and, urgent 
operations pathways. These efforts could first leverage the section 804 rapid 
prototyping fund that is already authorized or create a new fund or budget line items.  
These funds may need the authority to also support the immediate funding of urgent 
 
251 The SBIR program is funded in a unique way through what is essentially a “tax” on federal 
government research and development programs.  This structure allows these funds to be off budget 
and outside of the control of the appropriations committees. The SBIR program funds small-scale 
R&D efforts from small businesses that would normally not be funded through the appropriations 
process. The historical issue for SBIR like many DOD R&D programs is the problem of follow-on 
funding after initial research has been completed.  Most of these efforts languish in the “valley of 





operational needs, or new software and artificial intelligence efforts or an additional 
fund could be established for these pathways.  It is likely that each service would 
need its own rapid funds to limit the time it would take to get approval from 
centralized authorities who would likely control one overarching DOD fund.252 
Other potential budgetary reforms that could be considered that would enable 
time-based innovation include the establishment of mission and capabilities 
budgeting beyond RDTE for certain categories of effort similar to the authority that 
was given to MDA in case example 4 that also allows for movement of funds 
between RDTE categories, Procurement, O&M and MILCON. Another option is to 
merely establish mission funds with “No Color of Money” that negates these 
distinctions.  This would be similar to the DIB’s proposal for a software color of 
money but to apply that concept to multiple mission or capabilities areas.  Yet another 
option that was once given to the now expired JFCOM is to give operational 
commanders limited acquisition and budget authorities to address urgent operational 
needs in their area of responsibility.  This would streamline the time it takes for 
urgent needs to be addressed that currently rarely get acted upon and leave gaping 
holes in U.S. operational ability to address rising threats. Each of these budgetary 
authorities would require agreement from Congress and OMB to implement, but the 
first step is for DOD to want to make any of these reforms a priority and then argue 
for them based on a compelling case for change.  
 
252 Service specific funds are already authorized for the Rapid Innovation Fund established under 





For any new budget flexibility there will be a need to ensure that the 
congressional appropriations committees have insight and transparency into the 
execution and use of these funds. It is also possible that these funds would be needed 
only as a bridge for two to three years and then the traditional funding process could 
continue under the PPBE process and be supported by current budget justification 
documents that are sent to Congress.  These bridge funds could be executed by 
budgeting wedges of money each year for these purposes, but not putting forth the 
detailed program budget justifications currently required for other funding lines since 
those programs and technology efforts would not yet exist.  Periodic reports to 
Congress could be made after the obligation of funds from these flexible accounts. 
Because of the inflexibilities inherent in the current program budgeting 
construct, these new flexible funds could quickly fund rapid prototyping initiatives.  
As such they would be the primary means of funding the Pentagon’s efforts to 
compete in a Great Power Competition level or conduct a “Third Offset Strategy” as 
these funds could take three years off the linear time-based cycle.  During the Cold 
War in both the first and second offset strategies when America really needed an 
important strategic or intelligence capability, the Pentagon emulated a more 
streamlined version of acquisition and budgeting that empowered entities like 
Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works to build operational capabilities faster than the 
traditional acquisition process. These revolutionary operational prototypes should 
again be developed. 
The next set of recommendations would address changing management 





the upfront time it takes to initiate capability development efforts would enhance the 
ability of non-traditional contractors to focus on providing defense solutions.  Still, 
the requirements for government-unique cost and pricing data under TINA, the 
requirements of CAS, intellectual property risk, and government unique contracting 
clauses are still huge barriers to CMI.  Reforms to FAR Part 12 commercial item 
exemptions in the last 5 years have not been successfully implemented and as a result, 
commercial firms that want to innovate on behalf of the government are advised not 
to contract with the government on that basis.   
As a result of the bureaucratization of FAR 12, there has been a large increase 
in non-traditional firms trying to enter the defense market on an OTA basis.  U.S. 
government-wide OTA spending has risen from about $1 billion in FY15 to $7.8 
billion in FY19 with DOD accounting for more than 90 percent of that. 253  This shift 
from FAR 12 to OTAs was not the intention when new commercial item reforms 
were passed by Congress in 2015.  The inability of the contracting community to 
determine and measure value in a commercial contract has led DOD back to a price-
based system and an overreliance on TINA and CAS.  In addition, new socio-
economic requirements that should have been exempted in FAR 12 have slowly crept 
back into the system.  Because of the inability to reform commercial item 
procurement the following recommendation is made.  
 
 
253 This number will be inevitably be higher in FY2020 given the OTA awards by DoD for COVID-19 
related medical work is alone valued at approximately $6 billion. Data comprised from: Benjamin 
Schwartz and William Greenwalt, “Other Transaction Authority & the Consortia-based Acquisition 







Recommendation 3:  Implement the preference for OTAs to address both 
contract linearity and CMI in DOD time-based innovative efforts. 
 
As a means to more quickly start new innovations to experiment and 
prototype, Congress in the 2018 NDAA created a preference for the use of OTAs.   
This should now be the default position to create a value-based commercial 
contracting process that removes barriers to CMI and the use of non-traditional 
contractors.  This preference can also be helpful in addressing time-based issues with 
contract negotiations. 
OTAs have the potential to be the best way for non-traditional and venture 
capital backed companies to participate in the DOD market.  It enables but does not 
guarantee commercial cost accounting and price-based negotiations based on 
commercial best practices and pricing. It allows for the ability to negotiate intellectual 
property rights and has the opportunity to be the most commercial like terms and 
conditions that nontraditional contractors are used to. 
However, both price and cost-based FAR clauses and socioeconomic 
requirements are creeping into OTAs.  This is now occurring on OTAs as the 
contracting community is slowly inserting more government unique FAR clauses in 
OTAs to make these contract vehicles look more and more like a traditional FAR 
contract.  To achieve CMI these clauses need to be limited on future OTAs.  To 
effectively do this, DOD should create OTA templates for non-traditional 
participation in government contracting. 
Another successful effect of the use of OTA authority is the ability to reduce 





for OTAs are measured in months, as opposed to years with traditional contracts. The 
Defense Innovation Unit and other entities executing Commercial Solutions Opening 
OTAs are getting on contract within 60-90 days.254  Consortium based OTAs are 
another way to execute contracts faster.255  For urgent, Mid-Tier and software time-
based acquisition pathways with both commercial and defense unique providers DOD 
should use OTAs to take almost 2 years out of the linear innovation cycle.   
 
Recommendation 4: DOD should create an adaptive CMI arrangement 
for nontraditional firms. 
 
Many other barriers beyond contracting exist that prevent nontraditional and 
venture capital backed companies in Silicon Valley working for DOD.  For example, 
different security requirements are a challenge. Obviously, these requirements are 
needed in a number of the classified applications that DOD is working on. Still, there 
is a need to streamline and adapt the security requirements to the ability to attract the 
types of firms and engineering talent to work on defense problems.  
DOD could consider an arrangement that would address the ability to rapidly 
clear personnel in nontraditional companies to allow them to bid on contracts. It 
would create a commercial pathway through the export control process to ensure that 
 
254 From the Defense Innovation Unit website: “Through our Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO) 
process, we competitively solicit proposals for innovative solutions that meet the needs of our DoD 
partners. DIU leverages Other Transaction authority (10 U.S.C. § 2371b(f)) to award prototype 
agreements in as few as 60-90 days. More importantly, after a successful prototype, the company 
involved and any DoD entity can enter into a follow-on production contract or agreement just as 
easily.” https://diu.mil/work-with-us 
255 A consortium is an association formed by multiple parties for the purpose of participating in a 
common activity or pooling resources to achieve a common goal. Consortium-based OTAs allow 
multiple companies and academia to collaborate with government customers and to partner with each 






these firms have a path to commerciality to be able to sell modified products and use 
their intellectual property in the global marketplace to eliminate the disincentives to 
working with the federal government.  In addition, special security requirements such 
as information security standards should be adopted to commercial standards to the 
maximum extent for non-traditional firms. 
Just as DOD needs an OTA contracting template that is tailored to these non-
traditional firms, it should tailor a number of other business practices in a way that 
makes defense more attractive to these firms.  These templates would also undermine 
the comparative advantage traditional firms have from merely being able to comply 
with non-technical management regimes requirements.  These new business 
arrangements could cover security, investment, auditing, testing, finance, and other 
regimes that have unique requirements not found in the commercial marketplace. 
 
 




This research has attempted to demonstrate that time to development and 
deployment of military capability has been increasing over the past 60 years and that 
this is linked to the increasing time it takes to perform management processes 
designed to oversee defense innovation programs.  Based on the data presented, there 
should be little debate that existing management processes no longer allow for 
developments to proceed at the speeds that occurred in the early Cold War.   
However, understanding that there is a link though between time and process will not 





implement recommendations to reduce time.  Despite long standing complaints about 
bureaucratic procedures and the establishment of periodic workarounds to achieve 
limited time-based innovation objectives, the DOD innovation model has not been 
able to effectively attract new entrants, incorporate leading commercial technology 
and deliver capability faster on a larger scale.   
Many reforms have been tried before.  While the case examples identified in 
this study show that process changes can succeed in bringing back on a limited basis 
time as an innovation focus, they also demonstrate how easily they can be rolled back 
by advocates that continue to adhere to the existing management paradigm.  Each 
new workaround to the existing management system has also had the unfortunate 
effect of adding further complexity by requiring approvals to implement any process 
exception or off ramp for innovation.  The ability to implement any alternative time-
based system and adapt new management regimes will continue to face significant 
barriers to change  
To successfully reduce process time, it will be important to not only continue 
to better understand why those times have been increasing, but to address the 
difficulties in modifying these processes.  While it is important as a first step to 
establish that managerial process and development times are linked, there is a need to 
proceed to the next level of analysis focused on the reasons for the staying power of 
existing management processes.  Time to development can be thought of as a 
dependent variable to a collection of managerial process variables but there are 
several other variables and values that have impacted managerial process time and 





specificity, the identification and underlying reasons for management process rigidity 
may ultimately serve as enhanced explanatory variables as to why time to 
development will be difficult to reduce.  Future areas of inquiry should focus on 
understanding why management processes are the way they are and what factors 
underpin the length of management process time.  Many of the following 
observations are designed to not only identify areas for future research but also to 
highlight where policy makers will likely need to focus if reform implementation 
slows when meeting these barriers.  
Within this study framework it has been proposed that a focus on other criteria 
such as cost, price, and systems analysis, particularly in the acquisition and budget 
regimes, have increased management process time implementation.  Increasingly 
segregated, stand-alone management regimes have focused on these other than time 
criteria and values in a step-by-step manner over decades.  A lack of an overarching 
criteria or centralized focus on time has allowed for the optimization of other values 
in each of the regimes that has resulted in the suboptimization of the overarching 
innovation process.  This structure as it has evolved over the last 60 years offers the 
clearest explanation of the forces driving the managerial complexity that has 
overtaken the importance of time in development. 
Still, there are likely other factors and barriers beyond the stove piping of 
processes, a systems analysis approach, and a value emphasis on cost and price that 
should be considered.  Each may eventually offer additional explanatory benefits but 
will also create a more complicated theoretical model when trying to address change.  





managerial process time, or perhaps now more importantly, serve as justification for 
maintaining the status quo.  Ultimately, while time to development is now dependent 
on managerial process time, this process time is a likely a dependent variable to a 
collection of other factors and values. In the course of this review, several other 
theoretical explanations and additional variables were identified.  These could be 
further explored and may underpin and explain some of the rise in time to 
development and managerial process time, but also to why it might be difficult to 
change these processes once they have been established.   
The first of these factors addresses the perception of the threat.  This variable 
should be a compelling force for change, but until there is an agreement of the nature 
of the threat it may be difficult to move away from the status quo. In the past, the 
realization of an impending threat has come later than was ideal (usually upon 
enactment of hostilities) and before changes could be made to the innovation system. 
This realization of the threat has been often too late given the lead time it takes to 
develop and deploy new weapons capabilities.  
In the post-Cold War era, the threat has not been considered as existential as it 
was in the 1950s.  Since that time, it has never been thought as compelling enough to 
argue for comprehensive process change, but as demonstrated in the case examples 
military innovation objectives could be achieved through ad-hoc measures.  As the 
perception of the threat changed after 9/11, management changes to meet that threat 
were addressed at the margin by going around the management system.  A similar 
framework of waivers and exemptions from management process has begun to be 





The increase in management process time over the last thirty years could be 
linked to a lesser concern about the threat in the post-Cold War period.  Without a 
compelling threat-based need management processes could be allowed to focus on 
other values besides time leading to a longer time to development.  While process 
time and time to market were already increasing in the 30 years prior to the end of the 
Cold War, this could potentially correspond to a perception in the relaxation of the 
threat through détente and arms control measures that began in the 1960s.  This and 
the policy and political ramifications from the Vietnam War could have undermined 
the importance of time and allowed for the beginning of the rise of other oversight 
criteria to take its place. A minimalist industrial strategy would then have called for a 
shift in focus on sustaining innovation to keep the industrial base more as a hedge 
against a future increase in threat. 
The second factor is the rise of complexity.  As it has evolved, the 
management system has arguably become too complex to change.  The accretion of 
complexity over decades has been furthered by oversight and budget reform cycles 
that are too compressed to allow for a complete reset to a previous baseline as 
occurred in U.S. history prior to World War II. The result has seen reform and 
counter reform cycles often linked to the rise and fall of the defense budget leading to 
a layering of new requirements and process complexity.   Periodic efforts to 
streamline processes have been limited to a segment of one or two management 
regimes and have never comprehensively addressed the entire management system.  





advances, and the protection of data and technology may also be factors in the 
stretching out of managerial process time. 
Another issue are the many institutions that derive their current power and 
raison d'etre from the current cost based predictive management system.  These 
institutions, including the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 
(CAPE) in OSD and the appropriations committees, will find it hard to change as they 
either truly believe that the current system is correct or will not wish to give up their 
power to an untested system.  The insights from academic work in bureaucratic 
politics could be insightful in addressing barriers to empowered actors not willing to 
cede power or pursue reforms.   
The PPBS process gave the appropriations committees a ready-made tool to 
enhance Congress’s constitutional power of the purse to better earmark expenditures, 
but it also empowered a centralized management approach emanating from the OSD 
comptroller and CAPE.  Congress emulated this centralized controlling system in the 
budget regime by creating several independent organizations in other management 
regimes.  These include the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation, the 
Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment and Research and Engineering, the 
Inspector General, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, and Defense Contract 
Management Agency each of which exercises authority over the waning power of 
program managers that manage defense innovation programs. 
Interest group politics is another area to study and address as not only do 
entrenched bureaucracies benefit from the current management system.  Traditional 





will also resist change as will federal employee unions that oppose acquisition 
reforms that might jeopardize workload on old defense systems that by law need to be 
maintained by federal employees. There has been a degree of regulatory capture by 
special interests that will be difficult to dislodge.  System and process complexity 
provides a cover for some of those benefits to accrue.  Socioeconomic factors 
designed to enforce competition, fairness to bidders, and small business participation 
actually limit participation to those firms that can specialize in government 
contracting rules and be rewarded for compliance with process.  As a result, Silicon 
Valley start-ups are not a significant part of the defense industrial base.  Buy 
American legislation, security requirements and immigration controls all favored by 
various interest groups limit the participation in defense innovation from our allies.  
This rejects the immense history of the technological inflows that occurred during 
World War II and the early Cold War that helped drive U.S. defense innovation.  
Another important factor that may underly the rise in new management 
process is the declining public trust in government that the Pew Research Center has 
been documenting since 1965.256  The public perception of defense innovation efforts 
has been impacted by a view in Congress that the defense budget is plagued by fraud, 
waste and abuse, industry profiteering, and programs that fail to meet cost, schedule 
and performance measures. While many of these arguments have been used to 
support past cuts to the defense budget, there is a complementary narrative that arose 
since the 1980s about the wastefulness of non-defense programs.  The result has been 
 






a decades long competition to discredit the effectiveness of any expenditure of public 
money on innovation and to ratchet up managerial oversight measures.  It is perhaps 
not surprising that the public has come to believe that the government is broken and 
inadequate.  Somehow the cycle of adding complexity to the system upon the latest 
case of fraud, waste or abuse, real or imagined, needs to be broken.  Rather than 
creating new processes that disincentivize risk, innovation and results-based 
solutions, the effectiveness of the legal system to prosecute real fraud and abuse in 
the small number of cases that occur using already sufficient existing authorities 
should be enhanced.  A much harder discussion will need to be had on research and 
experimentation when the results do not lead to immediate success.  
Finally, a further factor discussed in this paper are embedded historical values 
that have not always rewarded innovation.  These values include: a desire for 
centralization, control and security; an aversion to private sector profits, initiative, 
ideas, and investment; the need for aaccountability enforced by government unique 
standards; full and open competition; and a preference for the lowest price.  
Predictability and the prevention of cost overruns is a value adopted by Congress but 
ironically the fixes put in place to address cost overruns oftentimes ensure their 
creation.  Many of these values and the processes to address them grew up in the Cold 
War and in another irony the success of “winning” the Cold War may have led to an 
unwarranted belief in the success of these legacy values and management processes.  
If they worked then, in the sense that they were in place when we outlasted the Soviet 
Union, there may be little incentive to change the system.  While this system might 





economic and political system, it may be unlikely to be of much use in different 
circumstances. 
While difficulties in change management have been often attributed to culture, 
there are multiple countervailing currents working against a cultural adoption of 
prioritizing time to innovation over other values and providing incentives to change 
management processes.  Still, as a practical manner, any change to a time-based 
innovation system will require a realization and a consensus by leadership and those 
who execute innovation programs on a need to change culture and values.  
First, senior leadership and those who implement the management system 
need to understand why adopting a time-based innovation system is so important. 
There is a need for not only leadership buy-in and support, but also for bottom-up 
execution and to be the source of continuous new ideas.  This awareness and 
understanding needs to occur particularly at the Congressional, DOD, and executive 
branch/OMB leadership level, as this is where most of the potential barriers to 
adopting a time-based innovation system will initially reside.  Once that leadership 
backing has been achieved the next step will be to focus on training of the oversight, 
budget, and acquisition workforce on time-based defense innovation practices and 
alternative value measurement beyond cost and price comparisons.   
These communities will be key because even when buy-in occurred, as it did 
with FASA in 1994 with both congressional and DOD looking for new innovation 
approaches, the biggest barrier to achieving a time-based innovation process 
continued to reside in the contracting and oversight workforce. Values, personnel 





approaches can be successful on anything beyond a minor scale.  The cost-based and 
price-based culture that is embedded in the workforce will be very difficult to 
overcome, as witnessed by the continuous pushback by the contracting community on 
FAR part 12 commercial item reforms of the past.  In addition, the oversight 
communities have been trained and wedded to evaluating current acquisition 
programs based on cost and price criteria that is not readily conducive to a time-based 
approach. 
However, it is vital for these communities to understand the inherent need for 
speed to compete against China. This will be all about culture change and the 
acceptance of new values and a prioritization of those values.  This will be extremely 
difficult and there will be a large need for training and leadership direction to address 
any such culture change.   
There is a longstanding fear in not only these communities but the budgeting 
and acquisition communities that experimentation and testing that is not successful 
will be seen as wasteful by Congress and an excuse to slash budgets.   Training the 
next generation of the workforce away from process to agility and in new definitions 
of what is wasteful or not will be important, but equally important is what the 
appropriations committees, CAPE, comptrollers and OMB do and think.  Criteria will 
be important.   There will likely be a need for greater oversight of the overseers in the 
future.  Congress and the executive branch need to understand and agree on what 
criteria is being used for evaluation and the measures of success.  While there may be 
a need for organizational changes, it is more important to get overarching agreement 





effectively move from a more predictive cost-based model to a more time-based risk 
and value-based model. 
But it is not just about the oversight and contracting community. The military 
itself will need to adopt a new way of thinking and debate where the use of time in 
innovation fits in to what is termed its DOTMILPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy) and reinforce 
this in its officer training programs such as the Joint Professional Military Education 
program.  To be successful, the military may need to look at its promotion process to 
ensure it does not unnecessarily weed out officers who may be future General 
Schrievers and Admiral Rickovers that can lead time-based innovation efforts. 
Perhaps more importantly, military officers will need to become less isolated 
from business and commercial technology.  Eventually, the demand signal and 
constant feedback from the military operators will be crucial and the hoped-for 
engagement by the Service Chiefs now back in the acquisition chain will encourage 
not only an operator embedding in the innovation process but a restoration of a longer 
tenured military program manager authority over many of the current management 
stovepipes.  
It will first be necessary for these communities to want to change – the 
military, Congress, and the implementation and oversight bureaucracy.  Then there 
will need to be an agreement on the nature of why it has been so hard to make 
management change.  This will need to be critically thought through and addressed.   
These are not easy hurdles to overcome and a time-based system will likely 





less effectiveness of the time-base system.  The first step is to identify that there is an 
alternative that once worked in a different and better way.  The next step is to build 
the compelling case of why changing to this alternative is needed.  In many ways, this 
is similar to the challenge that Roosevelt faced prior to WWII, or that Eisenhower and 
Vannevar Bush faced in maintaining the WWII innovation system in the early Cold 
War.  The system can change when confronted with a specific threat and can 
implement the correct policies.  The key question will be how much lead time is still 
needed and available to implement those policies.  There is an urgency given shifts in 
power, capabilities, and threats to begin to address some of these issues.  Will DOD 












MANAGEMENT REGIME DESCRIPTIONS 
 
In Table A-1 several management regimes that are critical to defense 
innovation are identified.  Of these regimes, four have the most significant direct 
impact on the time it takes to deliver military capability: requirements, budget, 
acquisition, and contracting regimes.  In addition to contracting, the finance and 
accounting, security, information management, and oversight regimes, while also 
having a time impact, have been most responsible for barriers to CMI and the 
participation in the industrial base by those firms that specialize in agile development.  
Science and engineering, personnel, and maintenance and logistics regimes while 
supporting regimes can also directly impact time and CMI. A greater connection 
between the regimes of the defense innovation system and the operators or operations 
regime could positively impact on the effectiveness of solutions. How all of these 
regimes are organized to interact with one another can be classified as a regime in 
itself.  Much reform over time has been organizational in nature as a way to try and 














Table A-1: Description of Management Regimes Important to Defense 






















Requirements:  The requirements regime addresses how the government determines 
what it needs to develop or buy.  The process for this can be formal or informal, but 
several steps are required.  The first is awareness.  This requires both intelligence to 
understand the threat and technological or market research to understand what 
alternatives can be developed to meet the threat.  This awareness, combined with a 
strategic and policy focus, provides insight into how a new technological solution or 
capability might shape the balance of power or an adversary’s reaction, which helps 





After the government determines a general need, it must make a more refined 
determination of how to meet that need.  Should, for example, the solution be a 
missile, manned aircraft, or unmanned underwater vehicle?  More clearly defined 
requirements may be needed to determine what a potential solution needs to do to 
meet that need, for example, travel 800 nautical miles, perform its mission, and then 
return to base.   A separate requirements process can be referred to as the technical 
requirements process and, in this case, there will be a focus on standards and 
specifications that any solution should meet.  For instance, these types of 
requirements might cover the quality of steel, tolerances, or the security of a 
contractor’s information management systems.  Technical requirements, standards, 
and specifications are placed in the contract and are linked to the contracting regime 
for implementation.  
Factors impacting the industrial base’s willingness or ability to compete for 
any solution identified by the requirements process include: 
• Is the requirements process long and cumbersome? 
• Do the requirements take into account what the commercial market has 
already done or what been produced elsewhere? 
• Does the process rely on unique technical requirements and specifications that 
are geared to past military specific solutions? 
In principle, the threat should drive the requirements process, but this process could 
develop bureaucratic rules and outcomes not related to the threat, such as in cases of 
so-called logrolling of services requirements designed to justify current force 





to failed acquisition programs. Finally, the time it takes to enter and exit the 
requirements process is a factor to consider in delaying innovation outcomes.   
Each of the U.S. military services has its own separate requirements process 
and the current joint requirement process is called the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS), overseen by the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC).  Key events in the development of the requirements process include 
the establishment of the predecessor of the JROC the Joint Requirements 
Management Board in 1984 and in 1992 the creation of the Requirements Generation 
System that would be replaced in 2003 by the JCIDS process.  Legislative 
modifications occurred to the JROC on the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization 
Act to decentralize some requirements back to the services. 
 
Budget:  The budget regime is the policymaking process that determines what the 
government wants to spend its resources on. The budget process impacts innovation 
by the choices that are made, the level of instability driven by changing planned 
levels of funding over the course of a project, and by the time that it takes to 
implement the process.  Expansive needs identified in the requirements process will 
add up to nothing if resources are not allocated to meeting that need, but if these 
processes are conducted in a serial fashion, the time it takes to initiate the start of a 
program to deliver innovation will be constrained by the combined length of these 
two processes.   
The process for the allocation of resources to develop defense capabilities can 





function, capability, organization, or program.   As in all resource allocations 
processes, resources are scarce and alternative choices need to be made.  Of a nation’s 
economic resources, only part will go to the government and within that, a decision 
needs to be made as to what is allotted to defense.  Within the overall defense budget 
number, distribution decisions need to be made to allocate funding by organization, 
mission or program, and possibly further subdivided into defense production, research 
and development, supplies, services, maintenance and personnel, with additional 
classifications within these functions.  More specific apportionment designed to 
manage cash flow between various lines of effort within larger categories needs to be 
made and then a process developed to address unspent or unobligated funds to move 
these to potential higher priorities – or not.  The rules for how this is done has a 
significant bearing on what can be developed and the time that may take.   
The relative size of the defense market as determined by the budget process 
relative to other markets is an important factor in commercial company participation.  
Another factor impacting industry participation is consistency in budgeting.  A 
history of budget instability or unkept funding promises may impact any assessment 
of a firm as to whether to enter the market.  Did the agency or program receive its 
requested budget from Congress and if not, what was the difference each year?  Were 
funds late to arrive, such as when budget agreements are not made on time and the 
government operations under a continuing resolution and, if so, how did that impact 
the revenues and profitability of firms that had already entered the market?    
The current DOD budget process is called Planning, Programming, 





the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS).  It is DOD’s contribution to 
the Presidential budget process that is ultimately approved or adjusted by the 
congressional appropriations process.  The ability to move funds within or among 
budget categories is called the reprogramming process and, depending on the 
threshold or whether a new program is being initiated, may trigger congressional 
notification or approval, which further impacts time to development. 
 
Acquisition and Program Management: The processes that governs and oversees 
how capabilities are developed and managed is the acquisition and program 
management regime.  This is the regime that attempts to bring together 
representatives from several of the other regimes and coordinate them all to a 
common purpose of developing a weapons system.   The processes to do this can be 
highly regulated and compliance-oriented, government-unique, or based on widely 
accepted commercial practices.  Compliance costs are important factors that influence 
the industrial base while time to implement these processes impacts the rate of 
innovation.   
The formal acquisition process, as evolved in the U.S. and mirrored in many 
other nations, is a very time-centric enterprise breaking down the steps of innovation 
into components often linked to budget categories and different “colors of money” 
embedded in research and development spending or that is distinctive from 
procurement or operations dollars. Thus, one allocates budgeting resources based on 
whether they are to be used for basic and applied research, early prototyping and 





initial production, production, operations, and maintenance, and finally the disposal 
of an asset.  There can be a large degree of linearity by implementing each of these 
components in a serial fashion on a defense program or one could conduct several 
functions in a concurrent fashion in an attempt to move faster.  This process is built 
around the systems engineering process described below, which has also developed in 
a linear fashion. Whether the linear engineering and acquisition process grew up 
around the budget process or the budget process conformed to the engineering and 
acquisition process of the 1960s is an open question, but having these categories 
locked in the budget process makes it difficult to change other processes. 
The current defense acquisition and program management process is outlined 
in a series of DOD Instructions known as the 5000 series. The first is DOD 
instruction 5000.01: The Defense Acquisition System and the second is DOD 
Instruction 5000.02: Operation of the Defense Acquisition System.  Established in 
1970, the 5000 series have been rewritten many times with the latest revision 
occurring in October 2020.  Responsibility for acquisition programs has followed a 
path of centralization of responsibility up until 2016 when it began to be decentralised 
to a degree back to the military services.  
 
Contracting or Public Procurement:  Once a government entity decides through a 
“make or buy” decision that, rather than federal governmental personnel providing a 
solution, it should be contracted out to the private sector, an innovation effort has 
entered the contracting or public procurement regime.  Public procurement or 





Contracting regimes provide the overarching framework underpinned by legal and 
regulatory rules of how the government buys goods and services.  These laws, 
regulations, and policies ultimately determine the nature of the industrial base that 
will support our country’s national defense.    
The contracting regime level is the starting point for the essential rules that a 
private sector firm must master to compete for and win a defense contract.  As such, 
these rules are the determining factors of who will bid on these contracts and how the 
industrial base will evolve to meet the government’s needs.  The terms of a contract 
can determine the level of profits, cash flow, and other incentives that private firms 
must consider before deciding to invest in the defense sector.  If the acquisition rules 
create too high of a barrier to entry, firms will make a rational business judgement to 
steer clear of government contracting, leaving the market to those companies 
choosing to specialize in the arcane rules of the government.  The rules of the 
contracting system have, for the most part, set the framework for whether a private 
sector entity will bid on a defense contract or successfully obtain one. 
Several values can guide the contracting regime, such as competition and 
fairness to ensure that there is an equal opportunity to bid for a contract.  Another 
important factor is ensuring the government is paying a fair and reasonable price, as 
is validating that the government is receiving quality goods and services and value for 
its money.  Factors to implement efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and 
socioeconomic values and goals can be directed in a contract.  Other values important 
to other management regimes, such as mitigating conflict of interest of personnel or 





compliance with policies emanating from those regimes.  To achieve the desired 
benefits from each of these values is an imposition of an implementation cost in either 
time, an increase in price, or forgone opportunity or innovation, by constraining the 
number of vendors who can comply with the regime requirements that to implement 
those values.   
U.S. contracting rules are contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(FAR), the DOD supplement to the FAR known as the DFAR, and various policies, 
executive orders, and agency memoranda.  Congressional direction for defense 
contracting usually occurs in Title VIII of the annual National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA), but also in various appropriations bill and general government 
management laws. 
 
Finance and Accounting:  The finance regime comprises the accounting processes 
required whenever the government spends taxpayer dollars. On the government’s side 
of the contract, the government itself needs to have a financial system to track 
expenditures and revenue.  In addition, the contractor that receives government 
money will also need to have a finance and accounting system to ensure that any 
government payments have been properly spent and accounted for.  The finance 
system in the government could be focused on how outlays and expenditures from 
appropriations bills are managed, or it can be focused on a listing of assets and 
liabilities such as required under the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990.  A 
governmental finance system could also be focused on the actual costs that the 





On the contractor’s side, this accounting can be done in accordance with how 
securities laws or the private market imposes requirements on companies to allocate 
revenues and costs, or the government can require the development of a unique 
financial accounting system enforced by the contracting regime.  The current U.S. 
governmental requirements to conform to the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) is an 
example of a system created to measure the actual cost used to implement a cost-
based reimbursable government contract.  Firms need to look at the incentive 
structure of the governmental finance system to determine if they are capable of 
complying with these requirements before receiving a contract and also the costs of 
such compliance.  Many commercial firms have made a business decision to not bid 
on a government contract that would trigger CAS compliance or, if they do, to create 
a separate business unit with a different accounting system.  Thus, the finance system 
can impact the industrial base but it can also impact time, while waiting for a 
contractor to develop an accounting system that is CAS-compliant before beginning 
work on a contract. 
 
Oversight:  To ensure that management regimes are implemented properly, a system 
of overseers who audit, test, or check on the implementation of these regimes has 
been created over time.  Oversight can be a cooperative exercise conducted with a 
light touch to gain insight and to provide alternative suggestions from experienced 
“old hands.”  It can also be an adversarial and risk-averse process deteriorating into a 
“checking the box” compliance activity that is conducted by individuals with little 





detailed, duplicative micromanagement that diffuses accountability and 
responsibility.  At its best, oversight can be the source of valuable management 
information and ideas that can save the government time, money, or enhance mission 
effectiveness.  The quality of oversight agency personnel as well as the criteria that 
they base their evaluations on are extremely important factors in the impact oversight 
has on innovation efforts.  The criteria used to evaluate compliance (which usually 
exists in other regimes rules) can either enhance or negatively impact time or the 
nature of the industrial base to continue to work on government contracts.  Congress, 
in its responsibility for the oversight of the use of federal funds, relies to a great 
degree on the work of audit entities to support legislation and oversight. 
The GAO, DOD Office of the Inspector General, service audit agencies, 
Defense Contract Audit Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency and 
Director, Office of Test and Evaluation are examples of oversight agencies that help 
regulate the U.S. defense innovation system. 
 
Security:  This regime is the result of being in a national security defense 
environment, but all commercial and other governmental entities will need some sort 
of security component to conduct operations.  The need to secure and ensure that 
adversaries are not stealing or sabotaging one’s defense technology or equipment is 
something that has long been an issue of concern to defense managers.  Several types 
of security systems become important. Data or information is the first level of 
security and a determination needs to be made on what data is needed to be protected 





classifications such as unclassified but sensitive, confidential, secret, top-secret and 
above. It also gives rise to the need for a process to control how such data is stored 
and where discussions or manufacturing using such information can take place.  In 
the physical world, this relates to building security and safes to lock up and store 
paper-based information.  In the cyber world, information systems security standards 
and practices will be needed and required. 
The next system relates to personnel.  Can you trust people and firms to 
access such data?  What is the process to grant and maintain some type of access to 
information or security clearance to show that level of trust?   A third type of security 
system relates to relations between one country and another and whether countries 
can share data and technology, either at a government-to-government level or at the 
industrial level.  This is usually administered through an export control process that 
governs military goods and services and also dual-use technologies and knowledge.  
Finally, security processes regulate investments of foreign entities or individuals who 
could potentially gain access to security data and technology through those 
investments in another country.  Each of these security processes can influence the 
kind of private entity that can bid on defense contracts – but also can add time for 
compliance. 
The U.S. has a security classification and review process administered by the 
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.  Export controls for military items 
are regulated by the State Department under the Arms Export Control Act and 
administered through the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations, for dual-use 





Administration Act now administered under the authority of International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act and the Commerce Control List.  Foreign investment is 
regulated by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States under the 
Defense Production Act (DPA). 
 
Science and Engineering:  This regime relates to the type of engineering process 
that would be used in creating new capabilities, the process of determining 
technology maturity or technology readiness levels, and how scientific and basic 
research supports developing innovative capabilities. If the government mandates the 
use of certain engineering processes, or in the requirements process requires certain 
standards, technology, or specifications, then engineering regimes are very important 
to the success or serve as barriers to innovation.   
Systems engineering process and the adoption of the linear waterfall 
engineering process can impact acquisition and program management regimes time 
parameters.  Agile engineering methods can reduce time, but ultimately time to 
innovation is a science and engineering process.  Mandating a certain engineering 
process will set not only time constraints, but also limit the industrial base. For 
example, a software developer who specializes in agile development may not be 
interested in or prepared to implement the compliance documentation necessary to 
comply with a waterfall software process.   Most of these impacts will be subsumed 
in this analysis under the acquisition and program management regimes but it should 






Personnel: The personnel regime is the framework for obtaining the quality and 
quantity of the workforce that supports the governmental regimes that enable 
innovation.  Issues related to the incentive structure of maintaining engineering talent 
both in the government and private sector are critical in personnel policies.  How to 
acquire the right level of qualified and non-conflicted personnel to meet a government 
need has been a historical challenge.  Governmental personnel rules impact the 
quality of government workers, while how the government chooses to reimburse 
contractors can impact the quality of contracting personnel by, for example, imposing 
a salary limitation on reimbursement for private sector engineers.  
Conflicts of interest from the government or industry in decision-making has 
been a longstanding personnel issue to mitigate. These conflict-of-interest issues 
reach into aspects of civil service reform, the unionization of the federal or private 
workforce, the backgrounds of political appointees, and the oversight of defense 
contractors that can be enforced through the contracting regime.  Organizational 
conflict of interest rules have been developed to address potential conflicts from those 
individuals and entities that advise the government.  Ethics rules have also been 
created in statute, such as the Procurement Integrity Act, and in regulations to address 
conflicts of interests or appearances of conflicts of interest when managing or 
executing a contract. 
 
Maintenance and Logistics: Whenever a government develops or buys a capital 
asset it will be expected to maintain that asset. How it chooses to do so and what 





government may choose to conduct maintenance itself in a centralized government-
owned facility or it may rely on contractors.  Policies vary for certain types of 
maintenance, such as the difference between major overhauls or depot maintenance 
and preventative or operational maintenance.   
When the government wishes to maintain a system, it may need a process or 
system of technical data rights from a contractor, enforceable by the contracting 
regime, to ensure it has the knowledge to maintain the system. If it relies on 
contractors for maintenance, the government needs to determine whether it wants to 
have only the original contractor that built the item also maintain the system or – if 
the government owns the data rights – give that data to other contractors to compete 
for the right to maintain that system.  The maintenance regime primarily places 
limitations on private sector calculations on downstream profits and revenues that 
impact decisions on whether to enter the market or not.  How long the government 
plans to keep an asset will impact the time and innovation cycle of future upgrades or 
new technologies. There is little incentive to create a new disruptive system if plans 
call to keep an asset and maintain it for 50 years.  The industrial base, both private 
and governmental, adjusts to that eventuality and even an increase in threat level may 
not be enough to generate new innovation to replace legacy systems.  The 
maintenance of U.S. systems by law is evenly split between public sector and private 
sector performance and there is a requirement for the public sector to have a “core” 






Information Management:  This regime regulates how information and data is used, 
shared, and stored.  Information management systems support other management 
regimes and operational systems.  How information will be used and secured is 
important in determining underlying requirements.  Unique information technology 
standards will increase compliance costs that could impact company participation in 
the industrial base and time.  Many of the information standards that will influence 
whether companies participate in defense innovation are implemented and enforced 
through the contracting regime, but established through the security regime.   
Complexity and any information standards differences from the commercial market 
will require unique governmental processes and create time and compliance issues.   
Late adoption of commercial standards and products could negatively impact 
innovation.  Information management was once centralized at the Office of 
Management and Budget and the General Services Administration.  This was 
decentralized at least for procurement purposes back to DOD in the Clinger-Cohen 
Act of 1996. 
 
Operations:  There is often a disconnect between those that actually use whatever 
capability is created out of the defense innovation system. Operators are often the last 
to know about what is happening in an acquisition program after the setting of the 
initial requirement.  The operations regime, other management regimes responsible 
for overseeing innovation, and the industrial base should be working together if 
innovation is going to effectively support defense operators. Without a feedback loop 





major issue in the success or failure of defense innovation system. A problem in 
regime management is the concept of “stove-piping”, in which each regime operates 
to maximize its own benefits to the exclusion of all other regimes.  In the absence of a 
feedback loop from the operators and users of a system, there is a risk that 
management regimes will self-optimize and deliver something of marginal or very 
little use to the operators – in a time period that is irrelevant to effective use.  Time to 
deployment and the quality of innovation are important to the operators, but if the 
end-product is not useful or inadequate, the benefits of whatever value the other 
management regimes are achieving becomes questionable.   
 
Organizational:  Finally, as issues with the role of operators illustrate, how all of the 
management regime pieces fit together organizationally to execute and oversee 
defense innovation is a critical component. The various authorities, power, and 
degrees of autonomy of actors within each of the regimes can determine which 
regime dominates, or whether the system degenerates into an inefficient balance of 
power structure that is created between the various regimes.  Stove-piping of 
authorities and whether processes are concurrent or linear can be influential as well as 
the process for solving conflicts between management regimes.  Coordination 
between regimes impacts innovation time, but the process of coordination can lead to 
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